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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the current study was to determine to what extent development of the 
nonfarm sector stimulates crop production and agricultural employment in India's semi-arid 
tropics (SAT). Two characteristics of India's SAT agriculture formed the basis for the study: 
i) that the major agricultural producers, smallholders, earn a significant part of their income 
outside their own farm, especially in the daily labour market; and ii) that crop production risk 
is high. As the farmers are risk averse and they have limited options to smooth consumption 
through changes in assets and liabilities, they try to stabilise income. This could result in the 
choice of crop production technologies that render relatively stable, but low yields. On the 
other hand, off-farm income may provide an alternative for stabilising income and ensure 
minimum consumption in all years. Hence, because they can earn off-farm income, farm 
households may be willing and able to increase crop incomes, even if this involves higher 
crop income variability from year to year. 
The study shows that the labour market is extremely important in preventing farm 
households in India's SAT from experiencing very low incomes. Households actively adapt 
family labour supply to production risk. Much more important for income stability, however, 
is the flow of labour income that households earn independent of their risk preferences. As 
expected, production risk affects not only farm-household labour supply, but also the use of 
the major inputs in crop production: male and female labour and fertiliser use. Depending on 
the specific input and the production environment, risk appears to increase or decrease the 
use of a specific input. 
The above suggests that the household labour endowment will affect crop input use 
and income from crop production. The first is true, given that there is sufficient year-round 
off-farm employment and not just employment during the agricultural growing season. In this 
case, households with a larger labour endowment feel less need to adapt the use of crop 
labour and fertilisers to production risk. However, these small changes in input use hardly 
seem to affect the magnitude and stability of crop income: the estimated input elasticities of 
the mean and variability of crop yields are low. Surprisingly, the household labour 
endowment thus has little effect on crop income. 
Actual labour income may, however, still have a significant impact on net crop 
income: some farmers work longer hours than others do. Moreover, income from minor 
sources of off-farm employment, like nonfarm self-employment, may also affect net crop 
ii 
income. Empirical estimates show that the size and nature of the effect of off-farm income on 
net crop income depends on the characteristics of the income flow. Activities that require 
labour simultaneous to crop production and that have low returns on labour decrease net crop 
income. If the returns on the off-farm activity are certain and high relative to the casual farm 
wage, households will, however, simply substitute hired labour or capital for family labour. 
Moreover, they will use part of the off-farm income to intensify crop production. Finally, if 
the nonfarm activity becomes the main source of interest of the farm household, income from 
this activity will no longer affect crop production. 
iii 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Statement of the problem 
Parts of Indian agriculture have been influenced by the Green Revolution over the past three 
decades. High-yielding varieties have been introduced, combined with the timely use of 
inputs such as fertiliser and irrigation. However, the increases in output have not been spread 
evenly over the country. Among the main beneficiaries are larger landholders in the irrigated 
Indo-Gangetic Plain. Although more than 70% of Indian cropland is cultivated under dryland 
conditions, irrigated agriculture has commanded the lion's share of agricultural research 
resources (Walker and Ryan, 1990). Consequently, the Green Revolution has largely 
bypassed areas with limited opportunities for irrigation, like the semi-arid tropics (SAT). The 
result is that SAT agricultural productivity is stagnating. 
Nonetheless, SAT agriculture provides a livelihood for more than 250 million people, 
either as cultivator households or as landless labourers (Walker and Ryan, 1990). Most of 
these people are very poor, and their number is ever increasing: population growth averaged 
1.8% for 1990-97 (EIU, 1998). The nonprimary sectors currently support only 30% of the 
Indian population, and growth is not fast enough to increase this percentage rapidly. 
Moreover, high-growth industry is concentrated in three main areas: around Mumbai; around 
Delhi; and the corridor from Bangalore to Chennai (EIU, 1998). Consequently, agriculture 
has to absorb the bulk of population growth in most parts of India, and continuous efforts are 
needed to stimulate agricultural development. As Ashok Gulati from the International Food 
Policy Research Institute puts it according to the Economist (2001): 'Agriculture has become 
a parking space for the poor. The was out of poverty is faster agricultural growth, which 
would raise farmers' incomes and increase the demand for locally produced goods and 
services, drawing labour away from farming.' 
The main determinant of agricultural production in India's SAT is the high variability 
of rainfall. The resulting yield uncertainty is the major source of income risk for farm 
households: at the start of the growing season, farmers can predict harvest prices in a nearby 
market much more accurately than they can predict yields in their own fields (Walker and 
Ryan, 1990). The households' capacity to smooth consumption is limited (Townsend, 1994). 
Consequently, households try to limit exposure to income shocks that can be handled with the 
means available (Morduch, 1995). One way to do so is to select secure production 
techniques, but this usually implies a low average crop income. 
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Risk affects agricultural production not only directly, but also indirectly through its 
effect on financial markets. Uncertainty causes informational asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders: the lender cannot control the activities of the borrower. In reaction, 
lenders demand collateral and ration credit (e.g., Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). The covariate character of agricultural risk further decreases the efficiency of rural 
credit markets. Empirical evidence on credit constraints in India's SAT is mixed. Farmers 
have very little access to long-term credit, while short-term credit is widely, but maybe not 
sufficiently, available. Risk may not only decrease the supply of credit, but also the demand 
for credit: prudent consumers may be reluctant to borrow (Deaton, 1997). 
Farmers in developing countries do not depend on agricultural production alone for 
their Uvelihood. Smallholders acquire a significant part of their income outside their own 
farm (e.g., Reardon (1997) for 17 African countries, and Ruben and Van den Berg (2001) for 
Honduras). This is no different for India's SAT, where only large-farm households rely 
mainly on agricultural income. For both landless and small-farm households, wage income 
from the daily labour market is the largest single income source (Townsend, 1994). Other, 
less important, off-farm income sources are the long-term labour market, nonfarm self-
employment, and remittances. 
Off-farm income may have a strong impact on the agricultural production decisions of 
households facing risk and credit constraints. It is an important source of cash income, which 
can improve farm productivity if it is used to finance farm-input purchase or longer-term 
capital investments. Moreover, off-farm income may help reduce the variance of overall 
household income and improve food security by allowing the household to buy food in cases 
of yield shortfalls (Reardon, 1997). Households may then be able to increase the riskiness and 
profitability of their agricultural activities. 
Investment of off-farm income in agriculture is, however, by no means automatic. 
Beyond the relative profitability and riskiness of agriculture, at least two sets of variables 
affect the investment decision. The first is the nature of the capital market: nonfarm income 
may serve either as a substitute or as collateral for credit. The second is the characteristics of 
the nonfarm income flow. This includes the timing as well as the interhousehold distribution 
(Reardon et al, 1994). 
These issues have received only limited empirical scrutiny. Previous research shows 
that wage income is actively used to manage risk in India's SAT (e.g., Kanwar, 1991; 
Kochar, 1995). Little attention has, however, been paid to the production and investment 
effects of labour income. Off-farm income is sometimes included as an explanatory variable 
Introduction 3 
in regressions of the decisions of farm households (Kelly, 1988; Savadogo et al, 1994; 
Woldehanna, 2000). However, this does not shed light on the workings of the underlying 
decisions and constraints. Off-farm income is not exogenous to the household, but an integral 
part of a decision-making process in which the household considers relative profitabilities, 
risk management, and liquidity (De Janvry, 1994; Reardon et al, 1992). Only by considering 
farm-household decisions within this context can we reveal the exact impact of off-farm 
income on agriculture in specific circumstances. 
The present study unravels the interactions between off-farm income and agricultural 
production in a high-risk environment with strongly seasonal production activities. It focuses 
on short-run production decisions alone and ignores the potential relation between off-farm 
income and on-farm investment, which is considered by, e.g., Savadogo et al (1994) and 
Reardon et al (1994). An analytical model was developed that reveals the underlying decision 
processes of family labour supply and crop input use. Empirical estimates were used to test 
the relevance of the model and the impact of the different options and constraints in two 
villages in India's SAT. Moreover, the study indicates the impact of off-farm income from 
different sources on income from crop production. The results provide food for policy 
recommendations: if well-functioning labour markets and nonfarm self-employment allow 
households to increase agricultural production and profits, labour market and nonfarm 
development policies can be considered as possible stimulants of agricultural development. 
1.2. Research questions 
Farm household theory states that household production decisions are independent of their 
consumptive preferences when all markets are perfect and there are no transaction costs. The 
use of labour in crop production is in this case independent of the household's labour 
endowment (Singh et al, 1986a). However, if labour is not actively traded in the market, 
households with a larger labour/land ratio will use more labour-intensive technologies than 
other households do (Benjamin, 1992). 
Even when labour markets are perfect, imperfections in other markets will cause the 
labour endowment to affect crop technology choice. Households facing risk and credit 
constraints may use labour income to alleviate both. Cropping-season wages may serve as a 
consumption floor and as a substitute for credit. Moreover, households can increase their 
engagement in off-farm activities when yields turn out to be low. Hence, we may expect that 
the household labour endowment will play an important role in the agricultural decisions of 
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farm households in India's SAT, even though, or, on closer inspection, just because, labour 
markets function well in this area. 
Insight into the relation between wage employment and crop production is important 
as it may reveal the possible use of (nonfarm) labour market policies for stimulating 
agricultural development. Although well-functioning rural labour markets are important 
characteristics of India's SAT, there is significant dry season unemployment. Unemployment 
rates vary considerably across regions. The data used in the present study comes from two 
villages with different labour market conditions: Aurepalle and Kanzara. In contrast to 
Kanzara, employment possibilities are limited in the dry season in Aurepalle. This restricts 
the use of the labour market for risk management in the latter village, and allows detection of 
the impact of dry-season employment on cropping season decisions. Moreover, the behaviour 
of the households studied, especially those in Kanzara, shows some of the (indirect) benefits 
of employment programmes in areas with relatively short cropping seasons and a significant 
dry-season labour surplus. 
In the current study, an analysis was made of how households cope with risk and 
possible credit constraints, and how they use off-farm employment possibilities in this 
respect. Therefore, the various chapters deal with the impact of off-farm employment 
possibilities on the demand for labour and fertilisers in crop production and on per capita 
household income. For farm households, the ultimate outcome of their decisions regarding 
resource allocation is household income, either in cash or in kind. Off-farm employment 
possibilities, of course, increase household welfare by offering an additional source of 
income. Moreover, such possibilities can increase the households' capacity to maximise crop 
profits in the presence of risk, as argued above. The size of the total effect of off-farm 
employment on farm-household income is yet unclear. 
Farm income is, however, not the only outcome of production decisions: the demand 
for inputs directly affects the village economy. Smallholders' labour demand provides the 
bulk of employment in India's SAT. Unless employment growth keeps pace with population 
growth, the number of people living in poverty will increase significantly in the coming 
years. In addition, fertiliser use is important for sustainabiUty. Currently, many SAT farmers 
mine their soils (Randhawa and Abrol, 1990). As the availability of manure is limited 
(Walker and Ryan, 1990), enhancing fertiliser use is required to counter the process of soil 
mining. 
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Summarising, in the current study, an analysis is made of the impact of family labour 
on crop production when yield risk is high and credit markets are imperfect. The following 
issues were given special attention: 
- How do risk and credit constraints affect farm-household labour supply? 
- How do risk, credit constraints, and the family labour endowment affect the use of the 
major crop inputs: labour and fertilisers? 
- How do risk, credit constraints, and the family labour endowment affect crop profits and 
per capita household income? 
- What is the specific impact of the different sources of off-farm income on net crop 
income? 
1.3. Outline of the study 
Despite imperfections in risk and credit markets, farm households in India's SAT operate in 
an environment with well-functioning labour markets. This market environment is discussed 
in depth in Chapter 2, which introduces the two study villages and the survey households. 
This specific market environment and some methodological considerations form the basis of 
the approach followed in the rest of the study. 
Chapter 3 presents the basic model used: a two-stage farm-household model 
covering a single agricultural year. In the planting stage, yields are uncertain and the 
household decides on current-period family labour supply and crop labour use. Credit 
constraints may limit household decisions. In the harvesting stage, the standing crop is 
harvested, and the household allocates labour under certainty. The model reveals, how 
households can use family labour to mitigate the effects of yield risk and short-term credit 
constraints. Households can work long hours in the planting stage to secure sufficient 
liquidity and to guarantee a certain amount of income (ex ante risk management). Moreover, 
they can increase their harvest-stage workload when yields turn out to be low (ex post risk 
coping). Empirical estimates confirm the active use of family labour for risk management, 
but they do not demonstrate the presence of short-term credit constraints. The empirical 
analysis introduces a risk measure from the production literature into a model of farm-
household behaviour. Past household studies used time series of income or production to 
estimate risk (e.g., Saha, 1994, Kanwar, 1991). These measures do not accurately measure 
risk as perceived by the farm household, which has more than just historical information at 
the start of the cropping season. The measure used in the current study includes as much of 
this information as possible. 
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The implications of family labour as a risk management tool for farm input use are 
considered in the next two chapters. Chapter 4 focuses on labour use decisions, examining 
the determinants of labour use within the context of the model presented in Chapter 3. Since 
both crop labour use and the family labour endowment affect income risk, the size of the 
family labour endowment may have a strong impact on agricultural labour use. This is 
important at the aggregate level, since agricultural employment is the major income source of 
the rural poor. To prevent an increase in poverty, employment growth should keep pace with 
population growth. In addition, seasonal employment fluctuations may have serious effects 
on household welfare. Consequently, India and other countries such as Pakistan and 
Bangladesh have adopted public-works programmes to provide employment during the slack 
season. The model indicates that these programmes will affect the capacity of smallholders to 
manage production risk and, therefore, their decisions on the use of labour in crop 
production. In other words, public-works programmes will affect agricultural employment. 
The empirical estimates confirm this hypothesis. The availability of year-round off-farm 
employment allowed the survey households to use family labour for risk management, which 
decreased the need to use crop labour for managing production risk. Planting-stage 
employment alone was not enough to produce this effect. Depending on crop technology and 
the biophysical environment, the availability of dry-season employment can imply an 
increase as well as a decrease in the use of labour. Moreover, wage income is likely to 
increase the availability of liquid assets at the beginning of the cropping season. As prudent 
households are hesitant to borrow, an increase in liquidity implies a rise in the use of crop 
labour. 
Smallholders' fertiliser use is dealth with in Chapter 5. Agricultural production is 
only sustainable if farmers replace the nutrients that are extracted through the cultivation 
process. This is not the case in the study area. Fertiliser use is low and many farmers do not 
use fertilisers at all. Although more and more farmers are applying inorganic fertilisers on 
their dryland crops, fertiliser use is still too low to prevent soil nutrient mining (Randhawa 
and Abrol, 1990). Manure is a not an alternative. The amount of fodder available limits the 
number of livestock that farmers can keep, and high transportation costs impede the purchase 
of manure in the market (Walker and Ryan, 1990). Accordingly, a significant increase in the 
use of organic fertilisers is not feasible in the medium run, and boosting fertiliser use must be 
part of a strategy to counter the process of soil mining. Empirical estimates for the two study 
villages reveal that farmers increased fertiliser use in response to risk. The introduction of 
alternative methods of risk management will, therefore, lead to a decrease of fertiliser use. 
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Consequently, public-works programmes, although valuable, cannot be used to promote 
smallholder fertiliser use. 
In Chapter 6, the estimates from Chapters 3-5 are used to simulate household 
behaviour with respect to crop production and labour supply. The results indicate that ex ante 
risk management and ex post income smoothing through family labour supply were effective 
risk strategies. Their main result was an increase in minimum income. Much more important 
for income stability was, however, the stable flow of labour income that households earned 
independent of their risk preferences. Moreover, the simulations show that the impact of 
changes in input use on household income was limited. As the estimated input elasticities of 
mean output were low, a change in input use translated into a much smaller change in output. 
The input elasticities of output variance were also moderate. Hence, although the family 
labour endowment significantly affected input use in one of the two study villages, its effects 
on the simulated level and variability of crop income were small. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, the possible impact of stochastic harvest wage rates is 
discussed. Production risk may lead to uncertainty of harvest-stage wage rates, as village 
labour markets are insular and crop production provides the bulk of employment. If yields are 
highly covariate, farm households will face low crop income and low harvest wage rates at 
the same time. If this were the case in the study villages, the simulations would overestimate 
the stabilising impact of family labour. Simulations of labour market equilibria at different 
yield shocks, however, reveal that harvest wage rates were quite predictable and largely 
independent of the yield shock. Accounting for the stochastic nature of wage rates did, 
therefore, hardly affect the results of the simulations of household behaviour. 
In Chapter 7, the specific impact of various sources of off-farm income on net crop 
income is examined. This chapter, therefore, takes a somewhat different perspective than the 
previous chapters and deviates from the formal model presented in Chapter 3. Farm 
households are still considered utility maximising units, but they can now choose between a 
number of farm and off-farm activities. Besides crop production, the analysis considers six 
income-generating activities: casual farm employment, casual nonfarm employment, regular 
employment, nonfarm self-employment, livestock production, and transfers. These six 
activities differ with respect to timing, profitability, and access barriers, and may therefore 
have a different impact on crop production. A regression of net crop income on agricultural 
resources and the various noncrop incomes confirms the diversity of the effects of different 
noncrop income sources. It appears that income from off-farm activities stimulates crop 
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income as long as the activity is relatively profitable but does not become the main interest of 
the farm household. 
The findings reported in the previous chapters are combined in Chapter 8. Together, 
they give a comprehensive picture of the role of labour endowment and off-farm income in 
rural development in India's SAT. This picture demonstrates how labour market interventions 
can stimulate agricultural and rural development. Moreover, the chapter puts the findings of 
the study into the perspective of development theory. 
The study provides several contributions to the literature. First, it presents a 
framework for studying the use of family labour for ex ante risk management as well as ex 
post income smoothing. The empirical measures utilised are more precise than the risk 
measures used in previous studies. Previous research considers ex ante risk management and 
ex post risk coping separately, but not as a joint strategy. Joint evaluation of the use and 
impact of the two strategies suggests that ignoring the ex ante strategy and, to a smaller 
extent, the ex post strategy, does not much affect the results of studies on farm-household 
behaviour in India's SAT. The latter strategy significantly decreased the impact of yield 
shocks on total household income. Paradoxically, this affected the use of inputs in crop 
production, but not the magnitude and variability of crop income. 
Second, the current study distinguishes empirically between the impact of risk and 
credit constraints on crop input use. It shows that short-term credit constraints did not affect 
household behaviour, while production risk involved adaptations in the level of labour and 
fertilisers used. Again, these adaptations appear to have had a negligible impact on both the 
variability and magnitude of crop income. 
Finally, the study looks into the direct effects of various sources of off-farm income 
on income from crop production. Off-farm income sources differ with respect to capital 
requirements, timing, and risk, and may, therefore, affect crop income differently. Although 
the literature recognises the importance of the nature of the off-farm income stream, these 
aspects have received little empirical scrutiny. 
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2. STUDY VILLAGES AND METHODOLOGY 
This study uses data from two villages in India's SAT which were collected by resident investigators 
of ICRISAT during the period 1975-1984. The villages represent two distinct agro-ecological zones. 
Aurepalle is located in the drought-prone district of Mahbubnagar, while Kanzara is situated in 
rainfall-assured Akola. Both the average productivity and the stability of yields were lower in 
Aurepalle than in Kanzara. The Kanzara labour market was buoyant owing to the favourable 
production environment and the presence of a public-works scheme. In Aurepalle, labour markets 
were competitive during the cropping season, but there was high unemployment during the dry 
season. Farm households in both villages were plagued by production risk and had limited capacity 
to smooth consumption from year to year. The basic methodology used for analysing these data was 
farm-household modelling. 
2.1. Indian development and SAT agriculture1 
Between 1956 and 1990, India followed a strategy of industry-led development based on the 
Soviet experience. In the early fifties, Indian agriculture was already suffering from heavy 
population pressure on land. Labour productivity was much higher in manufacturing than in 
agriculture, and the income elasticity of demand for industrial goods exceeded that for 
agricultural products. The idea was that rapid industrialisation and expansion of markets 
would boost trade and commerce, transportation, banking and finance, etc. The government 
focussed policies on heavy industries producing basic machines and metals. The idea was that 
these industries would help the economy to build up a large volume of capital stock at a 
relatively fast rate. In order to achieve self-reliance, the government opted for a protectionist 
path and encouraged import-substitution. 
Although real per capita income doubled between 1950 and 1990, this did not lead to 
the elimination of poverty. Between 1974 and 1990, the number of people living in poverty 
declined at an annual rate of 2.7 % in the rural sector and 2.2 % in the urban sector. 
Nevertheless, in the early nineties, over one third of all Indians still lived below the poverty 
line. The absolute number of poor increased, and income and wealth became increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of the propertied class. 
In 1991, the government introduced a new development strategy emphasising 
privatisation and liberalisation. Most policy measures were directed at the corporate sector, 
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which accounted for only 10% of GDP. The new policies boosted GDP growth, but there has 
been debate about their impact on poverty. Influential scholars argued that there was a 
slowdown in the rate of poverty reduction, as the expected automatic transmission of the 
benefits of production growth to the poor did not materialise. They contended that the link 
between growth, employment, and poverty reduction depends crucially upon the pattern of 
growth. This pattern concerns the economic sectors in which growth takes place and the 
degree to which the disadvantaged segments of the population and the backward regions of 
the country are successfully integrated into the wider growth process. This point of view is 
controversial, but has significantly influenced Indian politics. 
Since 1996, special consideration has been given to agriculture. Although the share of 
agriculture in GDP decreased from 53% in 1960-61 to a mere 26% in 1997-98, agriculture 
remains the backbone of the Indian economy. Agricultural commodities amount to 50% of 
exports, while manufactured goods with a substantial agricultural content contribute another 
20%. Moreover, around 65% of the total workforce is employed in agriculture. However 
rapidly new industries develop, they will not be able to provide adequate employment for the 
ever-growing population in India. Increased employment will, therefore, also have to be 
found in agriculture or in rural industries. 
The growth rate in agricultural production has been highly skewed in terms of 
geographic areas and crops. Regions that are well endowed with resources (like Punjab, 
Haryana, and Western UP) have benefited much from the use of modern green revolution 
technology, while other regions have remained backward and underdeveloped. Reduction of 
regional disparities requires giving special attention to these areas. 
The large dryland areas of India's SAT form an important part of the country that has 
been largely bypassed by the green revolution. The SAT are those tropical regions where 
rainfall exceeds potential évapotranspiration in four to six month of the year. Mean annual 
rainfall ranges from about 400 to 1,200 mm. India's SAT includes much of the peninsula (see 
Figure 2.1). The salient agricultural characteristics of the SAT are rainfall uncertainty, 
synchronic timing of operations, and covariate production risk. Nevertheless, India's SAT are 
vast and the production environment is diverse. Soils are heterogeneous, and the rainfall 
regime differs between various regions and districts. Cereal production performance varied 
considerably from district to district within the dryland SAT states, but generally lagged far 
behind what had been obtained in the irrigated Northwest. 
1 This section is based on Datt and Sundaharan (2000). 
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The remainder of this chapter elaborates on the setting of the study and the 
methodology used. Section 2.2 introduces the ICRISAT village-level studies, part of which is 
used in the present study. Section 2.3 presents the main characteristics of the survey 
households, while section 2.4 elaborates on the village environment in which these 
households operate. Finally, section 2.5 introduces the theoretical framework used: farm-
household modelling. Special attention is paid to methods to estimate farm-household 
models. 
2.2. The ICRISAT village-level survey2 
2.2.1. Selection of the study villages 
In 1975, the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) 
initiated the now influential village-level studies on backward SAT agriculture. ICRISAT 
selected three contrasting dryland regions, based on cropping systems, soil conditions, and 
climatic criteria. Within each region, ICRISAT chose a representative district, and within 
each district, they selected two typical villages for in-depth investigations. In selecting the 
villages, ICRISAT kept in mind the specific characteristics conditioning district selection and 
took care that the villages were not located near larger towns or on paved roads. Villages with 
special government programmes or direct outside resources, such as those where private 
voluntary organisations were active, were also not considered. About the representativeness 
of the selected villages, Walker and Ryan (1990) state: 
We believe that some of the findings reflect what is happening nationally, most apply to the study 
regions, while a minority are unique to the villages. 
The regions selected were the Telengana region in Andhra Pradesh, the Bombay 
Deccan in Maharashtra, and the Vidarbha region also in Maharashtra. Districts representative 
of those regions included Mahbubnagar in the Telengana region, Sholapur on the Bombay 
Deccan, and Akola in the Vidarbha region (see Figure 2.1). The main agricultural 
characteristics of these regions are given in Table 2.1. 
2 Unless stated otherwise, the information in this section comes from Walker and Ryan (1990). 
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Table 2.1. Soil, rainfall and crop characteristics of the ICRISAT study regions 
Mahbubnagar Sholapur Akola 
soils Red soils (alfisols); low Deep black heavy clay Medium deep black clay 
water-retention capacity soils (vertisols); high soils (inceptisols/'medium-
water-retention capacity deep vertisols'); medium 
water-retention capacity 
rainfall" Unassured, 630 mm, 31% Unassured, 630 mm, 22% Assured, 890 mm, 22% 
CV CV CV 
major Kharif, or rainy season, Rabi, or post-rainy season, Cotton, sorghum, mung 
crops sorghum, castor, pearl sorghum, pigeon pea, bean, pigeon pea, wheat 
millet, paddy, pigeon pea, minor pulses 
groundnut 
Note: a The mean rainfall estimates and their coefficients of variation (CVs) in percent refer to ten 
annual observations collected in one study village in each region from 1975/76-1984/85. 
Source: Walker and Ryan (1990) 
Semi-arid tropical boundary H Akola and neighboring 3 dis-
tricts (medium-deep Vertisols, 
• Capital annual average rainfall of 817 
A Neighboring state capitals m m ' 
• District headquarters Scale: 127000000 
Source: Walker and Ryan, 2000 
Figure 2.1. India's SAT and the survey districts 
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The districts span much of the diverse growth experience in cereal production within 
India's dryland SAT. In the rainfall-assured but little irrigated Akola region, growth was 
relatively high (3.5%) and easily outpaced population growth; in the more heavily irrigated 
but rainfall-unassured Mahbubnagar district, cereal production growth was just high enough 
to compensate population growth (1.5%); and in the drought-prone Sholapur region, cereal 
production has stagnated (0.3%). 
Data collection started in 1975 among 40 sample households in two villages in each 
district. In 1978, data collection was stopped in one village per district, mainly because of 
similarity between two nearby villages. In the remaining three 'continuous' villages, data 
collection continued until 1984. 
Data from only two of the continuous villages, Aurepalle in Mahbubnagar and 
Kanzara in Akola, were used in the present study. There were two main reasons to exclude 
the third village, Shirapur in Sholapur district. Most important, data on family labour 
allocation, which are essential for this study, are incomplete for Shirapur (Townsend, 1994). 
Moreover, the potential for agricultural development of the region is very limited. Rabi (or 
post-rainy season) sorghum is grown on 42% of the gross cultivated area. Farmers use this 
traditional cropping system to cope with the high uncertainty of the onset of the southwest 
monsoon. They store rainfall in their soils during the rainy season and cultivate sorghum 
under a regime of receding soil moisture during the post-rainy reason. Alternatives that are 
more profitable are not available. 
2.2.2. Data 
ICRISAT drew a sample of 10 landless and 30 cultivator households in each study village. In 
the present study, only the data for the cultivator households, which were defined as those 
operating more than half an acre (0.2 ha), were used. ICRISAT stratified the cultivator 
households in each village according to operated farm size into three equally numerous 
groups (see Table 2.2). They drew a random sample of ten households from each tercile. 
Over time, households left the sample and switched between the landless and the cultivator 
groups. New households from the same (original) landholding class replaced the households 
that were dropped from the sample. 
Table 2.2. Farmsize groups in the study villages: landholding terciles in 1975 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
small 0.2-1.2 0.2-1.8 
medium 1.2-3.2 1.8-5.3 
large >3.2 >5.3 
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Annually, the resident investigators updated information on the composition of the 
household, land use, credit and debt, stocks, livestock, implements and machinery, and farm 
buildings. As in most studies, the data on credit is limited: the data files contain only 
information on credit use, not on demand (Singh et al, 1985). On the other hand, land use 
data is very extensive. For each plot, data was collected on various soil characteristics (e.g. 
type, depth), irrigation status, and the (combination of) crop(s) cultivated. 
With three-to-four-week intervals, resident investigators collected data on household 
transactions, family labour and draught power utilisation, and crop cultivation. Crop 
cultivation data cover detailed data on the amount and type of inputs used. Labour use was 
classified into four main categories: family male, family female, hired male and hired female 
labour. Besides the category, the activity is specified: e.g., weeding, harvesting or ploughing. 
The type of fertiliser was registered, so that the content of nitrogen, phosphorus and 
potassium can be calculated. 
Detailed data on family-labour allocation were collected only during the second half 
of the survey. For 1975-1978, the researchers collected day-before-interview recall data, not 
time aggregates. Since 1979, however, the data files contain information about wage 
earnings, individual labour supply to own farm production, casual and regular wage 
employment, and involuntary unemployment. The current study, therefore, uses the entire 
sample for estimation whenever possible, and the years 1979-1984 whenever labour supply 
data are needed. 
Not all data are equally reliable and consistent. Consumption data are noisy, as not all 
consumption categories were collected in all years (Townsend, 1994). Moreover, data on the 
use and supply of family labour was collected in multiple schedules. First, the plot cultivation 
schedule (SP) provides information on family labour used per crop activity. Second, the 
labour utilisation schedule (SL) provides information on the supply of family labour supply 
to own production and to three types of casual markets. Finally, the household transaction 
schedule (ST) provides information about the supply of family labour to the casual and the 
regular labour market. The information of these various schedules is not always consistent. 
Family labour used in the different production activities (SP) does not sum up to total family 
labour supplied to their own farm (SL). Moreover, the supply of labour to the different casual 
labour markets (SL) does not sum up to total casual labour supply (ST). For the current study, 
the data from the most detailed records, i.e., data on own-farm family labour from the plot 
cultivation schedule and data on casual labour supply from the labour utilisation schedule, are 
used. 
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2.3. The survey households 
2.3.1. Population profile 
The study villages are small: in 1975,476 households lived in Aurepalle and 169 in Kanzara. 
Although fertility declined, the population was still growing by the end of the 1980s. Natural 
growth was the main source of change in the number of village inhabitants. The bulk of 
migration was comprised of the wife moving to the husband's village, often from a nearby 
village. Moreover, every year a few households, usually landless labourers, settled in 
Kanzara. 
Most of the village households are caste Hindus. In each village, one can find many 
separate caste affiliations. The dominant castes are traditionally farmers: the Reddis in 
Aurepalle and the Malis and Maharathas in Kanzara. Somewhat lower on the hierarchical 
ladder are families belonging to the different service castes who are employed as herder, 
carpenters, blacksmiths, barbers, water carriers, washermen, goldsmiths, etc. They often 
engage in agriculture beside their traditional caste activity. Harijans, or former untouchables, 
make up 10 to 25 percent of the village population. Many of them belong to the group of 
landless labourers. The caste hierarchy is not static: some castes perceive themselves in 
ascendancy and others in decline. 
Although caste strongly affects many aspects of village life, its effects are often 
overshadowed by other considerations (Binswanger and Singh, 1988): 
Lower caste (adjusted for parental education) leads to lower education, indicating either poor 
access of low caste individuals to the education system or poorer commitment to education. 
Similarly, caste sharply affects how much inheritance an individual receives. In sharp contrast, 
however, once a person has been given his or her endowment in terms of inheritance and 
schooling, caste does not strongly affect their individual performance, i.e. caste and ability do not 
seem to be correlated. Nor does it appear that an individual's performance in the private economy 
of the villages is constrained by caste. 
During the survey, over 95% of the village households relied heavily on agriculture, 
either as cultivators or as landless labourers. The remaining few percent were full-time 
village artisans, shopkeepers, and traders. About one third of the agricultural households were 
labour households. Labourers comprised, however, only about one quarter of the agricultural 
population because their mean family size was less than that of cultivator households. 
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About one-half of the sample households were nuclear; four-tenths were stem, in 
which one or both parents reside with their son's family; and one-tenth were joint-stem, in 
which parents reside with more than one married son. The incidence of extended families did 
not differ much between the villages, but increased gradually as the sample aged over the 
research period. This supports the view that 'jointness' is primarily determined by the 
lifecycle. 
The vast majority of village households were very poor, even compared to all-India 
averages. Annual median income per capita was Rs 400 in Aurepalle as compared to Rs 700 
in Kanzara over the study period (1975 prices). This was equivalent to around US$50 and 
US$85. Based on a poverty line of a monthly per capita expenditure of Rs 15 in 1960/61 
prices, about three fourths of the households fell below the poverty line. The parity in average 
income between the landless labour and the cultivator group is striking. Only the highest 
tercile of landholders enjoyed significantly higher per person income compared to the rest of 
the village. Nevertheless, even some households with large landholdings fell below the 
poverty line from 1976/77 to 1981/82. 
Many village households saw their prosperity increase during the period of analysis 
from 1975/76 to 1983/84. The poorer households in the mid-1970s experienced as much or 
more growth in real per capita income as the richer households. Holdings of consumer 
durables and financial assets increased. However, although many households moved up and 
down in the village income profile over time, income inequality remained about the same in 
both villages. 
2.3.2. Income composition 
The survey households earned income from various sources: crop production, livestock, wage 
employment, self-employment, and transfers (see Table 2.3). In both villages, crop 
production and wage employment were by far the most important sources of income: large 
farmers generally earned most of their income with crop production, while small farmers 
depended largely on wage income. Most households derived some income from the sale of 
livestock, especially goats. Except for shepherd households, livestock production was, 
however, less important than crop or labour income. Income from nonagricultural self-
employment did not figure heavily in household income for the vast majority of households, 
with the exception of some toddy (palmwine) tappers in Aurepalle. 
Income variability was substantial, especially in drought-prone Aurepalle, where the 
average coefficient of variation of household income was somewhat over 40% (see Table 
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2.3). Income transfers were of only minor importance for the study households. These 
transfers had little effect on total income stability. Nevertheless, household income was 
considerably less volatile than farm income. This implies that off-farm income stabilised total 
household income, despite the high coefficients of variation for the individual income 
sources. 
Table 2.3. Income composition and variability (1975-1984) 
small 
Aurepalle 
medium large small 
Kanzara 
medium large 
total income (Rs) 3296 5526 13269 5590 6222 20178 
(0.42)a (0.45) (0.41) (0.23) (0.31) (0.31) 
crop share 0.15 0.35 0.62 0.30 0.49 0.66 
(0.76) (1.08) (0.61) (0.62) (0.52) (0.38) 
livestock share 0.09 0.17 0.32 0.05 0.13 0.23 
(1.15) (0.98) (0.55) (1.14) (0.90) (0.59) 
wage share 0.47 0.19 0.04 0.57 0.34 0.11 
(0.66) (0.98) (1.08) (0.31) (0.52) (1.30) 
nonfarm self-employment 0.28 0.31 0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.01 
share (-0.70) (0.57) (0.36) (-0.12) (7.73) (-2.42) 
transfer share 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 
(1.98) (1.69) (2.13) (1.78) (1.81) (1.88) 
Note: a median intra-household coefficient of variation for the level of income in parentheses. 
2.4. The village environment 
The study villages represent distinct agro-ecological zones. Aurepalle is located in the 
drought-prone district of Mahbubnagar in Andhra Pradesh. Soils are heterogeneous: at the 
finest level of classification, farmers recognise twenty-one soil categories. Most soils can, 
nevertheless, be broadly classified as red alfisols. Kanzara is situated in the relatively rainfall-
assured, homogeneous black-soil district of Akola in Maharashtra. The villages are 
predominantly dryland, but irrigation is not unimportant in Aurepalle. During the survey 
period, around 10% of the cultivated area was under irrigation in this village, compared to 
3% in Kanzara. 
The major cropping season, kharif, starts with the coming of the southwest monsoon, 
late June and early July. Harvesting extends from September into January, depending on the 
crop. The cropping pattern is diverse, but the most common systems are hybrid sorghum and 
cotton intercrops in Kanzara, and cereal/pulse intercrops, castor and paddy in Aurepalle. 
Significant technological progress has been made in both villages, especially in paddy 
production in Aurepalle and sorghum in Kanzara. 
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The main agricultural inputs are labour and bullock draught power. Fertiliser use is 
low but increasing. Especially in Aurepalle, farmers have applied fertilisers 
disproportionately to irrigated area. Nevertheless, the picture is changing, and more and more 
farmers also apply fertilisers on their dryland crops. 
The demand for bullocks is highly covariate, as most activities have to be executed 
within a fairly narrow time frame. Soil preparation must be finished before the soil becomes 
too dry in the case of red soils in Aurepalle or too unworkable on the heavier clay soils in 
Kanzara. This inhibits the development of a rental market. Nevertheless, some small farmers 
hire draught power. Single bullock owners in Aurepalle often pool their bullocks into teams 
and cultivate land on an exchange basis. Alternatively, they pool their bullocks with cows or 
buffaloes. 
Farmers consider male and female labour as separate inputs, for all pre-harvest 
activities are gender-specific. The most important female activities are hand weeding, 
transplanting paddy (in Aurepalle), and cotton picking (in Kanzara). Men engage mainly in 
activities involving animal draught power: ploughing, harrowing, and interculturing, i.e., 
mechanical weed control. Moreover, (male) family members are responsible for the general 
management and supervision of crop production. 
2.4.1. Labour market 
Village labour markets were reasonably competitive and responsive to the forces of supply 
and demand. Linkages with the markets for land and credit were the exception rather than the 
rule. The bulk of labour income was earned in the daily-rated labour market (see Table 2.4). 
This market was impersonal in nature: employers were usually indifferent to the caste or 
socio-economic status of prospective day workers, and workers were willing to work for 
almost all employers. 
Table 2.4. Composition and variability of wage income (1979-1984) 
small 
Aurepalle 
medium large small 
Kanzara 
medium large 
casual farm wages 0.65 0.85 0.21 0.53 0.80 0.34 
(0.50)a (0.53) (2.35) (0.46) (0.73) (2.00) 
casual nonfarm 0.16 0.10 0.40 0.15 0.04 0.12 
wages (1.55) (1.70) (0.99) (1.30) (1.81) (1.74) 
regular wages 0.19 0.05 0.39 0.28 0.11 0.42 
(1.14) (1.20) (1.43) (0.48) (2.45) (0.57) 
Note: " median inter-household coefficient of variation for the level of income in parentheses. 
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Most farm households were both buyers and sellers of labour (see Table 2.5). During 
the survey period, hired labour provided as much as 60 to 80% of total labour use in crop 
production. Of total female labour used in the villages, as much as 80 to 90% was hired. The 
resulting employment provided the lion's share of wage employment. 
As labour was geographically immobile, village labour markets were insular. Within a 
village, wages were mostly uniform for a given operation, season, and sex. An all-India study 
shows that wages were higher in villages where nonfarm work opportunities are relatively 
plentiful (Mazumdar, 1989). There was some unemployment in both villages, but the 
problem was greatest in Aurepalle in the dry season. In Kanzara, employment was relatively 
secure due to the favourable production environment and, since 1979, the presence of a 
public-works programme. 
Table 2.5. Percentage of farmers hiring and selling labour (1975-1984) 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
% selling labour % hiring labour % selling labour % hiring labour 
small farmers 89 88 98 100 
medium farmers 77 96 97 100 
large farmers 12 99 63 100 
2.4.2. Credit market 
The study villages had a reasonably well-endowed credit infrastructure: there was a credit co-
operative in each village and a bank at less than 10 kms distance. Formal financial institutions 
resulted from a supply-leading approach to agricultural credit, which is rooted in the 
overriding concern for increasing agricultural production and for diminishing farmers' 
oppressive debt to informal sources, particularly moneylenders. Because of this policy, 
moneylenders lost ground relative to institutions over the period 1951-1981 (Bell, 1990). 
Formal credit, mainly from the credit co-operative, had replaced most informal loans in 
Kanzara. On the other hand, a well-developed traditional money-lending system still existed 
in Aurepalle, where misappropriation of funds or wanton borrower delinquency had limited 
the historical impact of the village credit co-operatives. Moreover, farmers in this drought-
prone village highly appreciated the flexibility of informal loans compared to the very strict 
terms of the credit co-operatives. 
The availability of good credit infrastructure does not necessarily imply that all 
households had sufficient access to credit. Economic theory predicts that informational 
asymmetries will cause rationing in the credit market (e.g., Hoff and Stiglitz (1993) and 
20 Chapter 2 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Lenders may lack information about borrowers' goals and actions, 
as well as about the risks of the projects being financed. As the interest rate influences the 
riskiness of prospective projects, credit is rationed according to other—nonprice— screening 
mechanisms, such as collateral requirements (Barry et al, 1995). This may imply that certain 
types of farms are more affected by credit rationing than others. Phimister (1995) suggests 
that small farms belong to this category. As they have more difficulty in generating funds 
from savings, they may face a higher demand for external funds relative to their profitability 
and collateral. 
In line with the above reasoning, credit was disproportionately concentrated among 
the large farmers in the study villages (see Table 2.6). These farmers were more eligible for 
loans: they had more collateral and fixed costs weigh less heavily on larger loans. Still, one 
cannot simply attribute low levels of credit use by small farmers to supply constraints. Small 
farmers may voluntarily abstain from (much) borrowing for several reasons. First, the return 
on capital may be low (Baydas et al, 1994). Second, banks and co-operatives prescribe fixed 
loan scales and seasonal repayment discipline, which restrain the flexibility needed by the 
farmer. Third, farmers may not be willing to take a loan because this loan has to be repaid 
even after a yield loss. Finally, prudent households choose to maintain the possibility to 
borrow in the future, when money may be needed even more (Deaton, 1997). 
Table 2.6. Credit use by farm households in the study villages (1975-1984) 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
Landholding class % credit Loan size # loans % credit loan size #loans 
Landless 5 416 122 1 56 87 
small farmers 12 845 156 10 441 110 
medium farmers 28 2095 142 23 716 156 
large farmers 55 3804 158 66 2065 155 
Total 100 1870 578 100 905 508 
Source: Maitra, 1996. 
Empirical evidence confirms the existence of constraints on long-term borrowing. 
Binding credit constraints limited investment in irrigation (Pender, 1992a). Moreover, the 
survey households had limited possibilities to use credit for consumption smoothing from 
year to year; measured discount rates were significantly higher than the highest interest rate 
paid by respondents in two study villages in India's SAT (Pender, 1992b). While borrowing 
did not significantly increase in low-income years in Kanzara, about 75 percent of the 
income-shortfall households were net borrowers in Aurepalle. Borrowing did, however, not 
compensate the large income risks in the latter village: the variability of consumption was 
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higher in high-risk Aurepalle than in relatively rainfall-assured Kanzara. What is more, 
households in both villages appeared unable to offset fluctuations in crop returns through 
changes in assets and nubilities (Ravallion and Chauduri, 1997; Townsend, 1994). 
Contrary to the compelling evidence on long-term credit constraints, empirical 
evidence on the adequacy of short-term production credit is mixed. Most smallholders had 
some access to short-term formal loans. A study in all three permanent ICRISAT villages 
shows that between 1975 and 1984 the only farm households systematically excluded from 
institutional credit were the rare households headed by widows. Studies from other parts of 
India present a similar picture: e.g., 74% of all households that wanted a formal loan could 
get one in the economically diverse state of Uttar Pradesh (Kochar, 1997b). Moreover, access 
to formal or informal credit did not affect land rental decisions in the same state (Kochar, 
1997a). According to Kochar, this suggests that lack of access to credit did not constrain 
households in their working capital requirements. Therefore, he concludes the following: 
"The finding ... suggests that credit constraints cannot explain levels of input use.' However, 
credit constraints may affect input intensity even if they do not influence the size of the 
cultivated area. All-India district-level data indicate that this may be the case for Indian 
smallholders: the availability of formal credit, as measured by the availability of credit 
institutions, was an important determinant of agricultural input use (Binswanger and 
Khandker, 1993; Binswanger and Khandker, 1995). 
2.4.3. Agricultural production risk 
As weather variability is a major cause of the strong yield fluctuations in the SAT, one may 
expect a high covariance of yields within a single village. Yield covariance results not only in 
covariate crop incomes but also in covariate harvest-labour demand. In years with bad 
harvests, aggregate labour demand is low. Yields covariance, therefore, limits the extent to 
which small farmers can use the (mainly agricultural) labour market to hedge crop income, a 
strategy suggested in Chapter 1. 
Contrary to common expectations, most variation in total household income was 
idiosyncratic (Townsend, 1994). More specifically, there was little co-movement in crop 
incomes across farm households in either study village: aggregate variables explained only 
40% and 33% of variation in a regression of kharif profits in real Rupees in Aurepalle and 
Kanzara, respectively (Kochar, 1999). This is not exceptional for the SAT: Carter (1997) 
estimated that village-level variation accounted for less than half of the variance of dryland 
yields in semi-arid Burkina Faso. Hence, when investigating the impact of risk on the 
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behaviour of SAT farm households, weather will be a very incomplete risk proxy, and 
household-specific proxies for risk are required. 
In Aurepalle, the explanation for the lack of yield covariance lies in the heterogeneity 
of crops and soils (Townsend, 1994). Moreover, rainfall appears nonuniform even across 
plots within the village. Because of this heterogeneity, the correlations between yields from 
different crops were relatively low, ranging from 0.09 to 0.81 (but with large confidence 
intervals). Likewise, cross-soil correlations were low: e.g., the yield correlation for castor 
planted in medium to shallow black soils and in shallow red soil was only 0.37 (Townsend, 
1994). 
Relative to Aurepalle, Kanzara presents a picture of apparent uniformity, with most 
households planting some cotton intercrop mixture in medium black soils. Rainfall is more 
abundant and less erratic in amount and timing. Nevertheless, crop diversification 
significantly decreased the variability of total crop income. Besides, non-rainfall-related 
sources of risk, like pests and diseases, are relatively important in this village. These sources 
of risk are mostly idiosyncratic. 
Economic theory suggests that, contrary to covariate risk, idiosyncratic risk may not 
affect household welfare. In a Pareto-efficient allocation of risk within a community, 
idiosyncratic income shocks are completely insured within the community, and households 
face only aggregate risk (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). Efficient allocation of risk can be 
supported by a competitive equilibrium with completely contingent markets. The existence of 
such a rich set of markets is, however, incredible given the information and enforcement 
problems associated with insurance contracts. Still, some communities have developed 
insurance systems that permit the allocation of risk to approach Pareto efficiency. These 
systems are based on generalised reciprocity. In small communities, where information flows 
very freely and the social pressure is high, flexible credit transactions may serve as an 
insurance against idiosyncratic shocks (Udry, 1990). In the study villages, however, a fully 
Pareto-efficient allocation of risk is not achieved, and some idiosyncratic risk remains 
uninsured (Ravallion and Chauduri, 1997; Townsend, 1994). 
The introduction of formal insurance programmes seems an obvious answer to crop 
yield risk- Crop insurance for common crops is, however, not an effective means to reduce 
income variability, as farmers adapt their cropping pattern to emerging information on 
rainfall events. The alternative, rainfall insurance, would reduce (crop) income risk only 
marginally, for it is not possible to relate rainfall to crop yield based on some very simple 
characteristics of the annual rainfall patterns (Bakker, 1992). 
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2.4.4. Summary of the main characteristics of the study villages 
The villages represent different agro-ecological zones of India's SAT (see Table 2.7). 
Aurepalle represents red soil areas with high rainfall variability, while Kanzara is situated in 
a relatively rainfall assured region with medium-deep black soils. 10% of the cultivated area 
was under irrigation in Aurepalle, compared to only 3% in Kanzara. These different growing 
conditions resulted in a diverging cropping patterns for the two villages. In Kanzara, most 
farmers grew cotton intercrops, while Aurepalle farmers cultivated a large variety of crops 
ranging from sorghum to castor and paddy. Both the average productivity of agriculture and 
the stability of yields were lower in Aurepalle than in Kanzara. 
Just like the biophysical environment, market conditions in the two villages differed 
considerably. The Kanzara labour market was buoyant due to the favourable agricultural 
production environment and the close proximity of a public-works programme. On the other 
hand, Aurepalle households faced relatively high unemployment rates during the dry season. 
Both villages had a credit co-operative. Besides this formal institution, there was an active 
informal credit market in Aurepalle. This allowed the village households to smooth 
consumption somewhat from year to year. Nevertheless, the household's capacity to smooth 
consumption was limited in both villages. 
Table 2.7. Summary of the characteristics of the study villages 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
soils heterogeneous (mostly) red soils homogeneous medium-deep black soils 
rainfall unassured, 630 mm assured, 890 mm 
irrigation 10% 3% 
major crops sorghum, castor, pearl millet, paddy, cotton, sorghum, mung bean, pigeon pea 
pigeon pea, groundnut 
risk high production risk moderate production risk 
labour market dry season unemployment buoyant, public-works since 1979 
credit market credit co-operative, active informal credit co-operative 
market 
2.5. Theoretical framework 
2.5.1. The farm household 
This study considers the farm household as a complex of three separate economic identities: 
the farm firm, the worker household, and the consumer household. The farm firm combines 
inputs to produce agricultural outputs. When necessary, the concept of the farm firm can be 
extended to include nonagricultural activities. The worker household supplies labour to its 
own and market production and earns labour income. Finally, the consumer household spends 
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money to maximise utility (Nakajima, 1986). Together, the worker household and the 
consumer household form the consumption side of the farm household: the household decides 
on the allocation of its foil income (nonlabour income plus the value of the time endowment) 
to home time and various consumption goods. 
The behavioural principle of the household is to maximise utility, which is a positive 
function of consumption and home time and a negative function of income instability 
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). The household maximises utility by allocating labour time of 
family members and capital resources to farm and off-farm activities, subject to budget and 
time constraints, ownership of land and capital stocks, and crop technology (Otsuka et al, 
1992). As the main interest of this study is current crop production, the remainder of this 
section focuses on farm household decisions during a single agricultural year and ignores 
intertemporal savings and investment decisions. 
Figure 2.2 gives a schematic representation of the household decision process 
analysed in this study. Reading from left to right, the household allocates its resources to 
home time and two productive activities: farm production and wage employment. Home time 
is time not spent in directly productive and labour market activities. It includes family 
maintenance, family reproduction, socialisation, and leisure. Wage employment requires only 
family labour, while farm production combines family labour with land and external inputs. 
These inputs are purchased using their own or borrowed financial assets. Wage employment 
and farm production both yield income, which is spent on consumption and the repayment of 
debts. 
Agricultural production is risky, and the returns on crop production are uncertain 
when the farm household must assign most of its resources. In doing so, they will account not 
only for the relative returns of the different activities and technologies, but also for their 
riskiness. Depending on their consumptive preferences, different households will assign 
different weights to expected income and income variability. To be more specific, wealthy 
households have more means to cope with an incidentally low income than poorer 
households have. A wealthy farm household can, therefore, take relatively high amounts of 
risk and will allocate its resources to relatively risky, but profitable, activities (Rosenzweig 
andWolpin, 1993). 
For the schematic view of the farm household, this implies that the farm firm cannot 
be considered as a separate unit that maximises profits. The three spheres of the household 
interact, and the characteristics of the consumption and labour sphere affect production 
decisions just like the characteristics of the farm (Singh et al, 1986b). 
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Figure 2.2. The three spheres of the farm household 
Credit constraints may be another reason for nonseparability of production and 
consumption decisions. Farm households cannot borrow mdefinite amounts of money. 
Depending on, for example, its land endowment, each farm household can borrow up to a 
certain maximum. This maximum and the current liabilities determine how much a household 
can still borrow: the credit reserve. If the demand for credit is larger than the available credit 
reserve, the household is capital constrained and their engagement in capital-intensive 
productive activities is limited. 
Risk and credit constraints may cause similar behaviour. Poor households are 
generally assumed to be both risk-averse and prudent. Prudence implies that households have 
a precautionary motive for saving, i.e., that they will save more when future income is more 
uncertain (Browning and Lusardi, 1996). Moreover, prudent consumers may be reluctant to 
borrow even when loans are available. A loan may protect income now, but it must be repaid 
in the future. At that moment, income may be even lower (Deaton, 1992b). As most data sets 
do not indicate whether low levels of credit use are the results of supply or demand limits, 
distinguishing between the effects of prudence and credit constraints is often impossible. 
2.5.2. Estimating farm-household models 
Farm household models are designed to capture interactions between the three different 
spheres of the farm household in a theoretically consistent manner. A basic farm household 
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model consists of a utility function, a production or profit function, and budget and time 
constraints (Singh et al, 1986b). These functions formalise the decision process described 
above. 
The model is separable if all markets exist, the farm household is a price-taker in each 
market, and there are no gaps between sales and purchase prices. The household behaves as if 
production and consumption/work decisions were made sequentially. First, the household 
solves the production problem. It maximises crop profits subject to input and output prices, 
resource endowment, and the current level of technology. In order to do so, they demand 
inputs and supply outputs. Second, the household solves the consumption/work problem. It 
maximises the utility of home time and consumption given the level of profits achieved in 
production, wage rates, and consumption prices. 
Under separability, econometric estimation of a separable household model can, 
hence, be divided into two independent parts: the production and consumption systems. The 
production part covers a standard system of a profit function, output supply functions, and 
input demand functions. The consumption system consists of a set of demand functions for 
consumer goods and home time. These systems can be estimated with regular micro-
economic approaches to firm or consumer behaviour. 
If there are market failures, (some) prices become endogenous, and the separability 
condition breaks down. Analysis of farm-household behaviour in such a situation requires a 
household approach which involves simultaneous estimation of production and consumption 
behaviour. The complete structural system of equation covers equations for consumption and 
the production behaviour equalling the standard micro-economic equations, but for the 
endogeneity of prices (Sadoulet and De Janvry, 1995). Estimation of such a complete system 
is complex and, for that reason, usually not done. The literature presents several approaches 
for the estimation of the reduced form. 
A first approach focuses on the time allocation of farm households under labour 
market imperfections (e.g., Abdulai and Regmi, 2000; Jacoby, 1993; Mishra and Goodwin, 
1997; Newman and Gertler, 1994). In the presence of labour market imperfections, the 
shadow wage rate of family labour may deviate from the market wage rate. This is the case if 
the household does not participate in the labour market and there is a price band between 
hiring and selling labour. A second situation in which the returns on family labour are 
endogenous is if a household does not sell labour and there are inefficiency differences 
between hired and family labour. In both cases, the endogenous shadow wage rates equal the 
marginal returns of family labour in crop production. The latter can be calculated on the basis 
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of the agricultural production function. Substituting the endogenous wage rates in the 
standard labour supply functions allows a straightforward estimation of farm-household 
labour supply. Separability of the household model is rejected if the shadow wage rates are 
significantly different from the market wage rate. 
A second approach focuses on the estimation of input demand functions when some 
inputs are nontradable (Lambert and Magnac (1992), according to Sadoulet and De Janvry 
(1995)). The household's production decision on inputs corresponds to a cost rninimisation 
problem with endogenous prices. The solution to this problem is a set of demand functions 
for the tradable inputs. The independent variables in these functions are the exogenous prices, 
the household resource endowment, the amounts of nontradable inputs used, and the level of 
output. These functions can be estimated with standard regression methods, provided that one 
accounts for the endogeneity of the nontradables and the output. Based on the demand 
functions for tradable inputs, one can calculate the shadow prices of the endogenous inputs. 
The most widely followed approach is applicable to all household decisions under all 
market failures. This approach considers the fully reduced form of the model (Behrman et al, 
1997; Iqbal, 1986; Saha, 1994). The endogenous prices are themselves functions of the 
exogenous prices, resource and time endowments, and household preferences. Substituting 
these variables for the endogenous prices gives a system of equations with identical 
independent variables for each equation. There is no justification for any specific functional 
forms of the system, and any flexible form can be chosen. Moreover, one can estimate the 
demand for a subset of inputs or home time without having to deal with a full system. Testing 
for separability of the household model based on this system of reduced form equations is 
simple: if the parameters of the vector of household time endowments and consumption 
preferences are jointly significantly different from zero in the input demand equations, 
separability is rejected (Benjamin, 1992). 
Simulation using a complete household model may render interesting information for 
policy- makers. When the full nonseparable model is not simultaneously estimated, a 
pragmatic approach involves calibrating the model as though it were separable (De Janvry et 
al, 1992). This implies assuming that all prices are observed and that credit constraints are 
not effective at the base point. While this is clearly inconsistent, comparing the solutions with 
and without market failures at least give a qualitative idea of the importance of these failures 
to household behaviour. 
The fully reduced-form approach was followed in the present study. The advantage of 
this approach is that it provides consistent estimates of household decisions regarding labour 
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supply as well as input use when the major missing market is the market for risk. The 
disadvantage is that the reduced form of a household model does not tell us more than that 
the exogenous variables of the model determine the choices of the farm household. The link 
between the reduced form and the underlying model is, therefore, weak. Why then, would we 
bother to specify the exact model? Can we not just take a reduced form equation from the 
literature? First, a formal model provides a rationale for the relevant exogenous variables to 
be included in the specific setting of the research. Second, and probably more important, a 
formal model provides insight into the decision process underlying the reduced form 
equations. Although it is impossible to derive functional forms from a nonseparable 
household model, such models often allow prediction of the direction of the impact of various 
exogenous variables. These can be different for different market constraints. As we shall see 
in Chapter 4, labour market constraints, for example, will result in a positive impact of family 
labour on labour used in crop production, while risk can cause the opposite effect. Hence, 
careful interpretation of the impact of the exogenous variables on household decisions can 
lead to an understanding of the underlying constraints, provided that an appropriate analytical 
model is specified. 
The problem with all reduced-form estimates is to choose an appropriate functional 
form. Theory may give us some basic insights — input use functions should demonstrate 
decreasing marginal returns — it does not dictate the functional relationship between, e.g., 
household preferences and labour use. The only solution is to let the data speak: select a 
number of feasible functional forms and determine by testing which fit the data best. 
Feasibility involves not only known theoretical relationships, but also the use of degrees of 
freedom. Given the complexity of the relations estimated, the focus in the present study was 
on linear and loglinear functions. 
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3. THE SEASONALITY OF LABOUR SUPPLY UNDER RISK: 
A Two-Stage Model of Farm Households in India's Semi-Arid Tropics 
While previous research has demonstrated that farm households use variations in family labour 
supply to smooth income, there is little evidence of the impact of the seasonal nature of agricultural 
production on farmers' labour supply. A two-stage farm-household model was developed that 
provides insight into the seasonal determinants of labour supply under risk. The empirical analysis 
uses a novel measure for production risk. This measure mimics the information available to the 
farmer more closely than the commonly used historical variance. Moreover, the analysis does not 
require tedious estimation of production shocks. Estimates for two Indian villages confirm the use of 
family labour for ex ante risk management as well as ex post risk coping. These results have 
important implications for research on the cost of income uncertainty for farm households, which 
currently focuses on asset accumulation. Moreover, interventions in labour markets can significantly 
improve the economic security of farm households. 
3.1. Introduction 
Labour is the major productive resource for landless and small-farm households in rural 
India. Employment opportunities are thus important determinants of household income, and 
seasonal employment fluctuations may have serious effects on household welfare. 
Consequently, India and other countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh have adopted 
public-works programmes to provide employment during the slack season. Both the design 
and prior evaluation of the effects of such programmes on rural incomes require an 
understanding of the seasonal determinants of labour supply and demand decisions of farm 
households. 
Skoufias (1993) shows how seasonal modulations in the agricultural cycle affect 
labour-demand decisions of Indian farm households. He concludes that ignoring the timing of 
application of labour inputs has a significant impact on the estimated response of labour 
demand to exogenous changes in, for instance, wages. The same holds for ignoring 
heterogeneity arising from differences in risk preferences. Similarly, we can expect that risk 
and seasonality will affect rural labour supply. 
The seasonal reactions of farmers' labour supply to production risk are not only 
important because of their impact on employment and wage income. Previous research shows 
that consumption is smoother than income in rural India (Townsend, 1994). As formal 
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insurance markets are absent and consumption credit is scarce, it is widely believed that 
consumption smoothing is achieved through asset transactions. The cost of this strategy is 
high; due to both ex ante portfolio choices that favour more liquid but less productive assets 
and to the ex post sale of assets at a loss (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989). Flexible labour 
markets may decrease income fluctuations and, thus, the need for such costly transactions. 
Ideally, farm households can use labour markets for both ex ante risk management 
and ex post risk coping. On the one hand, they can work long hours early in the cropping 
stage and assure a certain wage income when crop income is still erratic. On the other hand, 
they can decide to work extra hours when crop income turns out to be low. Evidence on the 
feasibility of these strategies may have strong implications for models of savings and 
investment that claim that a significant share of the savings of farm households in developing 
countries represents a precautionary response to uncertain crop incomes (Deaton, 1989). 
Most labour supply studies do not explicitly account for risk and seasonality. 
Woldehanna (2000), e.g., presents an elaborate nonseparable farm-household model 
including labour supply to farm work, off-farm work, leisure, supervising hired farm labour, 
and transacting the off-farm labour market. The household faces numerous market 
imperfections: a cash constraint, an entry barrier in the labour market, transaction costs in off-
farm work, and input purchase. However, the model is deterministic and covers a single 
period only: the agricultural year. 
A number of recent studies touch upon risk and seasonality, but none provides an 
empirically tractable method for estimating the impact of both ex ante and ex post risk 
behaviour as described above. Kanwar (1991) concentrates on ex ante risk management, 
while Kochar (1995; 1999) covers ex post risk coping. Both estimate all year market labour 
supply and do not distinguish between different seasons. Moreover, Kochar doubts the 
reliability of his results because of data limitations: his concept of a yield shock is difficult to 
apply empirically. Fafchamps (1993) models labour supply under risk in three stages of the 
cropping season. His model is, however, not suitable for studying the issues mentioned 
above, as it does not consider labour market transactions. Inspired by the Indian context, 
Skoufias (1994) developed a two-stage model of labour supply under weU-functioning labour 
markets. He models the household's possibility to increase labour supply in anticipation of a 
possible income shock as well as in reaction to a realised yield shock. The empirical model is 
formulated such that all risk factors are incorporated in the individual effects, which 
disappear from the equations after taking first differences. This method is only consistent 
under perfect lifetime credit markets, an assumption that has been rejected in the Indian 
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context (Binswanger and Khandker, 1993; 1995; Pender, 1992). Even Skouffias' himself 
concludes in his thesis underlying further publications that: 'Accounting for credit constraints 
at the empirical level is very important to the farm modelling approach and should be pursued 
further' (Skoufias, 1988). As soon as the assumption of perfect lifetime credit markets is 
released, Skoufias' reduced form equations and estimation method are no longer valid. The 
alternative reduced form equations for labour supply explicitly include risk. 
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is twofold. First, it presents a farm-
household model that shows the impact of risk on labour supply in the absence of long-term 
credit markets and under different assumptions regarding short-term credit markets. The 
outcomes of the model are tested empirically for two villages in India's semi-arid tropics 
(SAT). Estimation of ex post behaviour does not require estimation of income shocks: 
information about actual income is sufficient. Second, this chapter introduces a risk measure 
derived from the production literature in a study on farm-household behaviour. Past studies 
used time series of income or production to estimate risk [e.g., Saha, 1994, Kanwar, 1991). 
These measures do not accurately measure risk as perceived by the farm household, which 
has more than just historical information. The Just-Pope variance from the production 
literature includes as much of this information as possible. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the analytical model 
used for the analysis of labour supply under risk and credit constraints. Section 3.3 discusses 
the empirical issues involved in the estimation of yield risk and presents estimates for the two 
study villages. Section 3.4 presents the labour supply estimates. Conclusions are presented in 
Section 3.5. 
3.2. Modelling framework 
In order to show the impact of risk on farm-household labour supply, a two-stage farm-
household model was developed. The model is similar to that of Skoufias (1994) in that it 
assumes perfect labour markets and models two agricultural stages with stochastic production 
in the first stage and deterministic production in the second stage. The main difference 
between the two models lies in the assumptions regarding the functioning of credit markets 
and the household time horizon. 
Skouffias assumes that the household maximises lifetime utility under perfect credit 
markets. This approach leads to a convenient set of equations for household labour supply 
and demand. Labour supply is a function of the production stage, the wage rate, household 
preferences, and the utility costs of giving up one unit of consumption. Similarly, labour 
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demand is a function of the production stage, the endowment of fixed production factors, the 
prices of inputs and outputs, and the utility costs of giving up one unit of consumption. The 
utility variable figures in both the labour supply and demand equations and thus reflects the 
nonseparability of the model. Skoufias assumes that the utility variable is constant over time. 
Consequently, it disappears when computing first differences in a panel data set. In other 
words, when using fixed effects estimation, labour supply and demand can be estimated as if 
the model were separable. This is computationally very convenient, but is conditional upon 
the assumption of perfect credit markets over the household's lifetime. 
Empirical research strongly rejects the latter assumption for the study area. There is 
very limited long-term credit (Walker and Ryan, 1990) and consumption smoothing from 
year to year is limited (Ravallion and Chauduri, 1997; Townsend, 1994). As a result, 
measured intertemporal discount rates exceed actual interest rates (Pender, 1992b). Skouffias 
(1994) acknowledges that credit market imperfections are likely to affect the estimates of 
labour supply. He states that further research on this issue should be pursued. 
The current model assumes a time horizon of a single agricultural year only and hence 
a total absence of long-term credit (i.e. credit between years). Pender (1992a) used the 
assumption of no long-term credit in his model of irreversible investment in India's SAT. 
Moreover, Saha (1994) and Kanwar (1991) used single-year models for analysing farm-
household labour supply in India's SAT. The current model covers a single year for two 
reasons. First, the research questions concern household decisions that are made within a 
single agricultural year. A single-year model gives the clearest representation of these 
decisions. Lifetime models can be relatively simple, but only if it is assumed that credit 
markets are perfect over the entire period. As described above, this is an unrealistic 
assumption in the study area. Second, previous research indicates that the impact of long-
term considerations on short-term decisions is small. Previous research on farmer's labour 
supply shows that non-current wage rates play a minor role in labour supply (Skoufias, 1996). 
Moreover, limited access to long-term credit markets results in myopic behaviour of asset-
poor households (Deaton, 1989). 
The approach to short-term credit is more ambiguous than that to long-term credit. As 
indicated in section 2.4.2, previous research has not given a conclusive answer as to whether 
farm households have sufficient access to short-term credit to finance inputs and the desired 
pre-harvest consumption. Hence, the current model allows households to borrow in the 
planting stage, conditional on repayment in the harvest stage. However, households can only 
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borrow up to a certain amount. Whether this amount is limiting is essentially an empirical 
question. 
3 . 2 . 1 The two-stage model 
The model starts from a two-stage whole farm production function. In the planting stage 
(denoted by subscript 1), the household allocates labour (Lj) to plant and grow a crop on a 
given acreage3. At this moment, there is uncertainty about exogenous factors influencing crop 
production (e), such as weather and pest infestation. The impact of these factors on crop 
production depends on the labour input and the inherent riskiness of the household's land (?), 
which is the result of the local weather, the terrain, and soil characteristics (Just and Pope, 
1979): 
6, = / ( £ , ) + A & b e , e~N{0,l). (3.1) 
This function includes two related measures for risk: the inherent riskiness of the household's 
land (?) and the riskiness of the land use system (h?), which is the result of the interaction 
between the inherent riskiness of land and the household's production decisions. This 
distinction is useful as the household faces risk that is exogenous to its behaviour (the 
inherent risk), but can at least partly affect the actual risk of its activities (the riskiness of the 
land use system) through its behavioural choices. 
Eq (3.1) is formulated such that E(Qj)=f(Li) and Nax(Qi)=h2(L1)$. In this way, the 
effects of inputs on the mean and variance of output can be independent.4 fa (the marginal 
product labour) is always positive, while huj^hs marginal risk effect of labour) can be either 
positive or negative. Both positive and negative relations are found in Philippine rice 
production, depending on the activity and technology at hand (Antle and Crissman, 1990). 
3 Labour is the main variable input in the study area. Other frequently used inputs are bullock 
traction and inorganic fertilisers. For the sake of transparency, these inputs are not included in the 
analytical model. Alternatively, one could replace Lj by V, a vector of variable inputs. 
4 Gautam (1993) tested for the significance of skewness in the production process for food crops, 
cash crops, and irrigated crops in Aurepalle. The results of these tests do not obtain significance. 
Besides, Walker and Ryan (1990) conclude that most improved cropping systems and traditional 
intercrops are characterised by normal yield distributions in the two study villages. Hence, I believe 
that the assumption of normality is justified. Alternatively, representation of risk by the standard 
deviation can be justified by assuming that a second-order Taylor's series expansion of the yield 
distribution is sufficient to capture the relevant risk characteristics. 
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The output of the planting stage is the standing crop (Qî), which the farmer observes 
in the beginning of the harvest stage (denoted by subscript 2). In this stage, all uncertainties 
regarding production are resolved and the farmer harvests the crop (Qi) using labour (L2): 
Note, unlike in static models, output and production costs are not all contemporaneous: part 
of the labour costs is borne in the planting stage, while all output is realised in the harvest 
stage. 
The household can generate income through wage employment as weel as through 
crop production. Labour can be hired in and out freely at a single wage rate (w). While the 
availabiUty of long-term credit is limited in India's SAT, an extensive network of co-
operatives and informal lenders provide short-term production credit. The model, therefore, 
allows for borrowing in the planting stage (B). All loans must be repaid at harvesting at 
interest rate r, and there is a maximum to the amount that a household can borrow (B„). The 
size of this amount depends on the characteristics of the household (Z). The household 
consumes (C) in both stages, and at the end of the harvest-stage, all income is consumed. 
Hence, the budget constraints are 
where p denotes the output price. L is the sum of family and hired labour in farm production, 
while F is the household's total labour supply, i.e., the sum of on-farm and off-farm family 
labour. 
The difference between each period's total time endowment (T) and family labour 
supply (F) equals home time (fy. 
Q2=g(Ql,L2). (3.2) 
C2 =pg(f(Ll)+h{Ll}ie,L2)+w2(F2 -L2)-{\+r)B, 
B*Bm{Z), 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
tt=Tt-F, t = l,2. (3.6) 
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The household facing these constraints maximises the utility (U) of consumption (Q and 
home time (£) in both stages. Households are risk-averse and prudent, and the precise form of 
the utility function depends on the household's characteristics (Z). The household decision 
variables are family labour supply (F) and labour use (L) in both stages, and borrowing (B) in 
the planting stage. 
The above implies that the harvest-stage decision problem is 
W = MaxU(C2J2;Z) Ut>0;Uu<0;Um>0; i = C,t, (3.7) 
subject to: 
C2 = pg({2* ,L2)+w2(F2-L2)-{l + r)B*, (3.8) 
t2=T2~F2, (3.9) 
where * implies that a variable is predetermined: B* is a planting-stage decision variable and 
Qi is the result of the planting-stage decision regarding L; and the outcome of the stochastic 
shock e. p, T2, M>2 and r are given. 
The following equation combines the two constraints: 
C2 +w2£2 = pgfa\L2)-w2L2-{l + r)B'+w2T2. (3.10a) 
Hence, the household equates the total value of consumption and home time to the sum of 
crop profits and the value of family labour minus loan repayment, i.e. full income (Y): 
C2+w2£2=Y. (3.10b) 
The use of this notation will become clear below. 
Substituting Eqs (3.8) and (3.9) into Eq (3.7.) gives 
W = MaxU{pg&,L2)+ w2 {F2 - L2)- (l + r)B', T2 - F2;z). (3.11) 
Recall that the harvest-stage decision variables are labour supply (F2) and labour use 
(Li). The respective first-order conditions are 
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Uh = w2U(h. 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
This is the standard result for farm-household models assuming perfect markets 
(Singh et al, 1986b). Harvest-stage production and consumption decisions are separable. 
First, the household maximises profit by setting the value of marginal product of labour equal 
to the wage rate (Eq (3.12)). In other words, the household chooses the amount of harvest 
labour, given the output from the planting stage, the harvest wage rate, and the output price. 
When the profit maximisation choices are made, the household knows its full income (Y, see 
Eq (3.10)). Subsequently, the household maximises utility by setting labour supply such that 
the marginal utility of consumption equals the value of the marginal utility of home time (Eq 
(3.13)). This implies that they optimise the ratio of consumption and leisure, given harvest-
stage full income, the household time endowment, the harvest-stage wage rate, and household 
preferences. Consequently, the reduced form equations for harvest labour supply and labour 
use are 
where * again indicates that the variable is predetermined: Q* is an outcome of the planting-
stage production process, while Y* is an outcome of planting-stage borrowing B* and harvest-
stage profit maximisation given Q*. 
Hence, the planting-stage decision problem is 
(3.14) 
F2=F2{T2,W2,Y',Z), (3.15) 
V=Max(u(Cl,tl;Z)+pEw(Q1\B°)) U, >0; Uti <0; Um >0; i = C,£, (3.17) 
subject to: 
C^w^-Lj+B 
B±Bm{z), 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
where p is the intertemporal discount factor, and E denotes expectation. 
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The Lagrangian for this problem is 
3 = U[wx{F, -Lj+B,TX-F^+pEUlpgijiL^+hiL^L,) 
+ w2(F2-L,)-{l + r)B,T2-F2;Z]+A(Bm-B) 
which we get by inserting Eqs (3.18), (3.20), (3.11), and (3.1) into Eq (3.17). Moreover, the 
Lagrangian multiplier A accounts for the borrowing constraint (Eq (3.19)). 
The three decision variables are Lj, B, and Fj. Note that the choice of Li and B affects 
harvest-stage decisions regarding L2 and F2. Moreover, the stochastic shock (e) affects Qi 
and, thus, L2 and F2. Hence, Qh L2, and F2 are uncertain in the planting stage. We can now 
derive the planting-stage Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see Appendix 1): 
w, Ur E(ur gn e) f = —•—* . _ h, y , 2 a / , (3.22) 
Uti=WlUCi, (3.23) 
UCi=p{l + r)EUC2+A, (3.24) 
A>0, (3.25) 
B<Bm{z), (3.26) 
where X>0 if B=Bm. Note the differences between the harvest and planting-stage condition for 
labour use (Eqs (3.12) and (3.22)). 
3 . 2 . 2 . Optimal responses for the planting stage 
Unlike harvest-stage decisions, the optimal labour-supply choice is not separable from the 
optimal labour-use choice in the planting stage. The marginal utility of planting consumption 
figures in the first-order conditions for planting labour demand (Eq (3.22) as well as planting 
labour supply (Eq (3.23) and borrowing (Eq (3.24)). Hence, the household does not simply 
maximise expected profit, but accounts for its consumption preferences in production 
decisions. Put differently, labour is not applied until the expected marginal value product 
equals its discounted price corrected for harvesting costs, as it would be in the case of profit 
maximisation. The difference reflects the riskiness of the land use system combined with 
household risk aversion. Moreover, if credit constraints are binding, harvest-stage utility is 
not discounted at the market rate of interest, but at an endogenous household-specific rate. 
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The nonseparability of household decisions has important implications for household 
labour supply. Yield risk will affect not only the amount of labour used in production, but 
also the household's choices regarding consumption and home time. Credit market 
imperfections will modify the latter effect, as they weaken the link between planting and 
harvesting utility. 
The sign of the risk elasticity of planting-labour supply is ambiguous and depends on 
the parameterisation of the utility function. Previous research indicates that households want 
to guarantee a minimum level of income by working long hours during the planting season 
(Kanwar, 1991). Family labour is in this case used for ex ante risk management, and the 
relation between risk and planting labour supply is positive. 
Although it is not an explicit argument in the harvest-stage first-order conditions, the 
outcome of the stochastic yield shock unambiguously affects harvest-labour supply: a 
negative yield shock increases harvesting labour supply and vice versa. If we assume that 
both consumption and home time are normal goods, households will consume less of both 
when full income decreases. A harvest loss will, therefore, induce the household to decrease 
home time, which is equivalent to increasing labour supply. The resulting increase in wage 
income limits the cutback in the consumption of goods. Hence, the farm household uses 
labour supply to smooth income ex post. 
Note that the ex post strategy hinges on the model assumption that wage income is 
risk free, or that at least employment risk and crop risk are largely independent. This may not 
be the case in India's SAT, where village labour markets are insular and yield risk is at least 
partly covariate. A village-wide negative yield shock will not only lead to a large increase in 
market labour supply, but also to a decrease in agricultural labour demand. The result is high 
unemployment rates in years with low crop income. In this situation, low yields will be 
associated with a decrease in wage income instead of an increase. 
Nevertheless, the model may be a good approximation of the situation in the survey 
area. More than half of the stochastic shock is idiosyncratic (see section 2.4.3), and the 
correlation between yearly average planting and harvest wage rates is a high as 0.96 in 
Aurepalle and 0.93 in Kanzara over the 10-year survey period. Previous research indicates 
that labour income appears to be important for income stabilisation: most households facing 
more than one severe income shortage during the study period do not have an able-bodied, 
healthy family member who can participate in the labour market (Walker and Ryan, 1990). 
Moreover, Kanwar (1998) could not prove that production risk (defined as the coefficient of 
variation of crop net revenue) Granger causes employment risk (defined as the product of the 
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probability of finding employment in the local casual labour market and the estimated real 
wage).5 
3.3. An empirical risk measure 
3.3.1. Inherent riskiness of land 
The model specifies planting-stage crop production as a composite production function (Eq 
(3.1)): 
G =/(£,)+*(£,)*?, e~N{0,l), 
where / depicts mean production and hytios standard deviation of production. The standard 
deviation is a function of household behaviour {Li) and the inherent riskiness of the land (f). 
The latter is exogenous to the household and is a function of a vector A of land size, land 
quality and weather. This vector was not included in the model description of section 3.2. It 
affects not only the inherent riskiness of land, but also mean output: 
Ql=f{L1,A)+MjLlW)e, e~N(0,l). (3.27) 
Similar Just-Pope specifications are commonly used to determine the relation between the use 
of variable inputs and the variability of output (Rosegrant and Roumasset, 1985; Smale, 
1998; Traxler, 1995). If we assume Cobb-Douglas function forms for all three partial 
functions, we get 
ft = «0 V n V + A> A A A V e, £ ~ N{0,1), (3.28) 
k=\ k=\ 
where the d s are the coefficients for the average production function (f) and the the 
coefficients for the standard deviation function (hf). The above specification imposes 
decreasing marginal returns on inputs, allows both positive and negative relations between 
input use and output variability, and is computationally convenient. 
5 The series xt fails to Granger cause y, if in a regression of y, on lagged y's and lagged x's, the 
coefficients of the latter are zero. This means that x does not cause y in the Granger sense if it does 
not precede y. 
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Just and Pope (1979, see Appendix 2) developed a three-step estimation method for 
estimating a composite Cobb-Douglas function like Eq (3.28). However, this method can be 
applied here only if we assume that planting-stage production equals total production. The 
composite production function in the analytical model describes planting production, while 
data are available only on total production. We can get the model's total production function 
by inserting the planting-stage function (Eq(3.1)) in the harvest-stage function (Eq (3.2)). 
However, the resulting function is too complex to be estimated. Hence, only if we assume 
that total production equals planting-stage production can we estimate the total production 
function. This assumption is probably not very unrealistic. Harvest costs are low relative to 
the value of the crop to be harvested. Although there might be some impact of the wage rate 
on the amount of harvest labour used, labour use will be dominated by technical needs. In 
other words: the farmer simply harvests the given crop. Consequently, the composite 
production function is estimated as if it describes total crop production. 
The first step of the Just-Pope procedure involves nonlinear estimation of the mean 
production function 
This step provides a consistent but inefficient estimate of mean output. The (heteroscedastic) 
residuals of this regression (e) are estimates of the standard deviation function {hye). 
The second step yields the information needed to calculate estimates for y. This step 
involves estimation of the square of this standard-deviation function: the variance function. 
Using ordinary least-squares regression (OLS), we can estimate the logarithm of the variance 
function: 
where u is a random error term with mean 1.2704 (Just and Pope, 1978). Hence, p0 = Po -
1.2704. The inherent riskiness of land (?) can now be computed as follows: 
0 1 *=1 * (3.29) 
ln(ê*2)= p; +p\ l n ^ J + fx hx{Ak)+u, (3.30) 
(3.31) 
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where A indicates that the parameters and /are estimated. For the ICRISAT data, the spread 
of /appeared insensitive to the precise variables included in A: J8 estimated for different 
vectors A are highly correlated.6 
The third step of the Just-Pope estimation procedure involves re-estimation of the 
mean production function (Eq(3.29)) using the predicted standard deviations from stage 2 
(hf) as weights in a weighted nonlinear least-squares regression (WNLS). The results of step 
two and three are consistent and efficient for cross-sectional data. Moreover, the three-step 
procedure yields consistent estimators when panel data are used. The results are theoretically 
not efficient for panel data. However, using data on American farmers, Griffiths and 
Anderson (1982) conclude that correction for individual or time effects adds little to the 
estimation procedure. 
The Just-Pope approach to risk differs from the general treatment of production risk in 
empirical farm-household studies. Previous studies have used historical variance as a proxy 
for production risk (e.g., Saha, 1994, Kanwar, 1991). This measure has two drawbacks 
compared to the Just-Pope method. First, historical variance does not just measure exogenous 
risk, but also past input choices of the household: as we have seen before, the level of inputs 
used affect output variability. Second, historical variance covers very little if the information 
available to the farm household. Farmers can observe current weather, which is related to the 
weather later in the growing season. Besides, the farmers know the current acreage. Owing to 
fallowing and leasing, this acreage is not constant over the years. Hence, historical variance 
overestimates the actual risk that the farm household faces. What is more important, there is 
no reason why the deviation between historical variance and real risk would be equal for all 
farmers. 
3.3.2. The production function 
Separate production functions were estimated for the two villages as general soil and weather 
conditions are very different. The actual regressions consider not just labour inputs, but also 
the input of animal traction and inorganic fertilisers. Moreover, two categories of labour were 
considered: male and female labour. Farmers consider these types of labour as separate 
inputs, since all pre-harvest activities are gender-specific. The set of land and weather 
variables covers size of cultivated area, share of irrigation, land value, share of shallow soil, 
and the share of area under pigeon pea (both villages), local pearl millet (Aurepalle), and 
6 Even the choice of the set of variable inputs included hardly affects the spread of y. 
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local cotton (Kanzara). The crop shares serve as proxies for the farmer's weather information. 
These crops are commonly cultivated and their adoption is known to be sensitive to 
expectations of weather. Moreover, the crops are planted early enough so that the area under 
the crop does not reflect any ex post adjustments to weather outcomes (Kochar, 1999). In the 
Kanzara equations, I added proxies for the household managerial capacity: literacy and the 
age of the household head. These variables were not included in the Aurepalle equations, as 
they caused multicollinearity problems. Finally, time trends reflect technological change.7 
Table 3.1. reports the results for the production regressions. For both villages, the set 
of regressors significantly explains the mean and variance of production, indicating that these 
are not randomly distributed around a mean value. Homoscedasticity was rejected at the 10% 
level in the first-stage regression, indicating that the three-step procedure is superior to the 
single-step estimation of a conventional loglinearised Cobb-Douglas function. Crop 
production is measured in monetary units (Rs), as the farmers grew a large variety of crops. 
The regressions consider kharif production only, which covered over 90% of the cultivated 
area in both villages. The Aurepalle function for mean production includes a dummy for 
small farmers. Without this dummy, the mean production function largely overestimates 
production for all farmers cultivating less than 1.9 hectares. The dummy did not affect output 
variance. 
Contrary to expectations, the estimates predict the variation of production around its 
mean (almost) equally well for risk-prone Aurepalle as for rainfall-assured Kanzara. 
Aurepalle farmers were apparently able to smooth production through crop choice and other 
management measures. The relatively large share of irrigated area in Aurepalle may also 
explain the high explanatory power of the mean function in this high-risk village. The higher 
production potential in Kanzara resulted in higher standard deviations of production. The 
coefficients of variation of output were, nevertheless, higher for Aurepalle. 
Mean output was higher for larger plots with a higher land value. The trend 
coefficients indicate that technological progress has been significant only in Kanzara. 
Irrigation significantly increased output in Aurepalle, but not in Kanzara. There was very 
little irrigation in the latter village, rainfall being relatively abundant and assured. The proxies 
for weather expectations significantly affected only mean output in Kanzara. The absence of 
a significant effect in Aurepalle may be due to the incompleteness of the proxies or the 
7 Conform convention, dummies, ratio and the time trend are included in the production function in 
exponential form: Y = a0X"1 e"2", where X is a regular continuous variable and D is a dummy, ratio 
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limited capacity of farmers to predict weather in this high-risk village. In Kanzara, education 
and age increased managerial capacity and thus yields. 
Table 3.1. Three-stage estimates for crop production (Rsa) (1975-1984) 
Stage 2: variance 
OLS, Eq (3.30) 
Stage 3: mean 
WNLS, Eq (3.29) 
Aurepalle Kanzara Aurepalle Kanzara 
Variable inputs 
male labour (hrs) -0.02353 -0.00632 -0.01519 0.10550* 
(0.20505) (0.33859) (0.02332) (0.05474) 
female labour (hrs) 0.08503 0.33515* 0.17504*** -0.08236** 
(0.20288) (0.20029) (0.04702) (0.03754) 
inorganic nitrogen (g) 0.06830* 0.08085*** 0.02562** 0.03936*** 
(0.03845) (0.02862) (0.01010) (0.00872) 
bullock labour (hrs) 0.74531** 0.00733 -0.04507 0.36349*** 
(0.32013) (0.39861) (0.06173) (0.07383) 
Fixed inputs & 'nature' 
cultivated area (ha) 0.71062** 0.73089*' 0.63276*** 0.40779*** 
(0.32976) (0.38597) (0.07741) (0.07595) 
land value (Rs/ha) 0.93642** 0.74237** 0.57964*** 0.45220*** 
(0.46128) (0.32694) (0.09426) (0.06949) 
share of irrigated area -0.25570 1.13613 0.48551** -0.11528 
(1.23334) (1.22404) (0.17016) (0.16822) 
share of shallow soil 0.33905 0.45375 0.09440 0.41168*** 
(0.46379) (0.50121) (0.07916) (0.14109) 
millet share 0.65356 -0.19391 -0.63458*** 
(1.14064) (0.30925) (0.13639) 
cotton share 0.49601 
(0.58216) 
-0.63458*** 
(0.13639) 
pigeon pea share -0.71368 0.62064 -0.19084 0.62832* 
(1.05848) (1.92630) (0.19933) (0.33895) 
dummy area<l .9 ha -29.4238 
(30.5030) 
year -0.03987 -0.13036** -0.00325 0.02808*** 
(0.05891) (0.05102) (0.01196) (0.00938) 
Farmer's capability 
literacy (yes=l) 0.33734 
(0.29592) 
0.29803*** 
(0.08398) 
age (year) 1.47395** 
(0.64612) 
0.87375*** 
(0.11463) 
constant 6.58296 11.7249*** 105.969 0.16281 
(4.50381) (4.38885) (94.5936) (0.15055) 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.42 0.88 0.92 
Notes: a The value of output is specified in 1983 prices. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
or trend. 
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Most input coefficients in the mean production function are significant and have the 
expected positive sign. Nevertheless, the regressions do not demonstrate a significantly 
positive effect of the closely related inputs male labour and bullock traction in Aurepalle. The 
diverse traction requirements of the heterogeneous soils in this village probably obscured the 
effects of these inputs on mean crop production. In the Kanzara equation, the coefficients for 
bullock and male labour are both significantly positive. The elasticity for inorganic nitrogen 
was low in both villages. This could point to a low efficiency of fertiliser use due to limited 
knowledge about this modern input. The elasticity for female labour was positive and 
reasonably high in Aurepalle, where large amounts of female labour were used in the highly 
productive cultivation of paddy. In Kanzara, the most important female task was weeding. 
The link between weeding and crop production is indirect, as weeding requirements depend 
very strongly on exogenous variables that may differ greatly between plots. Hence, the 
estimate for the female labour elasticity is negative for Kanzara. 
Output variability increased not only with the size of cultivated area, but also with the 
value (or quality) of the land. The high potential of good land was apparently mostly realised 
in good years. Surprisingly, Kanzara's technological progress has lead to a decrease in the 
variability of output. Irrigation did not significantly decrease output variability in either 
village, although the coefficient for irrigation is negative in the Aurepalle equation. 
Farmers could significantly affect the variability of crop output through the choice of 
inputs. Nitrogen fertilisers increased output variability in both villages. In addition, output 
variability increased through bullock traction in Aurepalle and through female labour in 
Kanzara. The other input coefficients are not significant. The Cobb-Douglas production 
function may be too restrictive to capture the subtleties of the production process. The data 
set is, however, too small to allow estimation of a less restrictive composite production 
function, like the translog. Even using the Cobb-Douglas for, the relatively large variance of 
the estimates may be due to the complexity of the two-step regression method and the limited 
sample size. The presence of individual effects may also lead to inefficiency of the estimates. 
Correction of these effects had little impact on the outcome of the regressions in previous 
research, but this may not be the case for all data sets (Griffiths and Anderson, 1982). If we 
ignore the significance level, all input coefficients are positive except for the coefficient for 
male labour in Aurepalle. This could indicate that all but the latter input increase risk. 
Nevertheless, the insignificant input coefficients are very small. 
Farmers' perceptions of the relation between input use and output variance may not 
coincide with observed relations. Srimaratnam et al. (1987) compared Texas farmers' 
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subjective beliefs with experimental data on grain sorghum yields to different levels of 
nitrogen fertilisers. Although experiments indicated that nitrogen increased the variance of 
output at all levels, the variance effect of fertiliser elicited by farmers was negative up to a 
fertiliser dose of 101 pounds per ha. This indicates that the farmers in Srimaratnam's sample 
falsely perceived nitrogen as risk reducing, while in fact it was a risk-increasing input. The 
farmers in the study villages may have had similar misperceptions. 
3.4. Farm-household labour supply 
3.4.1. The labour supply functions 
The model presents the following reduced form equation for harvest-stage labour supply (Eq 
where full income (Y*) is defined as the sum of harvest-stage crop profits and the value of the 
harvest family labour endowment minus loan repayment, or equivalently as the sum of total 
crop profits plus the value of the harvest labour endowment minus planting consumption. In 
reality, harvest-stage full income includes year-round income from all sources plus the value 
of the harvest time endowment minus planting consumption. Hence, we need to know only 
actual full income and not the income shock, i.e., the difference between expected and actual 
income. Previous research uses this shock to test for the use of family labour for ex post 
income smoothing. The shock is, however, difficult to estimate, which hinders the test 
(Kochar, 1999). The only problem in determining harvest-stage full income is deterrnining 
Ci. This study ignores that factor and calculates full income based on total income. This 
simplification will presumably have little effect on the results, as planting season 
consumption is a function of expected total income and is necessarily independent of the 
exogenous shock. 
There are two possible regimes in the planting stage: the household is credit 
constrained or it is not. Both have a different reduced form equation: 
(3.15)): 
F2=F2{T2,W2,Y',Z), 
Fl=FX{Z,p,A,wl,w2,p,Tx,T2,'] 
F\ =••FL(Z,p,A,wl,w2,r,p,Tl,T2 
r), 
r), (3.32b) 
(3.32a) 
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where Eq (3.32a) holds for the constrained household and Eq (3.32b) for the unconstrained 
household. The difference between the two equations is the interest rate (r), which affects the 
planting-labour supply decision of unconstrained households alone. Recall that y is the 
inherent riskiness of the land as estimated in section 3.3.1, and is, therefore, exogenous to the 
equations. 
We do not know a priori in which regime the sample households were, and different 
households may face different regimes. Besides, households owning large stocks of liquid 
assets may use these holdings to smooth consumption and, hence, may not feel the need to 
vary labour supply in response to risk. Endogenous switching regression techniques are 
designed to estimate models with more than one latent structure, but are hard to apply with a 
limited set of panel data, especially if there are three possible regimes. This study, therefore, 
used a different approach and tested for structural breaks at different levels of land 
ownership, the main determinant of access to credit, and liquid asset holdings. A structural 
break was found at an average level of asset holdings of at least 72% of average household 
income: F-tests reject equality of the coefficients for full income between farmers holding 
less and more liquid assets at the 1% level. This liquid asset ceiling coincides with a 
maximum landownership of 8 hectares. As land ownership was exogenous to household 
behaviour over the time period considered, the largest farm households can be excluded 
without having to correct for sample selection. For Aurepalle, no threshold was found.8 
The set of household characteristics (Z) is specified such that it covers proxies for the 
household's risk aversion and their access to credit and alternative sources of liquidity. 
Included are the value of liquid assets,9 the size of area owned, and the value of livestock. 
Liquid assets and livestock income are alternatives to credit, while land ownership serves as 
collateral. Moreover, asset endowments serve as proxies for risk aversion: wealthier 
households have more possibilities to smooth consumption from year to year. These 
smoothing options are more important for risk behaviour than pure risk preferences. In most 
developing-country farming communities, villagers hold rather similar preferences regarding 
risk, and there is no relationship between pure risk aversion and the net household wealth 
(Binswanger and Sillers, 1983). This was not different for the villages analysed in this study 
(Binswanger, 1981). However, even if individuals have identical risk preferences, those with 
In contrast to households in Kanzara, Aurepalle households are known to increase borrowing in 
low-income years. In addition to landownership thresholds, I therefore experimented with thresholds 
related to both levels of liquid assets and harvest-stage borrowing. 
9 Hausman tests do not reject exogeneity of this variable. 
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access to greater amounts of consumption credit or household savings will have a greater 
capacity to absorb risk (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990). This implies that the smallest 
landowners will be most risk averse, as interest and collateral terms will be least favourable 
for them. Moreover, even if loan terms were identical, small owners will perceive loans as 
both more risky and more expensive than larger farmers do: if a loan exhausts the collateral, 
the borrower will be able to resort to additional credit (insurance) only on more adverse terms 
(Binswanger and Sillers, 1983). Ownership of assets that cannot serve as collateral may also 
affect risk behaviour. In the absence of credit, households will be more willing to take up 
high-risk activities if (near) liquid asset holdings are large, providing a buffer for 
consumption shortfalls (Dercon, 1996). Evidence presented by Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
(1993) and Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) on India's SAT supports the above reasoning that 
wealthy households take more risk. 
The prices and wages used are village averages. The estimates include only current-
stage female wage rates and the price of one major cash crop per village. Inclusion of more 
than one output price or wage rate caused multicollinearity problems. The crop prices used 
are weighted averages of the past prices for three years. Besides wage rates and output prices, 
the estimates include prices for the other major farm inputs besides labour: bullock traction 
and inorganic nitrogen. Moreover, the empirical model covers the share of irrigated area as a 
proxy for land quality10 and a time trend to account for exogenous developments over time. 
The estimated labour supply functions are village-specific in order to account for the 
differences in the production environments (see Table 3.2. for descriptive statistics).11 Unless 
we impose unrealistic restrictions on the utility function, neither the model nor economic 
theory dictates the functional form of the labour-supply functions. Hence, several forms that 
use only limited degrees of freedom were tested: linear, log-linear, and double logarithmic. 
Since the logarithmic equations did not give normally distributed residuals, the linear form 
was selected. 
Note that the model predicts total household labour supply and not just market labour 
supply. Estimation of market labour supply would imply corner solutions: not all households 
supply labour to the market. Corner solutions signify the use of truncated regression 
Inclusion of expected production computed from the ex ante production function (Table 3.1) did 
not increase the explanatory power of the labour supply functions. 
1 1 Chow tests reject equality of the village-specific equations at the 1% significance level. When all 
other coefficients are allowed to differ between the two villages, equality of the riskiness coefficients 
is not rejected at the 10% significance level, while equality of the income coefficient is rejected at the 
5% level. 
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techniques. These are less powerful than the standard least-squares techniques, which can be 
used for estimating total labour supply. Fixed-effect regression is applied to allow for 
unobserved individual effects that may be correlated with the regressors. The individual 
effects cover, e.g., pure risk preferences, time preferences, self-employment opportunities, 
and interest rates.12 Two-stage least-squares estimation accounts for the endogeneity of full 
income. Estimation instruments are the planting-stage variables (see appendix 3 for first-stage 
estimates). 
Table 3.2. Description of the households (1979-1984)° 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
(N=152) (N=124) 
mean standard dev. mean standard dev. 
Labour supply 
planting stage (hrs) 680.622 499.581 1331.65 661.246 
harvesting stage (hrs) 1193.62 1098.85 1887.57 1195.39 
Labour endowment 
adults 3.98026 1.79207 3.99194 2.30410 
Agricultural resources 
cultivated area (ha) 3.21575 2.60915 2.68162 2.51551 
irrigated area/cultivated area 0.08115 0.12345 0.01556 0.05214 
inherent riskiness of land (# 117.814 52.1803 388.760 168.978 
Prices 
female planting wage (Rs/hr) 0.38518 0.12166 0.38651 0.12256 
female harvest wage (Rs/hr) 0.39009 0.12028 0.34092 0.11539 
bullock price (Rs/hr) 1.31019 0.14500 2.16925 0.22181 
nitrogen price (Rs/kg) 5.96053 0.50986 6.33089 0.78239 
paddy price (Rs/kg) 1.43855 0.01684 
cotton price (Rs/kg) 5.58742 0.19164 
Assets and income 
land ownership (ha) 5.63645 6.98011 2.36065 1.97815 
livestock (Rs) 4254.65 4134.12 1211.88 1316.54 
liquid assets (Rs) 7507.63 9154.46 1437.79 1638.19 
harvest full income (Rs) 10922.1 7432.37 8173.00 5478.33 
Note: a All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
3.4.2. Labour supply estimates 
The estimates of the labour supply functions provide some interesting insights regarding the 
relation between risk and labour supply (Table 3.3). The households actively used family 
labour to manage risk. There were, however, clear differences between the villages. Before 
Hence, I assume that interest rates are household-specific and time-invariant. For computing 
harvest-stage full income, I set the interest rate to zero. The outcomes are not sensitive to assumptions 
about interest rates: the correlation between full income at interest rates of 0% and 100% is as high as 
0.95. 
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discussing these results in detail, the effects of the other variables in the labour supply 
functions are examined. 
Table 3.3. Fixed effect estimation of labour supply (1979-1984) 
Variable Aurepalle Kanzara 
planting harvesting planting harvesting 
(N°152) (N=152) (N=124) (N=124) 
Labour endowment 
adults" 112.509*" 431.775*** 288.274*** 712.433*** 
(40.8407) (83.4222) (83.6600) (220.005) 
Agricultural resources 
cultivated area (ha) 12.2168 
(26.7681) 
43.9239 
(42.7374) 
irrigated/total cultivated -545.248 
(424.083) 
2468.12 
(1446.98) 
inherent riskiness of land (j) 3.76606* -0.56186 
(2.12674) (0.96379) 
Prices 
wage rate (Rs/hr) 16996.2*** 1189.15 1909.34 -862.033 
(4090.76) (1332.28) (2579.04) (2137.34) 
bullock price (Rs/hr) -3167.87"* 
(729.521) 
-1209.18 
(2189.55) 
inorganic nitrogen price -330.673*** 202.685*** 
(Rs/hr) (115.695) (61.2392) 
paddy price (Rs/kg) -3321.92* 
(1904.09) 
cotton price (Rs/kg) 1330.91 
(959.053) 
Assets and income 
land ownership (ha) 12.7041 -52.1358** 146.574 15.2171 
(32.1759) (25.0995) (107.550) (149.357) 
livestock (1000 Rs) -5.69694 -2.40994 -34.6642 524.046*" 
(9.91512) (13.0076) (92.6986) (176.945) 
liquid assets (1000 Rs) 11.1047 2.22085 24.0523 102.741* 
(7.07361) (9.06029) (43.7988) (59.1014) 
full income (1000 Rs)b -78.0733*** 
(21.4772) 
-348.759*** 
(117.145) 
year -892.489*** -183.952" -180.847 80.6725 
(199.382) (74.1183) (348.778) (97.1142) 
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.93 0.52 0.24 
Notes: a Equality of the coefficients for men and women could not be rejected at the 8% level for 
Aurepalle harvest labour supply and at the 10% level for the other equations. 
b Instruments are used for this variable (see Appendix 3 for the first-stage estimates). 
White/Heteroscedasticity corrected covariance matrices used. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *" indicate significance at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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As expected, labour endowment was a major determinant of household labour supply. 
For Kanzara farmers, there was only one other significant variable in the planting stage: the 
fertiliser price. There was no difference between the effect of an additional man or woman in 
either village. The negative time trend in the Aurepalle equations may reflect the tightening 
of the labour market, which reduced the probability of unemployment. 
Asset levels had only a limited impact on family labour supply. Land ownership had a 
negative impact on harvest labour supply in Aurepalle. Large landowners could smooth 
consumption through means other than increasing harvest labour supply. Nevertheless, liquid 
assets did not significantly affect planting labour supply in either village. This suggests that 
short-term credit constraints were not a problem. Surprisingly, the relation between liquid 
assets and harvest-stage labour supply was positive in Kanzara. The same holds for livestock. 
Possibly, farmers needed additional income to feed their livestock throughout the dry season. 
Both wage rates and other prices affected labour supply. The wage elasticity was 
positive for Aurepalle planting labour and not significant in the other equations. An increase 
in fertiliser prices increased labour supply in Kanzara. This could result from a decrease in 
the profitability of crop production associated with a rise in input prices. This is, however, far 
from obvious given the insignificance of the other production-related variables. In Aurepalle, 
where fertiliser use was less widespread, the fertiliser price elasticity was negative, as was the 
bullock price elasticity. This indicates that input prices pick up something other than just 
production costs. Bullock prices, e.g., affect not only production costs, but also potential 
income from renting out bullocks. Because of their impact on crop profits, output price 
elasticities were expected to be negative. However, the observed effects were insignificant, 
presumably because of the large wealth of crops cultivated. 
Risk affected planting labour supply only in Aurepalle: the risk elasticity of planting 
labour supply was 0.65 (see Table 3.4). In other words: Aurepalle households increased 
labour supply in response to production risk. Thus, they guaranteed a certain income when 
yields were still erratic. This is the ex ante risk-management strategy mentioned in sections 
3.1 and 3.2. Risk behaviour may also explain the negative coefficient for irrigation: higher 
irrigation implies a smaller chance of very low yields. The results do not confirm the use of 
family labour for ex ante risk management in Kanzara. 
On the other hand, the estimates show evidence of the use of family labour for ex post 
risk coping in both villages: households increased their harvest labour supply when full 
income declined. The income elasticity of labour supply was -0.71 and -1.51 in Aurepalle 
and Kanzara, respectively (see Table 3.4). This corresponds to compensating 4 and 21% of 
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the losses in income through increases in labour supply. In other words, Kanzara households 
actively used family labour for ex post risk coping, while Aurepalle households used this 
strategy only marginally. 
Table 3.4. Household labour supply strategies with respect to risk (1979-1984) 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
Ex ante 
risk elasticity 0.65* -0.22 
Ex post 
income elasticity -0.71* -1.51*** 
% of crop profit loss compensated 4* 21*** 
Notes: Elasticities are calculated for group means. 
* and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
These results indicate that the households in the two villages had different risk 
strategies: Kanzara households used family labour to stabilise income ex post only. Aurepalle 
households made little use of the ex post strategy, but used family labour extensively for ex 
ante risk management. The latter strategy is more costly in terms of utility, as it requires 
stabilising measures before the results of the stochastic process are revealed. The explanation 
of these differences starts from the difference in ex post smoothing. 
There are two possible explanations for the ex post difference: i) because of the larger 
availability of informal consumption credit, households in Aurepalle may have been less 
inclined to sacrifice home time in order to stabilise income than their counterparts in 
Kanzara; ii) employment opportunities in Aurepalle were too limited to allow much ex post 
stabilisation through the labour market. The first explanation alone cannot account for the 
behavioural difference. The higher income variability in Aurepalle translated into higher 
consumption variability. There is no reason to believe that Aurepalle households had smaller 
stability preferences than households in Kanzara. What is more, this hypothesis is rejected on 
the basis of the results for the planting stage. Hence, labour market constraints explain at least 
part of the difference: in Aurepalle, employment was scarce in the second part of the harvest 
stage, while in Kanzara, agricultural employment was spread relatively evenly over the year 
and there was a public-works programme. 
The above presents part of the explanation for the ex ante difference. Production risk 
was higher in Aurepalle. We could, therefore, have expected more intensive risk management 
strategies in Aurepalle than in Kanzara. Moreover, Aurepalle households were less able to 
compensate crop losses ex post, as explained above. This increased the necessity for ex ante 
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risk management even more. Hence, labour supply in the planting stage cannot be considered 
without regard to the possibilities to generate income in the harvesting stage. 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, a two-stage farm-household model was presented that provides insights into 
the seasonal determinants of labour supply under risk and credit constraints. The model 
shows that households increase labour supply at the cost of home time when crop income 
turns out to be low (ex post risk coping). The effect of risk on growing-season labour supply 
is ambiguous and depends on crop technology and household preferences. Possibly, 
households will work long hours in order to guarantee a certain consumption floor (ex ante 
risk management). Previous research either drops risk from the empirical analysis because of 
the unrealistic assumption of perfect lifetime credit markets or only covers the two risk-
management strategies in isolation. 
Besides, mere has been a focus on labour supply to the market as compared to total 
labour supply. An increase in off-farm labour supply is not equivalent to sacrificing home 
time to compensate for an income shock. After a negative shock, less labour is required for 
on-farm harvesting activities. This in itself will lead to a shift to off-farm employment. 
Moreover, a focus on off-farm labour supply implies the use of econometric techniques that 
allow for corner solutions. These techniques are less powerful than least-squares regression. 
The measures used to demonstrate risk management differ from those used in 
previous studies. The model shows that it is not necessary to estimate the unanticipated 
income shock to demonstrate ex post smoothing. If it is possible to single out harvest-stage 
labour supply, it is sufficient to determine the household's reaction to actual harvest-stage full 
income. However, we do need a measure of production risk to show the ex ante effects of 
risk. Instead of time series of production, the Just-Pope two-stage method from the 
production literature was used to estimate the standard deviation of production. The 
advantages of this method are twofold: i) it includes as much information as possible on the 
actual production situation that is available to the farmer at planting; ii) it does not require 
panel data (although it can accommodate them, as it does in this study). 
Empirical estimates for the two study villages confirm the use of family labour for ex 
ante risk management as well as ex post risk coping. These results have important 
implications for research on the cost of income uncertainty for farm households. While most 
of this research focuses on the role of savings and assets on consumption smoothing, family 
labour may be at least equally important. The costs of income uncertainty are at least partly 
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reflected in decisions that affect the households labour endowment, including migration, 
education, and fertility. Moreover, interventions in labour markets may significantly improve 
the economic security of farm households. These interventions may be indirect — through 
health programs that enhance the ability of individuals to engage in physical employment — 
or direct—through public works programs. 
The results give an indication of the short-term impact of the latter, as they present 
information about household behaviour in two different villages. In one of the villages, 
households had access to a year-round public-works programme. In the other village, there 
was no such programme and dry-season employment is limited. The households in the first 
village had a greater capacity to smooth income ex post. Risk induced the households in the 
latter village to work long hours in the planting stage, by way of compensation. This implies 
that these households sacrificed additional home time for ex ante risk management. 
The question remains whether the households sacrificed not only not only home time, 
but also crop profits. In the absence of sufficient possibilities to compensate for yield losses 
ex post, households may try to prevent large losses by choosing relatively stable, but low-
return crop technologies. In this case, dry-season employment projects could stimulate farm 
households to increase crop income. This could put upward pressure on agricultural labour 
demand. In a situation where there is (some) year-round unemployment, dry-season 
employment projects could, thus, indirectly decrease cropping-season unemployment. 
Similarly, these projects could stimulate fertiliser use, which affects not only household 
income but also the sustainability of agricultural production. These issues are dealt with in 
the following two chapters. 
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4. FARM AND NONFARM EMPLOYMENT: COMPLEMENTS OR SUBSITUTES? 
A Case Study of India's Semi-Arid Tropics 
In order to absorb the increasing population of India's rural SAT, agricultural employment should 
expand continuously. Nonfarm employment policies are likely to affect agricultural employment, as 
the main agricultural employers, smallholders, are also important suppliers of market labour. These 
smallholders face high production risks and limited availability of credit. Wage income as well as 
liquid asset holdings affects their capacity to cope with risk Nevertheless, previous research has 
tended to ignore the interactions between wage income and farm labour use. Using the model 
presented in Chapter 3, this chapter disentangles the ambiguous relations between risk, credit 
constraints, family labour, and agricultural labour use. Empirical estimates for the two study villages 
in India's SAT show that, depending on the production environment, risk can both increase and 
decrease labour use. However, there is no compelling evidence of short-term credit constraints. The 
estimates confirm the hypothesis that off-farm employment opportunities affect farm labour use, but 
the direction of the effect is ambiguous. 
4.1. Introduction 
The majority of the rural people living in India's semi-arid tropics (SAT) depend heavily on 
dryland agriculture for their livelihood (Walker and Ryan, 1990). Not only is crop production 
an important income source for landed households, it also provides the lion's share of rural 
employment. The latter is important for cultivators as well as for the landless: most farm 
households earn a significant share of their income through wage employment. Unless 
employment growth keeps pace with population growth, the number of people living in 
poverty will increase significantly in the coming years. 
Walker and Ryan (1990) are pessimistic about the prospects for significantly 
absorbing more labour in dryland agriculture in India's SAT. They see considerable potential 
in the more favourable areas, but pin their hopes for labour absorption in rainfall unassured 
areas mostly on an expansion in irrigated areas. As the perspectives for such an expansion are 
bleak, the growth in nonfarm labour demand must accelerate to decrease the supply of labour 
to the agricultural labour market. Employment in nonagricultural sectors is, however, limited 
and is expanding too slowly to absorb population growth (Rataa Reddy, 1995). 
Consequently, the growth of agricultural employment remains an essential factor in 
alleviating poverty. 
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Agricultural employment is likely to be affected by production risk, which is a 
pervasive characteristic of developing country agriculture in general, and of SAT agriculture 
in particular. The relation between production risk and employment becomes especially 
interesting in the light of studies showing that technological progress has increased 
production risk over time (e.g., Hanumatha Rao et al, 1988). Nevertheless, attempts to 
include production risk explicitly into analyses of labour demand are rare. 
Notable exceptions are Skoufias (1993) and Kanwar (1999). Skoufias explicitly 
incorporates yield risk in his analytical model, but not in bis empirical estimates. Kanwar 
tries to empirically determine the effects of risk, but his perception of the impact of risk is 
rather narrow. He argues that a marginal increase in risk will cause a decline in the demand 
for labour, given decreasing absolute risk aversion and a well-behaved production function. 
However, this relation only holds when an increase in input use implies an increase in 
production risk. This is not necessarily the case (Just and Pope, 1979). In practice, the 
marginal risk effect of an input depends on the specific production technology and the 
biophysical environment (Hanus and Schoop, 1989; Smith and Umali, 1985). Consequently, 
aggregating male and female labour and pooling farmers facing different production 
environments, as Kanwar does, may average out the diverse effects of risk. 
A second characteristic of developing country agriculture that is mostly ignored in 
studies of labour use is the imperfection of credit markets. Skoufias (1993), e.g., assumes that 
Indian farmers face perfect financial markets over their lifetime. This strong assumption is 
not supported by empirical evidence. Despite the wealth of financial infrastructure, long-term 
credit is scarce in India. Consequently, farmers are not able to offset fluctuations in crop 
returns through changes in assets and liabilities (Ravallion and Chauduri, 1997). On the other 
hand, empirical evidence on short-term credit constraints is mixed (e.g., Kochar, 1997; 
Binswanger and Khandker, 1993). 
Production risk and credit constraints affect labour supply as well as labour demand. 
Indian smallholders not only provide the lion's share of rural employment, but also a 
significant share of market labour. It was shown in Chapter 3 that the resulting wage income 
helps to reduce the variance of overall household income. Households that are better able to 
cope with risk are more likely to invest in profitable, but risky, crop technologies. In addition, 
prudent or credit-constrained farmers may use wage income to finance input purchase. 
Consequently, there may be a strong relation between wage income and agricultural 
productivity and employment. The studies described above do not consider this potentially 
important role of wage income in labour use decisions. 
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The impact of wage income on crop production is highly relevant when designing 
employment policies. The introduction of public-works programmes or small-scale industries 
may lead to a change in agricultural production technologies and, thus, agricultural 
employment. Increased nonfarm employment results in a tightening of the labour market and 
may, hence, cause a rise in wage rates. Although evaluations of employment programmes 
generally recognise this direct effect, they ignore the indirect effects through risk and 
liquidity described above (e.g., Dart and Ravallion, 1994). Consequently, these evaluations 
may well be biased. 
This chapter shows the simultaneous impact of risk, credit constraints, and off-farm 
employment on agricultural labour use in two villages in India's SAT. The structure of the 
chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 describes labour use in the survey villages. Moreover, it 
elucidates the effects of risk, credit constraints, and family labour on farm-labour within the 
framework of the model from Chapter 3. The combined impact of these factors is essentially 
an empirical matter. Section 4.3 presents empirical estimates of labour use in the study 
villages. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.4. 
4.2. Agricultural employment in India's SAT 
4.2.1. Crop labour use in the study villages 
Three previous studies address the determinants of agricultural labour use in the ICRISAT 
villages. Walker and Ryan (1990) present two regressions that give a first impression of the 
determinants of labour use in crop production, while Skoufias (1993) and Kanwar (1999) 
estimate reduced form labour demand functions derived from farm-household models. The 
remainder of this section presents the major findings of these studies. 
Walker and Ryan regressed labour intensity on a time trend in years and found a 
significant negative trend for Aurepalle and a significant positive trend for Kanzara. They 
argue that the reason for the positive trend in Kanzara was a shift to more labour-intensive 
cropping patterns, particularly the substitution of mung bean, intensive in its demand for 
women's labour for weeding, for local sorghum in upland cotton intercropping systems. The 
significant negative trend for labour intensity in Aurepalle could be the result of two effects: 
i) between 1983 and 1985, i.e., at the end of the survey period, annual rainfall was below 
average; ii) real wages rose during the survey period. 
In an additional analysis, Walker and Ryan regressed labour use per hectare on the 
household resource endowment controlling for soil quality and year-to-year variability. The 
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results indicate that, especially in Aurepalle, the extent of irrigation played a dominant role in 
determining the demand for labour. The high labour requirement for cotton, the dominant 
rain-fed crop in Kanzara, explains the small size of the irrigation coefficient in this village. 
Moreover, the main irrigated crop in Aurepalle, paddy, requires more labour than the 
irrigated cropping systems of Kanzara. The coefficients for bullocks were positive. This is 
consistent with the observation that bullock hire markets may not be well developed due to 
the covariance in the demand for animal traction. Cultivated area only had a significant effect 
on labour use intensity in Kanzara, where 12% of the area is under sharecropping. The effect 
of family workers was not significant in Kanzara and four other villages that Walker and 
Ryan considered. Only in Aurepalle was there a significant negative coefficient. Walker and 
Ryan interpreted this as support for the hypothesis that the daily-rated labour markets in the 
villages worked fairly well and were reasonably competitive: labour market imperfections 
would result in significantly positive coefficients. The negative coefficient for Aurepalle 
remains unexplained. 
Skoufias developed an intertemporal model of household behaviour under risk and 
estimated the planting- and harvest-stage labour demand functions derived from the model. 
The independent variables are wage rates, fixed inputs, and individual effects. The model is 
formulated such that risk and household preferences are included in the individual effect. 
Credit markets are assumed to be perfect over the household's lifetime. In his empirical 
model, Skoufias added a number of land quality and weather indicators. Intriguingly, he 
treated fertilisers as a land-augmenting improvement determining labour utilisation and not as 
an alternative variable input. The regression results indicated that the demand for male labour 
in pre-harvest activities had an elastic response to changes in the male wage rate. On the 
other hand, the use of female labour was unresponsive to changes in wage rates. Moreover, 
more planting labour was applied on irrigated plots and on plots where fertilisers and/or 
pesticides were used. 
Kanwar estimated the total demand for labour as well as the demand for hired labour. 
His regression equations are based on a static farm-household model, which assumes that all 
inputs increase risk and that within-year credit markets are perfect. The main explanatory 
variables are wage rates, household composition, resource endowment, and the (historical) 
mean and standard deviation of net returns. Expenditures on variable inputs other than labour 
are considered an exogenous technology factor. The estimates did not distinguish between 
planting and harvesting labour or male and female labour. The real wage rate was found to 
have a significant negative effect on both total and hired labour demand. Household 
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composition affected the demand for hired labour, but not total labour demand. The impact of 
nonland assets and variable inputs was significantly positive as expected, but production risk 
was not found to affect labour use. 
The above studies ignore potential credit constraints, but give a first impression of the 
effects of risk and the family labour endowment on labour use in crop production. In 
Skoufias' study, all differences in risk behaviour are taken up by the individual effect. This is 
computationally convenient, but does not shed light on the precise effects of risk on labour 
use. Kanwar included explicit measures of risk and family labour in his regressions of total 
labour use. He did not find significant effects of either factor. However, as mentioned before, 
the absence of a distinction between male and female labour and the pooling of farmers in 
very different regions may obscure the results. Walker and Ryan, on the other hand, found a 
significantly negative relation between the household labour endowment and labour use in 
crop production in Aurepalle. They did not consider production risk, and the negative impact 
of labour endowment on labour use remains unexplained. The absence of a comprehensive 
overview of all relevant relations between labour endowment and labour use is probably at 
least partly to blame for this lack of explanation. Moreover, the results obtained may be 
biased, as the regression does not include any independent variables other than resource 
endowments. 
4.2.2. Crop labour and production risk 
In order to show the ambiguity of the impact of risk on labour use, the two-stage farm-
household model described in the previous chapter was used. The advantage of this two-stage 
model over Kanwar's static model is that it reveals the impact of risk and family labour on 
the use of crop labour in greater detail. Planting-stage decisions are made under uncertainty, 
while the harvest stage can be used to cope with the consequences of the outcome of the 
stochastic process. Moreover, the model allows for risk-decreasing as well as risk-increasing 
inputs. Whether labour increases or decreases risk depends on the specific activity and 
production environment at hand. 
The model in Chapter 3 shows that farmers can adapt the use of crop labour, the 
major agricultural input, in order to stabilise household income. Recall the first-order 
conditions for the planting stage: 
w, Ur E[Ur gne) 
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Uti=w,UCi, (4.2) 
UCi =p{\ + r)EUC2+A, (4.3) 
A>0, (4.4) 
B<Bm{z). (4.5) 
Combining Eqs (4.1) and (4.3) gives 
P E{UCigJ PPE{UC2g&) ^ E{uC2gJ 
This equation demonstrates the impact of risk and credit constraints on the use of labour in 
crop production. 
First, consider a household that is not credit constrained (2=0). Production risk affects 
planting-labour use, and the sign of the effect equals the sign of the marginal risk effect of 
labour, hu- This is easily understood as follows. The value of the marginal product of labour 
does not equal the discounted wage rate, even after correcting for harvesting costs.13 The 
difference is a correction factor that covers the joint effect of household risk preferences and 
the marginal risk effect of labour. The sign of the correction factor is ambiguous. Let us first 
consider the numerator of the ratio. Following Kanwar (1999), note that a rise in e involves a 
rise in planting-stage produce and thus profits and harvest consumption, C2. Given risk 
aversion, this implies a decrease in the marginal utility of harvest consumption, Uci. 
Likewise, a rise in e involves a decrease in the marginal productivity of planting produce, 
gQi. Consequently, E(UC2g,Qi£)<0. As E(UC2gQi) is positive, the sign of the correction factor 
is thus opposite to the sign of fai. The latter factor is ambiguous: hu>0 if labour use 
increases risk, while hu<0 if labour use decreases risk. In other words, risk increases labour 
use if labour is risk decreasing and vice versa. 
The sign of the marginal risk effect of labour depends on the production technology 
and the biophysical environment (Hanus and Schoop, 1989). The impact of labour on 
production risk may even vary according to the specific activity executed. A study on 
Philippine rice production illustrates the richness in possible relations (Antle and Crissman, 
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1990). Crop establishment labour, for example, decreases yield variability for modern 
varieties, while for traditional varieties, establishment labour increases variability in some 
years but has no effect in other years. Land preparation labour is uniformly risk-reducing, 
whereas labour devoted to pest and weed management and irrigation activities does not affect 
yield variability. Finally, increasing management attention reduces the chance of very low 
yields. The estimates from Chapter 3 indicate that female labour is risk-increasing in 
Kanzara. If we ignore the high standard errors of the other labour coefficients in the variance 
functions, we could say that both male and female labour are risk-increasing in Aurepalle and 
that male labour is slightly risk-decreasing in Kanzara. Nevertheless, previous research has 
shown that farmers perceptions do not necessarily coincide with the technical relations 
observed (see Section 3.3.1). 
In the presence of credit constraints (A>0), the household may not be able to attain 
maximum expected utility as described in the previous paragraphs. If credit demand exceeds 
credit availability, the household will take the maximum loan possible and allocate resources 
and consumption accordingly. Hence, the household consumes less in the planting stage and 
uses less planting-stage labour in production than it would in the absence of a credit 
constraint. Whether or not credit constraints are binding depends not only on exogenous 
factors like the household credit reserve, their land size, and the riskiness of their land, but 
also on their preferences. Prudence may limit borrowing because farmers want to avoid 
repayment requirements after a bad harvest (Deaton, 1997). 
The above indicates that the family labour endowment will affect crop labour use. 
Chapter 3 has shown that farm households in the survey villages use family labour to smooth 
household income. The results, however, do not establish a direct relation between short-term 
credit constraints and labour supply. When the family labour endowment moderates risk and 
(possibly) credit constraints, this will affect the use of labour in crop production. The sign of 
the foreseen effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative importance of risk and credit 
constraints and the nature of the risk effect of labour. 
13 The corrected output price is p 
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4.3. Risk, credit constraints, and labour demand 
4 . 3 . 1 The empirical model 
The reduced form equation for planting-stage labour use derived from the analytical model is 
as follows:14 
The main variable of interest in this equation is % the inherent riskiness of the land. 
This variable represents the expected standard deviation of crop production prior to decisions 
on input use and is therefore exogenous to the equation. The determinants of j'are related to 
land size, land quality and weather expectations (see section 3.3.1). 
Nonseparability of the model is reflected in the presence of consumption as well as 
production characteristics of the household. In the absence of risk (or risk aversion) and 
credit constraints, production and consumption decisions would be separable and the farmers 
would simply maximise risk. This results in the following labour use function: 
As the two empirical models are nested, we can easily test for separability. Rejection 
of the separability hypothesis proves that at least one market is imperfect, but does not 
indicate which market this is. Hence, we must interpret the coefficients of the various utility 
related variables with care. 
The model assumes perfect labour markets and hence rules out what is probably the 
best-known effect of family size on labour use: the consequences of labour market dualism. 
In the presence of hiring frictions and unemployment, the effective wage rate of hired labour 
is higher than that of family labour. Ceteris paribus, this results in a higher labour intensity in 
crop production for larger families (Benjamin, 1992). However, despite the existence of some 
(seasonal) unemployment, this relation is generally assumed to be irrelevant in the study area. 
r,TuTa,p,Z). (4.7) 
(4.8) 
1 4 See section 2.5.2 for more information about the reduced form approach to estimating 
nonseparable household models. 
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The estimates, moreover, provide a test for the assumption of perfect labour markets: it is not 
rejected if the coefficients for labour endowment are not uniformly positive. 
The functional form of the labour use function is ambiguous. The Cobb-Douglas 
function was used in the present study. This functional form accounts for decreasing marginal 
returns and is linear in its parameters. The use of male and female labour were estimated 
separately, as all pre-harvest activities are gender-specific. Distinct equations were also 
estimated for the two villages.15 Different production environments may lead to opposite 
relations between risk and labour use. Moreover, Chapter 3 has shown that the income-
smoothing capacity of labour differs between the two villages. 
The equations were estimated with least-squares techniques accounting for the panel 
character of the data. The estimates allow for correlation between the individual effect and 
the independent variables. The individual effect covers several variables that are assumed to 
be time-indifferent: the household-specific interest rate, pure risk preferences, and time 
preferences. The presence of year effects is rejected in all equations. 
Two-stage least-squares regression is used to correct for endogeneity of the share of 
irrigated area in the Aurepalle equations. Hausman tests did not reject the exogeneity of the 
share of irrigated area in Kanzara and of cultivated area and liquid assets in either village. 
Large farmers in the later years of the study period distort normality of the residuals in the 
Aurepalle equations: these farmers used much less labour than the average function suggests. 
Labour markets have tightened over the years, which has caused large farmers to resort to 
less labour intensive technologies. Inclusion of a dummy solved the normality problem.16 
The data required for estimation of the labour supply functions were collected during 
the entire ten years of the survey (see Table 4.1 for descriptive statistics). For the labour 
supply functions, only the last six years could be used. This allowed calculation of expected 
output prices as weighted averages of prices during the previous three years. As this 
procedure would lead to a loss of three years of labour use data, it was assumed that expected 
prices equal previous year village averages. The larger sample size compared to Chapter 3 
allows inclusion of the prices of more than one important crop: paddy and castor in 
Aurepalle, cotton in Kanzara, and pigeon pea and sorghum in both villages. Nevertheless, 
multicollinearity precludes inclusion of more than one wage rate per equation. Finally, the 
regressions cover a proxy for land quality, which represents yield expectations prior to 
1 5 Chow tests reject equality of the labour use functions for two villages at the 1% level. 
1 6 The dummy is 1 if the cultivated area is larger than 5 ha in the years 1981-1984, zero otherwise. 
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decisions on input use. The proxy equals the predicted value of the mean production function 
from section 3.3.1 divided by cultivated area. In order to ensure that this variable is fully 
exogenous, I use per hectare averages of input use to calculate predicted output.17 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of the farm households (1976-1984) 
AurepaUe (N=234) Kanzara (N=241) 
mean standard dev. mean standard dev. 
Labour use (excl. harvesting) 
male labour (hrs) 474.962 553.534 695.759 792.579 
female labour (hrs) 373.825 640.689 832.365 1079.40 
Agricultural resources 
cultivated area (ha) 3.41685 2.82188 5.47773 6.85483 
irrigated area/total area 0.10039 0.17233 0.03326 0.11424 
expected yield (Rs/ha) 1026.34 519.928 1006.45 354.185 
inherent riskiness of land (j) 120.383 49.7327 583.295 369.297 
bullock owned (yes=l) 0.63248 0.48316 0.56847 0.49632 
Prices 
male wage (Rs/hr) 0.60779 0.19767 0.78255 0.08915 
female wage (Rs/hr) 0.41141 0.13095 0.44300 0.07911 
bullock price (Rs/hr) 1.40599 0.21640 2.18696 0.26335 
nitrogen price (Rs/kg) 5.90368 0.51799 6.57948 0.90827 
Household assets 
liquid assets (Rs) 5187.73 7531.04 5726.81 11189.6 
land owned (ha) 5.72923 7.30246 5.07137 6.38470 
livestock (Rs) 4330.92 4294.80 2044.05 2551.56 
Labour endowment 
adults 3.75641 1.62216 4.16598 2.16733 
Note: All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
Prior knowledge indicates that there may be several structural breaks in the estimates 
for Kanzara. First, Chapter 3 indicates that the labour-supply behaviour of very large farmers 
deviated from that of the rest of the farmers. Second, the public-works programme was not 
introduced until 1979. Nevertheless, the structural breaks at 8 hectares and 1979 were not 
statistically significant at the 5% level, so the complete sample was used for the estimates. 
4.3.2. Labour-demand estimates 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the labour-use regressions. The focus of interest is the effects 
of risk and family labour on crop-labour use. The estimates reveal that the effects were 
diverse and differed between the two villages and the type of labour considered. This section 
starts with clarifying how risk and the nature of the labour market caused these diverse 
As irrigation is an important determinant of input use in Aurepalle, I used three different levels 
of input use per hectare for this village: input use without irrigation, input use with less than half of 
the area irrigated and input use with over half of the area irrigated. 
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effects. Household behaviour in Kanzara is contrasted with household behaviour in 
Aurepalle. Next, the section briefly analyses the effects of the other independent variables on 
labour use. 
Table 4.2. Fixed effect estimates of labour use in the study villages (1976-1984) 
Aurepalle (N=234) Kanzara (N=241) 
ln(male hrs/ha) ln(female hrs/ha) ln(male hrs/ha) ln(feroale hrs/ha)' 
Agricultural resources 
ln(cuMvated area) 0.29882** 0.24811 -0.47644*** -0.28791**' 
(0.13787) (0.16081) (0.11507) (0.07223) 
irrigated area/total areab 0.65324 4.06439*** -0.53492** -0.42942 
(0.57166) (0.72628) (0.28592) (0.33281) 
unexpected yield) 0.74438*** 1.13657*** -0.15927 -0.33227* 
(0.20758) (0.21269) (0.14716) (0.19694) 
ln(riskiness land (j)) -1.08527*** -1.21460*** 0.73287*** 
(0.29750) (0.36005) (0.26343) 
bullock owned (yes=l) -0.07297 -0.00956 0.13584* -0.00798 
(0.09447) (0.09394) (0.07921) (0.10062) 
Prices' 
ln(wage rate) -1.43102 1.22148 0.84813 0.53334 
(1.34363) (0.83288) (0.71472) (0.41688) 
ln( bullock price) 0.19114 -0.67579 0.30194 -1.32335** 
(0.86984) (0.43908) (0.47708) (0.55178) 
ln(nitrogen price) -0.31159 2.23096 -0.59827* -0.48392 
(0.71975) (1.56026) (0.31350) (0.48793) 
Household assets 
ta(liquid assets) 0.03806 0.09967* 0.07877** 
(0.05551) (0.06012) (0.03161) 
ln(land owned) 0.01495 0.09061* -0.14799* 
(0.03575) (0.04927) (0.08759) 
In(livestock) 0.04655* 0.04067 -0.00983 
(0.02699) (0.04035) (0.02167) 
Labour endowment 
ln(adults)d 0.22737 0.12546 -0.22600** 
(0.15616) (0.17992) (0.09896) 
year 0.12574 -0.35184*** 0.08254*" -0.04330 
(0.18860) (0.11764) (0.02941) (0.03353) 
dummy5 -1.14919*** 
(0.16399) 
0.02699 
(0.12195) 
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.83 0.42 0.36 
Notes: a Profit maximisation could not be rejected at the 10% level. 
b Instruments are used for this variable in the Aurepalle equations (see Appendix 3). 
c Expected prices for the following crops were included in the regression, but not in the table: 
pigeon pea, sorghum, paddy (Aurepalle), castor (Aurepalle), and cotton (Kanzara). Expected 
prices are assumed to equal the village level average price during the previous year. 
Additional inclusion of the log of men or women or the ratio of men to women yielded 
coefficients for these variables that were not significant at the 10% level. 
e dummy =1 if year >80 and cultivated area>5 ha; 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *" indicate significance at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Farm andnonfarm employment: complements or substitutes? 65 
In Kanzara, production risk led to an increase in the use of male labour. Apparently, 
farmers used male labour to decrease production risk. This coincides with the findings for 
paddy production in the Philippines (Antle and Crissman, 1990). In the study area, major 
male tasks are land preparation and supervision. Both were shown to increase yield stability 
in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the production function estimated in chapter 3 does not 
provide much support for this relation. Although the coefficient for male labour in the 
variance function is negative, it is very low and insignificant. Nevertheless, the village 
farmers seem to consider male labour as a risk-increasing input. The negative coefficient for 
land ownership confirms this perception. As wealthier households were better able to manage 
risk, their need to use male labour to decrease yield risk was lower. 
The above relation between risk and labour use implies that the effects of risk and 
credit constraints on crop-labour use were opposite. Land ownership is a major determinant 
of access to credit. An increase in land ownership will, therefore, ceteris paribus increase the 
availability of loans. The positive relation between land ownership and labour use thus 
indicates that supply limits did not constrain the use of short-term production credit. If we 
compare this finding with the studies presented in Chapter 2, we can conclude that it is 
consistent with Kochar's assertion that working capital did not constrain agricultural 
production, as credit constraints did not affect land rental decisions. The results reported by 
Binswanger and Khandker, which show that the availability of credit institutions increased 
district level fertiliser use, may be less relevant for the study villages: there was a credit co-
operative in both villages. 
Unlike land, liquid assets increased the use of male labour. This is consistent with 
Kanwar's findings for nonfarm assets. Using the reasoning from the previous paragraph, 
limited borrowing can explain this relation while risk aversion cannot. However, it was 
argued that credit constraints were not binding. The positive effect of liquid assets on labour 
use, therefore, mainly resulted from the unwillingness of households to borrow. They 
preferred spending their own funds to taking a loan, which they must repay even when yields 
are low. 
In line with the previous results, the relation between family labour and labour use 
was negative. Neither labour market imperfections nor borrowing constraints can explain this 
relation. Risk management, however, renders an obvious explanation: a higher labour 
endowment implies a higher capacity to manage risk and, therefore, makes households less 
inclined to use crop labour to manage risk. It is not surprising that the risk effect of family 
labour was larger than its effect on liquidity and prudence. Total labour income serves as a 
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risk management tool, while households can use only part of labour income to finance crop 
production. 
The public-works programme appeared to be of minor importance for the risk-
management capacity of family labour, as there was no structural break in household 
behaviour at the introduction of the programme in 1979. Agricultural labour demand was 
spread relatively uniformly over the year due to the favourable production environment in the 
rainfall-assured area of Akola. This appears to allow significant ex post risk coping through 
the labour market. 
Risk, prudence, and family labour did not affect the use of female labour in Kanzara. 
A joint F-test for all consumption-related variables in the equation did not reject profit 
maximisation for this input at the 10% level. Hence, farmers' risk perceptions again deviate 
from the technical relation between input use and risk as described by the production function 
estimated in Chapter 3. 
The story is different for Aurepalle, where production risk significantly decreased the 
use of both male and female labour.18 Remember that risk increased the use of male labour 
and did not affect the use of female labour in Kanzara. The stabilising effect of monitoring 
supposedly explains the risk-decreasing effect of male labour. Monitoring was probably less 
effective in the harsh production environment of Aurepalle. On the other hand, inevitable 
yield losses due to adverse weather conditions, which imply the loss of most of the costs of 
inputs used, were more likely to occur in Aurepalle than in Kanzara. Besides, in Aurepalle an 
important female task was transplanting paddy. This type of labour was found to increase risk 
in some less favourable production systems in the Philippines. Nevertheless, the coefficients 
for male and female were not significant in the variance function estimated in Chapter 3. 
The different asset categories all have significantly positive coefficients in the 
Aurepalle equations, indicating that wealthier households used more labour in crop 
production than their poorer neighbours did. Both risk and borrowing limits can explain this 
effect. Greater wealth implies that farmers can afford to take more risk in crop production. In 
Aurepalle, this led to greater use of labour. Moreover, wealthier household were less hesitant 
to borrow and less likely to face credit constraints. This also allowed them to use more crop 
labour. 
The inter-village difference between the coefficients for riskiness is significant at the 10% level 
for male labour. 
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In contrast to Kanzara, the family labour endowment did not affect labour use in 
Aurepalle. We might have expected a significant positive effect because, like physical 
capital, family labour can be used to decrease the impact of risk and credit constraints or 
prudence. However, as was shown in Chapter 3, Aurepalle households could only adapt 
family labour supply to production risk in the planting stage. Hence, the effect of family 
labour on income stability was small in Aurepalle compared to Kanzara, where households 
could increase labour supply in response to unexpected yield losses. We still need to explain 
the absence of a significant effect of family labour on household liquidity, and thus on credit 
constraints or prudence. Only a limited share of total labour income can be pocketed before 
labour is applied in crop production. It is hence not surprising that the liquidity effect of the 
family labour endowment on current labour use was small. 
The variables not directly related to risk and liquidity management present no 
surprises. The coefficients for cultivated area may seem to indicate implausibly large scale 
effects. However, we must keep in mind that an increase in cultivated area involves a rise in 
production risk. The coefficients for these variables are opposite in all three equations 
covering risk. Given the amount of production risk, an increase in cultivated area would, for 
example, induce farm households to increase the intensity of male labour in Aurepalle. 
However, an additional plot of land is associated with additional production risk. This 
additional risk will buffer the increase in labour intensity. 
The observed time trends confirm the findings of Walker and Ryan (1990). The 
intensity of female labour shows a negative trend in Aurepalle. Between 1983 and 1985, 
which was the end of the survey period, annual rainfall was below average. Apparently, this 
resulted in a low use of labour. In addition, the included dummy shows that the tightening of 
rural labour markets decreased the availability of hired labour especially for large farmers. 
Finally, the results confirm the positive trend that Walker and Ryan found for labour use in 
Kanzara. This positive time trend resulted at least partly from a shift to more labour-intensive 
crops. 
In Aurepalle, labour use was highest on soil with higher expected yields in general 
and irrigated areas in particular. Land quality had the opposite effect in Kanzara. The use of 
female labour was lower on soils with higher expected yields, probably because weed growth 
is less abundant on poorer soils. Besides, irrigated crops require less male labour than dryland 
crops. 
Input prices had only a limited effect on crop labour use. Wage rates were not 
significant in any of the equations, presumably due to the impossibility of disentangling the 
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effects of male and female wage rates. This is in line with Skoufias' finding of insensitivity to 
wage rates for female labour. On the other hand, he found that male labour had an elastic 
response to changes in the male wage rate. Male labour and fertilisers appeared to be 
substitutes in Aurepalle. The other fertiliser price coefficients are insignificant. Many farmers 
did not use fertilisers, especially in Aurepalle. This may obscure possible complementarity or 
substitutability of labour and fertilisers. The bullock price coefficients indicate that female 
labour and bullocks were complements in Kanzara: farmers can control weed though manual 
weeding by women or through mterculturing with bullocks. Bullock prices are not significant 
in the male labour equations. However, the significantly positive sign for the bullock 
ownership dummy in the Kanzara male labour equation indicates not only that bullock-hiring 
markets were imperfect in this village, but also that male labour and bullocks were 
complements. The insignificance of the bullock-ownership dummy in the Aurepalle 
equations suggests that buUock-hiring markets were rather efficient in this village. 
4.4. Implications for employment studies 
In order to absorb the increasing population of India's rural SAT, agricultural employment 
should expand continuously. The development of effective policy measures will benefit from 
insights into the determinants of labour demand from smallholders, the main agricultural 
employers. Nevertheless, previous research has failed to account for the effects of possibly 
the most pervasive characteristics of SAT agriculture: risk and credit constraints. Prior 
studies, moreover, have neglected a potentially important means to alleviate the 
consequences of these constraints: family labour. Farm households can use wage income to 
purchase inputs as well as to reduce the variability of overall household income. 
Consequently, nonfarm employment programmes may affect employment not only directly, 
but also indirectly through their impact on agricultural employment. This indirect effect is 
currently ignored in policy evaluations. 
The model presented in Chapter 3 is used to elucidate the potential impact of risk, 
credit constraints, and family labour on crop labour use. As production and consumption 
decisions are nonseparable, risk, nonagricultural assets, and household preferences affect the 
use of labour in crop production. The impact of risk depends on household preferences and is 
ambiguous: labour may increase or decrease production risk. On the other hand, credit 
constraints will unambiguously lead to a decrease in labour use. Family labour can mitigate 
the effects of both risk and credit constraints. 
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Estimates of labour use in two villages in India's SAT indicate that the impact of 
short-term production credit constraints was negligible, while risk affected labour use in 
various ways. First, risk decreased the willingness to borrow and, thus, decreases labour use. 
Second, risk affected labour use more directly through crop technology. The use of labour 
will either increase or decrease production risk, depending on the biophysical environment of 
the farmer and the technology used. The estimates show that farmers adapted labour use 
accordingly. 
The empirical estimates confirm the hypothesis that exogenous employment 
possibilities affect farm labour use. The effect is twofold. First, the availability of year-round 
off-farm employment allows households to use family labour for risk management. As a 
result, there is less need to adapt the use of crop labour to production risk. Depending on crop 
technology and the biophysical environment, this can imply both an increase and a decrease 
in the use of labour. 
The results have interesting consequences for employment policies. Improving dry-
season employment will affect cropping-season labour use. Since the relation between labour 
income and agricultural employment is ambiguous, it is not possible to draw general 
conclusions about the direction of the effect. Depending on the specific production 
environment, dry season employment may either crowd out or stimulate agricultural 
employment. The actual effects are site- and gender-specific. At any rate, evaluations of 
public-works programmes that do not account for these effects are likely to be biased. 
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5. DO PUBLIC WORKS DECREASE FARMERS' SOIL DEGRADATION? 
Labour Income and the Use of Fertilisers In India's Semi-Arid Tropics19 
This chapter focuses on the possibility of using public works to stimulate farmers' fertiliser use in 
India's SAT. Inadequate replenishment of removed nutrients and organic matter has reducedfertility 
and increased erosion rates. Fertiliser use, along with other complementary measures, can help 
reverse this process, which ultimately leads to poverty, hunger, and further environmental 
degradation. In a high-risk environment like India's SAT, there may be a strong relation between off-
farm income and smallholder fertiliser use. Farmers can use the main source of off-farm income, 
wage income, to manage risk as well as to finance inputs. Consequently, the introduction of public-
works programmes in areas with high dry-season unemployment may affect fertiliser use. This study 
confirms the relevance of risk for decisions regarding fertiliser use in two Indian villages. 
Nevertheless, governments cannot use employment policies to stimulate fertiliser use. Public works 
even decreasedfertiliser use in the setting of this study. 
5.1. Introduction 
Sustainability has been an important subject on the political agenda since the 1980s. Many 
people have realised that we cannot sustain economic development if we do not maintain the 
services and quality of natural resources over time. Sustainable development, therefore, 
requires the utilisation of renewable resources at rates less than or equal to the natural rate at 
which they can regenerate. Moreover, waste flows to the environment should be kept at or 
below the assimilative capacity of the environment (Pearce and Turner, 1990). Agricultural 
research and policy in developed countries tends to stress the latter aspect. A major concern is 
the contamination of surface and groundwater from (in)organic fertilisers and pesticides (Parr 
et al, 1990). This type of research has limited relevance for the developing world, where the 
use of chemical inputs is low except in the most productive regions. A sharp degradation of 
natural resources is the basic challenge to be met in this part of the world (e.g. Reardon 
(1995) for the Sahel; Byringiro and Reardon (1997) for Rwanda; and Randhawa and Abrol 
(1990) for India). 
Although several factors have contributed to soil degradation, inadequate 
replenishment of removed nutrients and organic matter has reduced fertility and increased 
This chapter is a revised version of a paper that will be published in Environment and 
Development Economics. 
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erosion rates (Bumb and Baanante, 1996). Between 1954 and 1990, nutrient depletion in 
India has caused light degradation of 1.9 million hectares of land, moderate degradation of 
10.3 million hectares, and severe degradation of 1.5 million hectares (Van Lynden and 
Oldeman, 1997). Declining soil quality on smallholder fields initiates a process that 
ultimately leads to poverty, hunger, malnutrition, and further environmental degradation 
(Pinstrup-Anderson and Pandya-Lorch, 1994). 
Fertiliser use, along with other complementary measures, can help reverse the 
downward spiral of environmental degradation in several ways (Bumb and Baanante, 1996). 
First, fertiliser can provide much-needed nutrients and hence increase crop yields and food 
production. Second, higher yields imply more biomass, which helps maintain soil organic 
matter and vegetative cover. Third, by increasing crop production in high-potential areas, 
fertiliser use can reduce the pressure to clear forests for crop production. In addition, fertiliser 
use can help reduce global warming by enhancing sequestration of carbon in soil organic 
matter. 
Despite the country's impressive record of crop production, India's per-hectare use of 
fertilisers is among the lowest in the world. Overall, less than half of the nutrients removed 
by crop production were applied as chemical fertilisers in 1983 (Randhawa and Abrol, 1990). 
Fertiliser use doubled between 1983 and 1999, but this was accompanied by an increase in 
cereal production of 40%, pulses of 15%, and of other crops of on average 50% (FAO, 1999). 
Moreover, aggregate numbers obscure strong regional differences. Production growth has 
come about largely in irrigated agriculture, and the government is increasingly concerned 
about the exorbitant use of fertilisers in these areas. On the other hand, agriculture has 
developed little in rain-fed areas. Although 70% of the country's gross cropped area is 
farmed under rain-fed conditions, dryland agriculture received only 20% of total fertiliser in 
1983 (Randhawa and Abrol, 1990). What is more, a significant share of cultivated area does 
not receive any fertiliser at all. Application of animal manure and atmospheric deposits 
somewhat reduce the gap between nutrient removal and replenishment resulting from low 
fertiliser use, but not enough to prevent the depletion of large dryland areas. 
The existing nutrient deficits will have an adverse effect on food security and resource 
conservation unless additional efforts are made to promote higher levels of fertiliser use in an 
environmentally sound manner (Bumb and Baanante, 1996). In the near future, a significant 
increase in the use of organic fertilisers is not feasible in India's SAT. Farmers value manure 
highly, but apply far less than what they view as desirable, as fodder availability limits the 
number of livestock that farmers can keep. Moreover, biomass scarcity makes the economics 
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of mulching and green manuring in dryland agriculture decidedly unattractive (Walker and 
Ryan, 1990). 
Effective promotion of fertiliser use requires clear insights into the determinants of 
input use at the farm level. Macroeconomic factors such as trade and exchange rate policy, 
foreign exchange availability, and inflationary pressures are important, but cannot explain 
differences in fertiliser application between neighbours or even regions. To explain these, we 
need to look into the farmers' microeconomic environment. For India's SAT, the major 
features are the large variability of crop yields, the limited development of (especially long-
term) financial markets, and the importance of wage income for smallholder livelihood. 
Wage income may have a strong impact on crop production in general and fertiliser 
use in particular. Households can use wage income to purchase fertilisers if they are unable or 
unwilling to take production loans (Reardon et al., 1994). Moreover, wage income may help 
reduce the variance of overall household income and improve food security by allowing the 
household to buy food in cases of yield shortfalls (Reardon, 1997). Wage income may, 
therefore, induce households to increase the riskiness (and profitability) of their agricultural 
activities. Depending on the relation between fertiliser use and production risk, this will lead 
to either an increase or a decrease in fertiliser use (Hanus and Schoop, 1989). 
The above indicates that rural employment policies can lead to changes in smallholder 
fertiliser use. Village labour markets are reasonably competitive and responsive to the forces 
of supply and demand (Walker and Ryan, 1990). Nevertheless, in some areas unemployment 
rates are relatively high during the slack season. Employment policies could stimulate the use 
of inorganic fertilisers in these areas, provided that wage income increases fertiliser use. 
Despite the potential importance of wages and other sources of off-farm income for 
fertiliser use, few researchers have addressed this topic. Kelly (1988) included off-farm 
income as an explanatory variable in a regression of farmers' fertiliser use. She found that 
off-farm income increased fertiliser use, but her results do not shed light on the workings of 
the underlying decisions and constraints. The model developed in Chapter 3 helps us to 
unravel the household decision process regarding fertiliser use. Contrary to previous research, 
the empirical analysis resulting from this model allows a distinction between the effects of 
risk and credit constraints. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 elaborates on the problem of 
soil mining and describes the interaction between risk, credit, and fertiliser use in India's 
SAT. Section 5.3 examines empirical estimates of the determinants of household-level 
fertiliser use for the two study villages representing distinct agro-ecological and policy 
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regions in India's SAT. Policy recommendations and conclusions are presented in Section 
5.4. 
5.2. Fertiliser use in a risky environment 
5.2.1. Fertiliser use and sustainability 
A recent survey on human-induced soil degradation reports that erosion and depletion of 
plant nutrients is slowly reducing about 80% of the cultivated land in the SAT to 
unproductive, parched terrain (Van Lynden and Oldeman, 1997). The magnitude of soil 
mining in rainfed agriculture is huge. Estimates of average nutrient removal have been as 
high as 200 kg of nitrogen, 30 kg of phosphorous, and 150 kg of potassium per hectare during 
the last decade (NRMP, 2000b). In many areas, the situation has reached the point where 
production gains cannot be achieved without a substantial increase in inputs. Nevertheless, 
farmers rarely perceive erosion and soil depletion as a high-priority problem. The losses in 
current productivity are low and can be masked by increased levels of inputs. Still, the losses 
are alarming in the long run or on a large area basis (Koala, 1999). Counteracting nutrient 
depletion requires an integrated approach including the use of organic as well as mineral 
fertilisers. 
Out of concern for the limited sustainability of current production systems, ICRISAT 
has initiated several projects focussing on improved nutrient management. A region that is 
getting special attention is the Mahbubnagar district, which is representative for rainfall-
unassured red soil areas. The district has degraded soils with low fertility, and the main 
nutrient constraint is nitrogen (NRMP, 2000a). Other regions that are getting special attention 
are those areas with medium-textured black soils. These areas are prone to severe 
degradation. The major biophysical constraints to crop production on these soils are soil 
erosion and depletion of nutrients. 
The two study villages represent the attention areas described above: Aurepalle in the 
Mahbubnagar district represents red-soil areas; while Kanzara in the Akola district represents 
medium-textured black-soil areas. In both villages, the use of inorganic fertilisers is low but 
increasing (see Figure 5.1). Fertiliser use was more widespread in Kanzara than in Aurepalle. 
Especially in the latter village, farmers have applied fertilisers disproportionately to irrigated 
area. The picture is changing as more and more farmers apply fertilisers on their dryland 
crops. Nevertheless, some dryland fields remain unfertilised, and the amount of nutrients 
applied on fertilised fields is low. Tentative nitrogen balances for the major crops and crop 
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mixtures in the two study villages indicate that nutrient removal is at least as high as the SAT 
averages presented above (see Table 5.1). 
Figure 5.1. Spread of fertiliser use in two villages in India's SAT (1975-1984) 
share of fertilised fields kg nutrients/ha on fertilised fields 
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Table 5.1. Tentative nitrogen balances for the study villages (kg/ha) 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
sorghum/pearl castor hybrid sorghum cotton/pigeon 
millet/pigeon pea pea/local sorghum 
Nitrogen additions 
manure 0 0 0 0 
fertiliser 0 0 15 0 
biological N fixation 3 0 0 5 
Nitrogen losses 
removal with crop 24 18 63 23 
leaching ? ? ? ? 
volatilisation 0 0 5 0 
Balance <-21 <-18 <-53 <-18 
Sources: Dev (1994); NRMP (2000a); Walker and Ryan (1990) 
5.2.2. Fertiliser use in a high risk environment 
The results reported in the previous chapters indicate that risk will affect fertiliser use. Inputs 
affect not only the level of output, but also its variability. Hence, farmers can manage risk 
through adaptations in input use. Whether this implies that risk leads to an increase or 
decrease of the use of a specific input depends on the risk characteristics of the input (see 
section 4.2). 
The relation between fertiliser use and the riskiness of crop production is ambiguous 
and depends on the specific environment, crop, and technology. Some researchers have not 
found significant effects of fertiliser intensity on yield variability (e.g., Smale et al (1998) and 
Traxler et al. (1995) for wheat in the Punjab of Pakistan and Mexico, respectively). On the 
other hand, Hanus (1989) concluded that nitrogen applications at the beginning of growth 
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reduce the variability of wheat and barley yields, while applications at later stages increase 
yield variability. Besides timing, the type of technology shapes the relation between nitrogen 
and yield variability, as two studies on Philippine rice cultivation illustrate. In the humid and 
semi-humid areas of the Philippines, nitrogen is risk-reducing for modern rice varieties under 
careful management (Antle and Crissman, 1990), but moderately risk-increasing under 
average technological conditions (Roumasset, 1989). Hence, whether fertiliser increases or 
decreases yield variability is essentially an empirical matter that may well vary considerably 
from site to site (Hanus and Schoop, 1989). It is not possible to extrapolate results from the 
humid and semi-humid tropics to dryer areas, as the frequent occurrence of moisture stress 
could interact with nitrogen to produce greater yield variability with nitrogen application 
(Smith and Umali, 1985). The production function estimates presented in Chapter 3 indicate 
that fertilisers increased risk in both study villages. 
Farmers risk perceptions, however, do not necessarily coincide with the technical 
effect of fertilisers on yield variability. Empirical evidence indicates that fertilisers increase 
the yield variability of sorghum yields in the USA. Nevertheless, SriRamaratnam et al (1987) 
found that 10 out of 12 Texas sorghum producers considered nitrogen fertiliser to be risk-
reducing. Consequently, typical U.S. farmers apply more nitrogen than the profit-maximising 
level (Babcock, 1992). This is rational if ex post optimal fertiliser rates are positively 
correlated with yield.20 In this case, fertilising for average conditions leads to relatively high 
levels of foregone income in good years, while the costs of some additional fertilisers in 
normal years are relatively low (Babcock and Blackmer, 1994). Uncertainty about the 
availability of nitrogen in the soil can also explain the observed high levels of nitrogen 
application. If the marginal product of nitrogen is a convex function, increasing uncertainty 
about the availability of soil nitrogen will increase nitrogen application. This is true for many 
functions, such as the Cobb-Douglas and the Mitscherlich production function (Babcock, 
1992). The intuition of this result is that increasing nitrogen usage above the amount that is 
needed on average imposes less loss when soil nitrogen is abundant than the gain when soil 
nitrogen is deficient. 
2 0 This condition holds if fertiliser is inexpensive relative to its marginal value in production when 
less-than-optimal rates are applied. 
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5.3. Farmers' fertiliser use in the study villages 
5.3.1. The empirical model 
The model from Chapter 3 can easily be extended to include fertiliser use as an additional 
input besides labour. The resulting first-order conditions for fertiliser use equal that for 
labour, but for inclusion of the fertiliser price instead of the wage rate. Analogous to Eq (4.6), 
the first-order condition for fertiliser use is 
pj^r) EUC2 + A P i _ E{UC2g8is) 
P E{UC2g&) PPE(uC2gJ i r E{UC2gJ' 
The rationale for decisions on fertiliser use is thus the same as that for labour use. 
Credit constraints can prevent farmers from buying the desired amount of fertiliser. The 
impact of risk is subtler. Farmers with limited options to smooth consumption will try to 
stabilise income. One way of doing this is adapting fertiliser use to account for the effect of 
fertilisers on output variability. Depending on the crop technology and the production 
environment, this may imply either an increase or a decrease in fertiliser intensity compared 
to a risk-free setting. The effects of both risk and credit constraints can be alleviated through 
adaptations in family labour supply: labour income provides liquidity and can stabilise total 
income. 
The reduced-form equation for fertiliser use derived from the extended model is 
^F{A,p^w2,Pl,r,y,Tx,T2,p,Z). (5.2) 
Village-specific fertiliser functions account for the differences between Aurepalle and 
Kanzara. The estimates use data on the application of the most frequently utilised nutrient: 
nitrogen. As only some of the farmers apply nitrogen, suitable regression methods are tobit 
regression and Cragg's model: a combination of probit and truncated regression. The second 
option was used in the present study, as equality of the effects of the independent variables on 
the decision to use fertilisers and the quantity of fertilisers used is strongly rejected. 
The reported variance estimators are robust for the panel nature of the data: the 
estimation method does not assume independence of the observations for a single household. 
However, contrary to the previous estimates in this study, the equations do not cover an 
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individual effect that takes up fixed household characteristics. Several proxies for household 
preferences and farming skills partly compensate this shortcoming: the age of the household 
head, caste, the number of literate household members, and the number of household 
members with secondary education (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics (1976-1984) 
Aurepalle (N=259) Kanzara (N=253) 
mean standard dev. mean standard dev. 
Inorganic nitrogen use 
nitrogen intensity (kg/ha) 5.67627 10.5504 12.6299 15.9155 
nitrogen for users (kg/ha) 12.1969 12.6512 18.6863 16.1755 
% of cases with nitrogen>0 46.5385 49.9762 67.5889 46.8969 
Agricultural resources 
cultivated area (ha) 3.28075 2.78028 5.70128 7.07898 
irrigated area/total area 0.09885 0.17177 0.03411 0.11303 
expected yield (Rs/ha) 1021.72 520.298 1025.50 370.260 
inherent riskiness of land (j) 118.080 50.9130 591.886 373.631 
bullock owned (yes=l) 0.60385 0.49000 0.57312 0.49561 
Prices 
female planting wage rate (Rs/hr) 0.40786 0.12955 0.44408 0.07794 
bullock price (Rs/hr) 1.40207 0.21561 2.19089 0.25969 
nitrogen price (Rs/kg) 5.92966 0.52076 6.57985 0.92464 
Skills 
farm caste (yes=l) 0.34231 0.47540 0.45850 0.49926 
age household head 54.1385 12.5531 44.3004 9.56581 
number of literate adults 1.32692 1.99150 2.45455 2.00270 
adults with secondary education 0.36539 0.84353 0.60079 1.20297 
Household assets 
liquid assets (Rs) 5237.56 8131.29 6328.90 12083.8 
owned land (ha) 5.60015 7.27233 5.26660 6.49759 
livestock ownership (Rs) 4222.29 4374.70 2091.12 2572.31 
Labour endowment 
adults 3.76154 1.61940 4.20949 2.21279 
Note: All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
In order to detect nonlinearities in the relation between risk, asset ownership, and 
fertiliser use, the first regression included interaction terms and quadratic variables. Only the 
interaction term between risk and liquid assets appeared influential and was retained in the 
final regression. Moreover, the Kanzara equations and the Aurepalle probit equation include a 
quadratic term for cultivated area. In the case of the Aurepalle truncated regression, inclusion 
of such a term only decreased the significance of the effect of cultivated area. As in the 
previous regressions, Hausman tests could not reject exogeneity of liquid assets. Tests for 
structural breaks were inconclusive due to the use of maximum likelihood estimation with 
limited degrees of freedom. However, the estimates for subsamples did not seem to alter the 
results much. 
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Table 5.2. Estimates of nitrogen intensity In two villages in India's SAT (1976-1984) 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
probit truncated probit truncated 
(N=259) (N=113) (N=253) (N=164) 
Agricultural resources 
cultivated area (ha) 0 .86235" -1.77828** 0 .33178" -3.31873*** 
(0.43390) (0.74799) (0.13380) (0.99605) 
cultivated area squared -0.02988* -0.01173*** 0.06917*" 
(0.01662) (0.00445) (0.02341) 
irrigated area/total area 14.3419*** 44.5129*** 1.37564 17.0638* 
(4.24983) (14.4854) (2.05306) (9.67977) 
expected yield (Rs/ha) -0.00078 -0.00116 0.00062* 0.00757* 
(0.00104) (0.00431) (0.00033) (0.00439) 
inherent riskiness o f land (j) -0.02199 0.11857** -0.00111 0.02402* 
(0.01733) (0.04875) (0.00153) (0.01377) 
bullock owned (yes=l ) 0.53122 3.67935 0.11420 -10.8307*** 
(0.36503) (2.51825) (0.30276) (3.39499) 
Priced 
wage rate (Rs/hr) -1 .36024 87.7600* -1.67245 -12.1602 
(3.39617) (50.4360) (2.96979) (22.1566) 
bullock price (Rs/hr) -0.33288 -7.70530*** -3.39667*" -8.72447 
(0.85725) (2.75989) (0.93294) (15.5073) 
nitrogen price (Rs/kg) -0.53668 7.04020 0.49790 0.50737 
(0.32851) (6.32957) (0.31159) (2.91637) 
Skills 
age household head 0.03257** -0.18462* -0.01678 0 . 3 3 4 3 1 " 
(0.01411) (0.09917) (0.01828) (0.14187) 
number of literate adults 0.29498 1.40525 -0.12154 0.41088 
(0.23299) (1.10303) (0.15166) (1.38868) 
adults with secondary education -0.55973* - 1 . 8 9 7 1 1 " -0.04125 -0 .75124 
(0.31833) (0.85945) (0.27597) (1.16522) 
farm caste (yes= l ) 1.11164* 0.93046 1.01559"* 7 . 7 4 2 0 2 " 
(0.62841) (3.74715) (0.25770) (3.63850) 
Household assets 
liquid assets (1000 Rs) -0.25157* 0.49149** -0.28066*" 0.78501* 
(0.14086) (0.24553) (0.08529) (0.47525) 
liquid assets (1000 Rs) x riskiness 0 .00245" -0.00280** 0.00063*"* -0.00052* 
(0.00111) (0.00113) (0.00017) (0.00031) 
owned land (ha) -0.10620** 0.04493 0.04467 0.16257 
(0.04836) (0.11147) (0.06052) (0.32911) 
livestock ownership (1000 Rs) 0.01354 0 .37659" -0.06516 1.19860 
(0.03998) (0.16732) (0.23216) (0.85467) 
Labour endowment 
adults -0.18034 -0.60144 -0.02039 -1.69336** 
(0.15133) (0.92720) (0.09473) (0.83889) 
year 0.28003 ^t.66122 -0.05872 3.03234* 
(0.18871) (2.94492) (0.09334) (1.70389) 
constant -24.2678* 361.702 10.1557 -232.216 
(12.8922) (255.780) (7.99705) (153.220) 
o 5.30917"* 
(0.58813) 
10.56809*** 
(1.255846) 
W a l d x 2 203.97 28753.20 247.99 559.39 
Notes: * Standard errors are in parenlheses. Standard errors are robust for within-household dependence of observations. 
b Previous year's output prices for the major crops are included in the regression but not in the table: paddy and 
castor in Aurepalle, cotton in Kanzara, pigeon pea and sorghum in both villages. 
° Egualitvjjf the coefficients for men and women was not rejected at the 5% level. 
*, ** and ** indicate significance at the 0 .10 ,0 .05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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5.3.2. Results 
The estimates give a clear impression of the effects of risk, short-term credit constraints, and 
family labour on the use of fertilisers in the two study villages (see Table 5.2). Risk strongly 
affected the use of fertiliser, while the impact of credit constraints appeared to be negligible. 
Despite the importance of risk for fertiliser use and the potential use of family labour to 
manage risk, increased fertiliser use is not a by-product of policies enhancing employment. 
On the contrary, a decrease in unemployment would even have lead to a decrease in fertiliser 
use. The rest of this section elaborates on these and other results of the regression. 
Farmers in both villages increased the amount of nitrogen applied in response to risk. 
This contradicts the technical relation apparent from the variance function: fertiliser use 
increased the variance of output. However, the behaviour of the households coincides with 
the behaviour of US farmers described in Section 5.2. These farmers perceived fertilisers as 
risk-decreasing inputs, while in fact fertilisers increased output variability. The effect of risk 
on nitrogen levels was highest in the high-risk village of Aurepalle, where fertiliser use was 
least widespread: the risk elasticity of nitrogen intensity was 0.7 for Kanzara and 1.2 for 
Aurepalle.21 Risk did not directly affect the probability of nitrogen use. 
The asset coefficients reveal that risk was more important than short-term credit 
constraints were for fertiliser use. This coincides with the findings for labour use presented in 
Chapter 4. In Aurepalle, larger landowners were less likely to use fertilisers as they had more 
alternatives to stabilise consumption. The coefficient for land ownership is not significant in 
Kanzara. Inter-village differences in the availability of long-term credit may explain this 
difference. In Aurepalle, households increased borrowing in low-income years. Large 
landowners have more collateral and can borrow more. Kanzara farmers had much less 
access to consumption-smoothing credit. 
Liquid assets increased the use of risk-decreasing fertilisers, just like they decreased 
the use of stabilising male labour in Kanzara. This reflects prudence: households preferred 
spending their own funds to taking a loan, which they must repay even when yields are low. 
The positive effect of liquid assets decreased at high levels of risk. On the other hand, the 
impact of liquid assets on the probability of fertiliser use was negative because of the 
importance of liquid assets for consumption smoothing. This effect also decreased with the 
level of risk. 
These elasticities are computed at village means for fertiliser users. 
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Farm households with more family members used significantly less fertiliser in 
Kanzara. This finding confirms the important role of family labour in risk management. 
Households were less inclined to adapt fertiliser use to manage risk if they could use their 
labour endowment to cope with production risk. This result confirms the findings reported in 
Chapters 3 and 4. These indicate that farm households in Kanzara could use family labour to 
compensate negative shocks in crop income at least partly. Aurepalle households could not 
do this. They could only increase labour supply in anticipation of risk. Because of the 
relatively large stabilising impact of family labour in Kanzara, labour-rich households felt 
less need to use male labour to stabilise crop production in this village. In Aurepalle, the 
family labour endowment did not affect the use of labour in crop production. The current 
results indicate that a very similar story holds for the use of fertilisers. 
The remaining results do not directly relate to risk and liquidity constraints, but 
present other interesting insights into the determinants of fertiliser use. Manure and inorganic 
nitrogen were complements: livestock ownership increased fertiliser use in Aurepalle. Input 
prices had only a limited impact on fertiliser use. Own-price elasticity is not significantly 
different from zero in any of the equations, while wage-elasticity is only significant in the 
level equation for Aurepalle. This significantly positive wage elasticity indicates that labour 
and fertilisers were substitutes. The price elasticities for bullocks were negative, although 
they are only significant in the level equation for Aurepalle and the probability equation for 
Kanzara. These negative bullock price elasticities indicate that animal traction and inorganic 
nitrogen were complements: crops benefit more from fertilisers in well-worked soil. In this 
light, the negative coefficient for bullock ownership in Kanzara is puzzling. 
The estimates confirm the presence of an exogenous positive time trend in the level of 
nitrogen use in Kanzara. Both the probability of fertilisation and the level of nitrogen 
increased in Kanzara. Surprisingly, the regressions do not pick up the strong upward trend in 
the probability of fertiliser use in Aurepalle that seems apparent from Figure 5.1: the time 
trend in this specific equation is positive, but only significant at the 15% level or higher. 
Furthermore, the probability of fertiliser use increased with cultivated area, while the nitrogen 
intensity decreased with area size in both villages. These effects levelled off for very large 
farms. 
As expected, irrigation was an important determinant of fertiliser use. The irrigation 
coefficients are significantly positive in all equations, except the probability equation for 
Kanzara. These results are in line with the observation that, in both villages, irrigated area has 
laid claim to a relatively large share of fertilisers, but that in Kanzara, dryland crops also 
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received an appreciable amount. In the latter village, fertiliser use was higher on soils with a 
higher expected yield. This effect was dominated by the irrigation effect in Aurepalle. 
Finally, household skills had a significant impact on fertiliser use. The age of the 
household head increased the level of nitrogen used in Kanzara and the probability of 
nitrogen use in Aurepalle. Nevertheless, in the latter village, older farmers applied smaller 
quantities of nitrogen than their younger colleagues did. Their experience induced them to 
use fertilisers, but only in small quantities. The farm caste dummy also reflects the 
importance of farming skills for fertiliser use. Households from traditional farming castes 
were more likely to use fertilisers and apply larger quantities. Literacy did not affect fertiliser 
use, while secondary education decreases both the probability and the level of nitrogen 
applications in Aurepalle. Apparently, highly educated families did not put a high value on 
agriculture. 
5.4. Conclusion and policy implications 
Fertilisers are important inputs in smallholder production in India's SAT. Not only do they 
affect crop yields and profits, they also have a strong impact on the future production 
capacity of dryland soils. Currently, nutrient balances are strongly negative, and special 
efforts are required to maintain soil productivity. As the potential for organic fertilisation is 
limited, restoring nutrient balances involves a significant increase in fertiliser use. In order to 
design effective policy measures for achieving this goal, governments need a profound 
insight into the determinants of smallholder fertiliser use. 
The analysis for fertiliser use runs parallel to the analysis of labour supply in the 
previous chapter. The theoretical grounds for the use of all variable inputs are identical. This 
implies that credit constraints will decrease the use of fertilisers, while the effect of 
production risk is ambiguous. Family labour mitigates the impact of both risk and credit 
constraints. 
Estimates for the study villages reveal that risk strongly affected fertiliser use: output 
variability increased the use of fertilisers in both villages. This implies that the village 
households utilised fertilisers to decrease risk, which coincides with the behaviour of U.S. 
farmers. The effects of the farmers' asset endowment on fertiliser use confirm this 
observation: wealthier households, which were better able to smooth consumption, used less 
inorganic nitrogen. On the other hand, constraints on short-term credit did not limit fertiliser 
use. This corresponds with the findings for labour use described in Chapter 4. 
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A starting-point of this research was the notion that employment policies might affect 
fertiliser use. The model suggests that off-farm employment decreases the effect of risk on 
fertiliser use and thus leads to a lower use of fertilisers. This implies that the introduction of 
public works or self-employment programmes in areas with high levels of dry-season 
unemployment would diminish fertiliser use. The regressions confirm this effect: fertiliser 
use decreased in reaction to improved off-farm employment opportunities as measured by the 
family labour endowment. In other words, dry-season employment programmes, although 
valuable in their own right, cannot be used to promote smallholder fertiliser use. 2 2 
The empirical estimates suggest another interesting, although not very surprising, 
direction for policy. In the study period, lack of knowledge has limited fertiliser use. Older 
farmers from traditional farming families used more fertilisers than their fellow villagers did. 
The greater familiarity of farmers with modern inputs in later years explains probably at least 
part of the positive time trend for nitrogen use. Given that India's fertiliser use was still low 
by the end of the 1990s, it nevertheless seems justified to conclude that extension is even now 
a suitable method to stimulate fertiliser application. Extension is a more effective method 
than (changes in) price subsidies: the nitrogen price did not significantly affect the nitrogen 
use during the survey period. 
On the other hand, stimulating off-farm employment could help decrease nutrient pollution in 
high-production areas. To test this assertion, more information on the specific production environment 
and household behaviour in these areas is needed. 
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6. FARM-HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN A RISKY ENVIRONMENT: 
The Role of the Labour Market in India's Semi-Arid Tropics 
A simple two-stage simulation model based on the analytical model and the regression results from 
Chapters 3 to 5 is presented in this chapter. The simulation model consists of a production function, 
an income equation, and reduced form equations for the use of all major inputs and household labour 
supply. The results indicate that the risk-management strategies presented in Chapter 3—ex ante 
risk management and ex post income smoothing through family labour supply — were effective in 
increasing the minimum income of the survey households. Much more important for income stability 
was, however, the flow of labour income that households earned independent of their risk preferences. 
The simulations also reveal that the impact of production risk on household income through changes 
in input use was small. Finally, harvest-wage variability due to yield covariance had little effect on 
household behaviour. 
6.1. Introduction 
Several interesting findings regarding the relation between family labour and crop input use 
in a risky environment were presented in the previous chapters. These chapters show that 
farm households in two villages in India's SAT use family labour as well as crop inputs to 
manage income variability. However, what was the quantitative importance of the various 
risk management strategies for the level and stability of household income? The previous 
chapters likewise did not deal with the potential covariance of yield shocks and the resulting 
household reactions regarding labour supply and demand in the harvest-stage. To what extent 
did yield covariance hinder harvest-stage risk coping? Before explaining the approach 
followed to address these unresolved issues, this introduction will first go somewhat deeper 
into the research questions suggested by the results from Chapters 3-5. 
It was shown in Chapter 3 that the farm households studied used labour markets to 
manage income risk. Small and medium farmers in Kanzara compensated, on average, 21% 
of unexpected losses in crop income through increases in the family supply of harvest labour. 
In Aurepalle, this number was a negligible 4%. There, farmers increased family-labour 
supply during the planting stage in response to risk. Besides, the very presence of a secure 
labour income decreased the chance of very low incomes in both villages. These observations 
leave us with two questions: What was the quantitative effect of this ex ante behaviour on the 
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intertemporal distribution of income? And how important was the stable flow of labour 
income for decreasing the coefficient of variation (CV) of household income? 
Chapters 4 and 5 revealed that risk affected the use of variable inputs in crop 
production and that labour income could reduce these effects. Farmers believed that the use 
of inorganic nitrogen decreased yield risk. An increase in production risk, therefore, led to an 
increase in fertiliser use. A similar, but somewhat more complicated story can be told for the 
use of crop labour. In Aurepalle, farm households considered both male and female labour as 
risk-increasing inputs. Consequently, production risk led to a decrease in the use of both 
types of labour. On the other hand, Kanzara fanners considered male labour as risk-
decreasing and female labour as risk-neutral. They, therefore, increased the use of male 
labour in response to an increase in production risk. The presence of able-bodied family 
members decreased the effects of risk on input use in Kanzara. Kanzara households could 
stabilise income ex post by increasing family-labour supply after a bad harvest. This 
decreased the need to use crop inputs to manage risk ex ante. Aurepalle households had only 
limited possibilities to use family labour for ex post income smoothing. Hence, in this village, 
the household labour endowment did not affect input use. Chapters 4 and 5 considered the 
implications of these interactions between risk, input use, and family labour for labour market 
policies and sustainability. But how large was the effect of risk-induced changes in input use 
on household income? 
Finally, Chapters 3-5 considered the response of individual households to production 
risk. Individual responses are, however, likely to interact at the aggregate level (Barnum, 
1979). In the study setting, this interaction could have resulted in riskiness of the harvest-
wage rate. Consider a village with an insulated labour market like the study villages. Now 
suppose that this village experiences a dry spell causing large yield losses for all village 
farmers. These low yields are associated not only with a low demand for harvest labour, but 
also with a high supply of family labour: households will try to compensate the loss of crop 
income by offering their labour in the market. Hence, wage rates will dramatically decrease 
or, if wage rates are downward sticky, unemployment rates will rise substantially. In other 
words, covariate yield shocks will inhibit the use of labour markets for ex post income 
smoothing. The model used in the previous chapters ignores this possibility. The question is 
to what extent did covariate yield shocks limit the usefulness of labour markets for income 
smoothing in the two study villages? 
In the present chapter, a simple simulation model based on the results from the 
previous chapters is presented to answer the above questions. The structure of the chapter is 
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as follows. Section 6.2 describes the simulation model, while section 6.3 presents the results 
from base-run simulations and from simulations of changes in risk and family labour. Section 
6.4 addresses the issue of stochastic harvest wage rates. Conclusions are presented in Section 
6.5. 
6.2. Simulation of household behaviour 
A simple simulation model based on the regression functions from the previous chapters is 
presented in this section. Central to the model is the uncertainty of crop yields in the planting 
stage. In the planting stage, the household decides on the level of labour supply and input use 
given resource endowments, preferences, prevailing prices, and the inherent riskiness of land. 
The inputs are used in an agricultural production process that is modified by a stochastic 
shock. The result of this process is the standing crop at the beginning of the harvest stage. 
Given this crop, the household subsequently decides on the amount of harvest labour to be 
used and the number of hours to be worked during the harvest stage. The final result of this 
decision process is total household income and total family labour supply. Both are 
stochastic, as they are affected by a random yield shock. 
Central to the model is a stochastic production function (see (Eq (3.1)). This function 
includes a random shock with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. In order to get a clear 
impression of the impact of such a shock, a random series of 1000 shocks with distribution 
iV(0,l) was generated. Each shock is associated with a certain level of production, income, 
and labour supply. Combined, these outcomes present the effect of yield risk on household 
income. As the model does not include a utility function, it cannot be used to do a welfare 
analysis of household behaviour. The reduced form equations, however, represent actual 
household responses to exogenous changes. Hence, the simulation results are indicative of the 
importance of risk and family labour for crop production and household income in the study 
villages. 
The previous chapters provide several important components of the simulation model: 
the production function (Chapter 3), labour supply functions (Chapter 3), and functions for 
the use of three major crop inputs: male and female planting labour (Chapter 4) and inorganic 
nitrogen (Chapter 5). Besides these functions, the simulation model includes an equation 
specifying household income as a function of crop production, input use, labour supply, wage 
rates, and prices. Finally, the model comprises functions for two remaining crop inputs: 
bullock traction and harvest labour. The sections below present the estimates for the latter 
functions. 
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6.2.1. Animal traction 
Table 6.1 presents estimates for the use of bullock traction in the two study villages. The 
independent variables equal the variables in the labour and fertiliser use equations, which are 
presented in section 4.3.1. As joint insignificance of all consumption-related variables could 
not be rejected for Aurepalle, the function for this village is estimated including production 
characteristics and prices only. Two-stage least-squares regression was used to account for 
the endogeneity of cultivated area in the Kanzara equation. The current section discusses only 
the second stage of the regression. The results of the first stage are presented in Appendix 3. 
Bullock ownership had a significant positive effect on the use of oxen traction in 
Kanzara. This confirms the conjecture from Chapter 2 that the seasonality of production may 
have inhibited the full development of a rental market for bullocks. The absence of an effect 
of bullock ownership on the use of oxen in Aurepalle, however, indicates that the traction 
market worked quite smoothly in this village. These results are in line with with the findings 
from Chapters 4 and 5: bullock ownership increased the use of male labour and fertilisers in 
Kanzara, but did not affect input use in Aurepalle. 
In both villages, bullock intensity decreased with farm size. Kanzara farmers utilised 
more traction on soils with low expected yields, while there was no significant effect of land 
quality on the use of animal traction in Aurepalle. Given expected yields, irrigation did not 
affect bullock use in either village. The bullock intensity increased over time in Kanzara, 
while it was constant in Aurepalle. 
The own-price elasticity of bullock use was significantly negative in both villages. 
Nitrogen prices did not affect bullock use. The wage elasticity was significantly positive in 
Kanzara. This indicates that animal traction and labour were substitutes in this village. On the 
other hand, wage rates did not significantly affect the use of bullock traction in Aurepalle. 
There were two separate relations between labour and traction. Firstly, male labour and 
animal traction were complements. Secondly, hand weeding by women and mterculturing by 
oxen were substitutes. The joint effect differed between the two villages. 
Production risk did not affect bullock use in either village. In line with this behaviour, 
the proxies for the household capacity to manage risk —illiquid asset holdings and family 
labour— did not affect bullock use. Nevertheless, Kanzara farmers holding greater stocks of 
liquid assets used more animal traction. The same was observed for male labour and 
inorganic nitrogen: farmers were prudent and preferred using their own money to borrowed 
money. 
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Table 6.1. Fixed effect estimates of ln(bullock hrs/ha) (1976-1984) 
Aurepalle" Kanzara 
(N=254) (N=247) 
Agricultural Resources 
-0.41079* ^(cultivated area)b -0.11203*" 
(0.04059) (0.21259) 
irrigated area/total area 0.35484 -0.15425 
(0.24428) (0.20703) 
unexpected yield) 0.08776 -0.21424* 
(0.11328) (0.12075) 
ln(riskiness land (j)) -0.03126 
(0.13121) 
Bullock owned (yes=l) -0.02955 0.35610*" 
(0.05792) (0.10613) 
Prices 
ln(wage rate) -0.24838 1.60397*** 
(0.70633) (0.5186) 
ln(bullock price) -0.82059* -0.69704* 
(0.46272) (0.38737) 
ln(nitrogen price) 0.49141 0.06078 
(0.38600) (0.24484) 
Assets 
ln(liquid assets) 0.08165*" 
(0.03023) 
ln(land owned) 0.00990 
(0.16943) 
ln(livestock) 0.00602 
(0.02034) 
Labour endowment 
ln(adults) 0.01700 
(0.08939) 
year 0.02595 0.03711* 
(0.09872) (0.02038) 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.45 
Notes: a Profit maximisation could not be rejected at the 10% level. 
b Ln(previous-year cultivated area) was used as an instrument for this variable in the Kanzara 
equation. (See Appendix 3.) 
All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
Previous-year village-level prices for pigeon pea, sorghum, cotton (only Kanzara), paddy and 
castor (only Aurepalle) were included in the regression but not in the table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
6.2.2. Harvest-stage labour use 
The analytical model presented in Chapter 3 predicts that production and consumption 
decisions are separable in the harvest stage. Consequently, profit maximisation and not 
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household utility maximisation drives harvest-labour use. This assumption was tested by 
estimating an extended harvest-labour function mcluding variables related to profit 
maximisation — the value of output, output prices, and the wage rate — as well as utility 
maximisation — labour endowment and asset ownership. F-tests for the joint significance of 
the latter variables indicate that the assumption of separability is justified: labour endowment 
and asset ownership were jointly insignificant at the 10% level. This conclusion may come as 
a surprise for the village of Aurepalle, where the flexibility of harvest-stage labour supply 
was limited. However, it confirms the hypothesis that this limited flexibility resulted from 
high unemployment rates during the dry season and not from labour market imperfections 
during actual harvesting. 
Following the above results, the ultimate reduced form labour-use function assumes 
profit maximisation (see Table 6.2). Two-stage least squares was used to cope with the 
endogeneity of output value (see Appendix 3 for the first-stage estimates.) The explanatory 
power of both functions is over 90%. The output elasticity of harvest labour was 1.00 in 
Kanzara and 0.75 in Aurepalle. As expected, the wage elasticities were negative for both 
villages: -0.92 and -0.53 in Aurepalle and Kanzara, respectively. Comparing these numbers, 
we see that Aurepalle farmers were relatively responsive to changes in wage rates, while 
Kanzara farmers accounted most strongly for changes in output. A shift in cropping pattern 
may have caused the time trends observed. 
Table 6.2. Fixed effect estimates of ln(harvest labour hrs) (1976-1984) 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
(N=262) (N=271). 
ln(output value)3 0.75232*** 0.99554*** 
(0.09152) (0.06343) 
ln(wage rate) -0.91659*** -0.52781** 
(0.14365) (0.20520) 
year 0.06679*** -0.02229* 
(0.01963) (0.01171) 
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.92 
Notes: a Instruments are used for this variable (see Appendix 3 for the first-stage estimates) 
All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
Previous-year village-level prices for pigeon pea, sorghum, cotton (only Kanzara), paddy 
(only Aurepalle), and castor (only Aurepalle) were included in the regression but not in the 
table. 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively 
Recall that equality of planting and harvest production was imposed to estimate the 
production function in Chapter 3. The estimates presented in Table 6.2 indicate that this 
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assumption is not fully correct. Farmers did not simply harvest a given crop, but decided on 
the amount of harvest labour to use based on the state of the crop and harvest wage rates. 
However, the effect that this decision had on harvested output is not likely to be very large. 
6.2. Farm-household labour supply and income in a risky environment 
6.3.1. The representative households 
Three representative farm households were defined for each village. These households are 
loosely called farmers in the remainder of this chapter. As the main concern of the study is 
the relation between crop production and family labour, the most logical clustering of village 
households starts from the size of the area under cultivation. Following previous research 
(Walker and Ryan, 1990), the households are divided into three farm-size groups that 
represent equal shares of the village population (see Table 2.2). For each group, the median 
values for the exogenous variables in the regression functions define a representative 
household (see Table 6.3 and Appendix 4). 
Table 6.3. The representative households 
small 
Aurepalle 
medium large small 
Kanzara 
medium large 
Agricultural resources 
cultivated area (ha) 0.8 2.3 5 1.2 3 8 
share of irrigation (%) 0 0 20 0 0 0 
expected yield (Rs/ha) 1595 1974 1755 
inherent riskiness (j) 72 99 158 330 510 830 
ex ante CV of yield 639 703 1056 
bullock owned no yes yes no yes yes 
Asset ownership 
liquid assets (Rs) 938 2061 3138 692 1137 7000 
land (ha) 0.9 2.6 7.5 1.3 2.5 9 
livestock (Rs) 1230 2142 5405 378 848 3500 
Labour endowment 
men 2 2 2 2 2 2 
women 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Skills 
farm caste no no yes no yes no 
age 52 52 52 45 45 45 
literate adults 0 0 2 1 1 4 
adults with sec. education 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The only exception is the group of large farmers in Kanzara. The median size of 
cultivated area for this group is 10 hectares. These very large farms are, however, not of 
interest for the current study: Chapter 3 reveals that Kanzara farmers cultivating over 8 
hectares of land do not use family labour for risk management. Hence, the representative 
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large-farm household in Kanzara cultivates only 8 hectares. The other exogenous variables 
are adapted accordingly. 
There are striking differences between the six farm households. The Kanzara 
representative farms are bigger than the corresponding Aurepalle farms. Moreover, the 
productivity of the black Kanzara soils is much higher than that of the red Aurepalle soils. 
While expected yields are relatively uniform between the Kanzara three farmers, there are 
large differences in yield expectations in Aurepalle. The large farmer has relatively high yield 
expectations because part of his land is irrigated. On the other hand, expected yields are low 
for the small farmer. Recall that the production function includes a small farmer dummy to 
account for the low yields observed for small farmers. 
Gamma increases with farm size and is much higher for Kanzara farmers than for 
Aurepalle farmers. This does not mean that risk is lower in Aurepalle. Gamma covers only 
the exogenous part of output variance. Total variance is just slightly lower in Aurepalle than 
in Kanzara, and coefficients of variation computed from the production function are highest 
for Aurepalle. 
Asset ownership increases with cultivated area in both villages. Land ownership is 
lowest for the small farmer in Aurepalle and highest for the large farmer in Kanzara. The two 
medium farmers own similar amounts of land. Aurepalle farmers own more livestock than 
Kanzara farmers from the same farm-size class. The inter-village division of liquid assets is 
complex. The Kanzara large farmer owns by far the most liquid assets, while for the other 
farmsize groups, liquid asset ownership is highest in Aurepalle. Bullock ownership is 
confined to the representative medium and large farmers in both villages. 
The availability of family labour does not differ between villages and farm sizes: all 
representative households are defined to consist of two men and two women. As children do 
not affect the simulations, the representative households are made up of adults alone. 
Education increases with farm size and is more widespread in Kanzara than in Aurepalle. In 
Aurepalle, the representative large farmer belongs to a traditional farm caste, while in 
Kanzara this farmer originates from a family of landowners, and the medium farmer is the 
one from the farm caste. 
6.3.2. Base-run scenario 
Substituting the characteristics of the representative households in the regression functions is 
not sufficient to obtain base-run estimates of input use and labour supply. Most decision 
functions are estimated using fixed-effects regression. Hence, the simulation model requires 
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the inclusion of fixed effects for each reference household and each relevant function. The 
fixed effects included are such that the outcome of each function approaches the median for 
the observed value in the respective farmsize group.23 This led to fixed effects that lie within 
the range of estimated values for all equations. 
Table 6.4 presents the results of the base-run simulation. Crop production was 
restricted to be positive, while minimum harvest labour supply was set at two hours per 
cultivated hectare. The latter is only relevant for the large farmers. Mean values and SDs and 
CVs summarise the effect of the stochastic shock. There are clear differences in behaviour 
between the villages and the households. Differences in input use and labour supply result 
from differences in fixed effects and for reasons explained in the previous chapters. 
Nevertheless, some points are worth stressing. 
Table 6.4. Crop production, income, and labour supply 
small 
Aurepalle 
medium large small 
Kanzara 
medium large 
Input use 
male labour (hrs/ha) 88 106 116 122 128 124 
female labour (hrs/ha) 15 21 85 155 151 125 
inorganic nitrogen (kg/ha) 0 0 6 0 17 4 
bullock traction (hrs/ha) 85 96 111 61 79 93 
Crop output 
mean output (Rs) 552 1752 7164 1140 5397 12353 
mean yield (Rs/ha) 682 762 1433 942 1799 1544 
SD output 368 818 2840 651 1938 3098 
CV of output 67 47 40 57 36 25 
Crop income 
mean crop income (Rs) 387 1418 5736 578 4099 9654 
% crop income to total 28 65 90 17 62 87 
SD crop income 325 738 2580 506 1726 2725 
CV crop income 84 52 45 88 42 28 
Labour supply 
mean labour supply (hrs) 2130 1655 1332 3596 3344 1917 
mean labour supply per capita 533 414 333 899 836 479 
SD labour supply 25 58 201 177 602 771 
CV labour supply 1 3 15 5 18 40 
Total income 
mean total income (Rs) 1385 2189 6338 3328 6621 11054 
mean total income per capita 346 547 1585 832 1655 2764 
SD total income 312 710 2483 359 1224 2122 
CV total income 23 32 39 11 18 19 
The CV of output decreases with farm-size in both villages and is highest in the 
rainfall-unassured village of Aurepalle. Kanzara farmers obtain relatively high yields due to 
I considered the median values for input use per hectare and labour supply per adult. 
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the high productivity of their soils and the corresponding high input intensity. The yield 
differences between the three Kanzara farmers are mostly the result of differences in fertiliser 
use. Both the medium and the large farmer use fertilisers. The medium farmer applies a 
relatively high dosage of inorganic nitrogen. He belongs to a traditional farm caste, and 
members of these castes use more fertilisers than their fellow villagers do (see section 5.3.2). 
In Aurepalle, the yield differences follow the yield expectations presented in Table 6.3. 
Yields are especially high for the large farmer, who not only has irrigation but also uses 
fertilisers and relatively high amounts of the other inputs. 
The various coefficients of variation expose the stabilising effect of family labour: the 
CVs of total income, i.e., crop income plus labour income, are much smaller than the CVs of 
crop income alone. The effect is largest for the small farmers, as these have a relatively high 
share of labour income in total income. The stabilising effect of labour income is smallest for 
the Aurepalle large farmer. Labour income is only a small part of his total income, and he has 
a limited capacity to increase his family labour supply when yields are low (see Chapter 3). 
Table 6.5 quantifies the relative importance of the three stabilising effects of labour 
income: i) the presence of a stable flow of income; if) ex ante risk management through 
labour supply, which is relevant in only Aurepalle; hi) ex post income smoothing through 
adapting labour supply to actual crop production. Both the stable stock of income and labour 
supply for ex ante risk management affect only the level of income and not the income 
variability. In theory, the opposite holds for ex post income smoothing. Nevertheless, ex post 
smoothing increases average income for the Kanzara large farmer. This is the result of the 
minimum set on harvest labour supply: in very good years, the household cannot decrease 
labour supply any further. 
The presence of a stable flow of labour income explains most of the difference 
between the level and CV of crop income and of total income in both villages. The CV of 
crop income plus non-risk related labour income is 70% and 83% percent lower than the CV 
of crop income alone for the Aurepalle and the Kanzara small farmer, respectively. These 
numbers are lower but still substantial for the larger farmers: 30% and 7% for the Aurepalle 
medium and large farmer; and 38% and 11% for the Kanzara medium and large farmer. 
Moreover, the stable flow of labour income secures positive incomes in all years for the small 
and medium farmers and greatly decreases the maximum loss for the large farmers. 
Nevertheless, the use of family labour for risk management is certainly not ineffective. 
Kanzara farmers use family labour for ex post income smoothing only. These farmers 
compensate 21% of crop income losses through ex post income smoothing (see Chapter 3). 
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Hence, ex post income smoothing significantly increases minimum income for all three 
farmers. The absolute as well as relative increase is highest for the large farmer. His 
rninimum income increases from a loss of Rs 158 to a gain of Rs 3078. The increase in 
minimum income is 87% for the medium farmer and 12% for the small farmer. Besides, ex 
post smoothing substantially decreases the CV of income of all three farmers. The decrease in 
the income CV is 29% for the small and medium farmer and 23% for the large farmer. In 
other words, ex post income smoothing through family labour supply considerably decreases 
income variability in general and the occurrence of very low incomes in particular. 
Table 6.5. The effect of labour income on income stability 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
small medium large small medium large 
Crop income 
mean crop income 387 1418 5736 578 4099 9654 
SD crop income 325 738 2580 506 1726 2725 
CV crop income 84 52 45 88 42 28 
minimum crop income -129 -138 -613 -371 -861 -1460 
No risk management 
mean total family-labour supply 1868 1295 748 3596 3344 1799 
mean total income 1274 2036 6195 3328 6621 10956 
SD total income 325 738 2580 506 1726 2725 
CV total income 25 36 42 15 26 25 
minimum total income 758 480 -154 2379 1661 -158 
Only ex ante risk management 
mean total family-labour supply 2130 1655 1332 
mean total income 1385 2189 6338 The households only use 
SD total income 325 738 2580 family labour for ex post 
CV total income 23 34 41 risk coping 
minimum total income 869 632 -10 
Only ex post risk coping 
mean total family-labour supply 1868 1295 748 3596 3344 1917 
mean total income 1274 2036 6195 3328 6621 11054 
SD total income 313 710 2484 359 1224 2122 
CV total income 25 35 40 11 18 19 
minimum total income 777 539 86 2656 3105 3078 
Ex ante and ex post risk management 
mean total family-labour supply 2130 1655 1332 
mean total income 1385 2189 6338 The households only use 
SD total income 312 710 2483 family labour for ex post 
CV total income 23 32 39 risk coping 
minimum total income 888 691 229 
Aurepalle farmers compensate a mere 4%> of crop income losses through ex post 
income smoothing (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, this behaviour significantly increases 
minimum income for the two larger farmers. The percentage increases in minimum income 
are 3% and 13%> for the small and medium farmer, respectively. The large farmer increases 
94 Chapter 6 
his minimum income from -154 Rs to 86 Rs. These higher worst-case incomes hardly 
translate into lower CVs of income. 
Aurepalle farmers use family labour not only for ex post risk coping, but also for ex 
ante risk management. This strategy has the greatest impact on the income of the medium 
farmer. Ex ante risk management through the labour market increases his minimum income 
by 32% and his average income by 8%. The small farmer increases his mean income by 
about the same share (9%), but he increases in minimum income by only 13%. The large 
farmer increases his mean income by 2% and cuts his maximum losses by 94%. However, 
this cut is small compared to average income. 
6.3.3. Increased production risk 
Table 6.6 presents the results of a 10% increase in the inherent riskiness of land. The 
simulations account only for changes in those choice variables for which the risk coefficient 
is significant in the reduced form equation. The inherent riskiness is a function of size of 
cultivated area, land quality, and weather expectations and is thus exogenous to the farmer 
(see section 3.3.1). In reaction to the increase in exogenous risk, the farmers will change the 
amount of inputs used in production and the amount of labour supplied by the family. This 
will lead to changes in both the mean and standard deviation of crop production, household 
income, and family labour supply. 
Kanzara farmers respond to a rise in risk by increasing the use of male labour and 
fertilisers. They consider these inputs to be risk-decreasing. However, the production function 
estimates (Table 3.1) show that both inputs increase the variability of output, although the 
effect of male labour is negligible. Hence, the standard deviation of crop output increases 
slightly more than the increase in exogenous risk. The higher the increase in fertiliser use, the 
higher the increase in output variability.24 
The increased input use leads to a small increase in output. As the value of this 
increase is higher than the additional costs incurred, an increase in exogenous risk leads to a 
small increase in crop income. The opposite was expected, as farmers supposedly apply 
additional inputs to stabilise output at the cost of profits. That this is not the case points at the 
underutilisation of inputs. We must, however, be careful with this conclusion as the changes 
in crop income resulting from changes in exogenous risk are very small. 
The risk elasticity for fertiliser use is much higher for the Kanzara large farmer than for the 
Kanzara medium farmer. There are two explanations: i) the large farmer's initial amount of fertiliser 
is smaller; ii) the large fanner's absolute increase in risk is higher. 
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Table 6.6. The impact of a 10% increase in the inherent riskiness of land 
(% increase) 
small 
Aurepalle 
medium large small 
Kanzara 
medium large 
Input use 
male labour -9.8 -9.8 -9.8 7.2 7.2 7.2 
female labour -10.9 -10.9 -10.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Inorganic nitrogen - - 29.3 - 6.1 36.1 
bullock traction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Crop output 
mean output -1.9 -1.9 -1.2 0.7 1.0 2.0 
SD output 9.6 9.6 10.6 10.0 10.2 11.4 
CV output 11.7 11.7 11.9 9.2 9.2 9.2 
Crop income 
mean crop income 0.1 -0.7 -1.3 0.6 0.2 1.0 
SD crop income 7.4 8.4 10.0 8.7 10.0 11.2 
CV crop income 7.3 9.2 11.5 8.1 9.7 10.1 
Total family-labour supply 
mean labour supply 1.2 2.2 4.8 0.0 -0.1 0.3 
SD labour supply 7.4 8.4 9.8 8.7 9.8 7.4 
CV labour supply 6.1 6.0 4.7 8.7 9.9 7.1 
Total income 
mean income 0.8 0.2 -0.8 0.1 0.1 0.9 
SD income 7.4 8.4 10.1 8.7 10.0 12.7 
CV income 6.5 8.1 10.9 8.6 9.9 11.7 
The increase in exogenous risk leads to a rise in the variability of crop income. The 
magnitude of this rise varies depending on fertiliser use. For the small farmer who does not 
use fertilisers, crop income variability increases somewhat less than the 10% increase in 
exogenous risk. At the other extreme, the variability of crop income increases slightly more 
than exogenous risk for the large farmer, who largely increases the use of risk-increasing 
fertilisers. Nevertheless, the simulated differences between the exogenous increase in risk and 
the increase in crop-income variability are small. This implies that adapting the level of input 
use in response to risk leads to neither a large increase nor a large decrease of income risk. 
The second reaction of Kanzara farmers to an increase in exogenous production risk 
involves an increase in the variability of family labour supply. If crop income turns out to be 
low, they increase harvest labour supply and vice versa. As the impact of exogenous 
production risk on household income increases with farm size, the rise in the variability of 
labour supply is higher for the medium farmer than for the small farmer. The large farmer is 
constrained in his labour-supply reaction to increased risk: he cannot work less than the 
minimum number of hours. Hence, the impact of a rise in risk on the variability of labour 
supply is largest for the medium farmer. For him, the relative increase in the variability of 
labour supply equals the relative increase in exogenous risk. 
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Changes is family labour supply appear, however, to be ineffective in absorbing 
additional risk. Only for unrealistically large families does the farm household's capability to 
smooth income ex post absorb a significant share of the additional risk. However, recall that 
adaptations in labour supply are effective in decreasing the impact of current risk. The 
adaptations are just not effective enough to significantly buffer an increase in risk. 
The response of Aurepalle farmers to an increase in risk is slightly different. They 
decrease the amount of male and female labour used in crop production by about the same 
percentage as the increase in the inherent riskiness of land. Besides, the large farmer 
increases the amount of fertiliser used. These changes lead to a small decrease in mean crop 
production for all three farmers. As was the case with the Kanzara farmers, the changes in 
input use do not effectively buffer the exogenous increase in risk: the SD of crop output 
increases by about the same percentage as the increase in the inherent riskiness of land. 
The Aurepalle farmers increase the mean and the variability of family labour supply 
in response to a rise in risk. Like Kanzara farmers, they increase harvest labour supply when 
crop income turns out to be low and vice versa. Besides, they increase planting labour supply 
in order to forestall some of the negative effects of possible yield losses. Not surprisingly, the 
increase is highest for the large farmer, who faces the largest absolute increase in risk. 
Combined with a slight to negligible increase in crop income resulting from a rise in risk, the 
increase in planting labour supply results in a higher average full income during the harvest 
stage. Hence, harvest-stage labour supply decreases somewhat, but not enough to cancel the 
increase in planting labour supply. 
Table 6.7. Ex ante smoothing of a 10% increase in Inherent riskiness of land in 
Aurepalle 
small medium large 
% increase in planting-labour supply 5.0 7.5 8.5 
resulting % increase in mean total income 0.9 0.8 0.4 
resulting % increase in CV total income -0.9 -0.8 -0.4 
Table 6.7 elaborates on the ex ante risk management of Aurepalle farmers. The risk 
elasticity of planting labour supply is quite high for all three farmers. Nevertheless, the rise in 
labour supply resulting from a 10% increase in risk results in less than a percentage increase 
in mean total income.' Consequently, the impact of ex ante smoothing on the CV of total 
income is small for all three farm types. This explains the conclusion of Chapters 4 and 5 that 
the option to use family labour for ex ante risk management does not affect farmers' 
decisions on input use. 
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6.3.4. Family size 
Just like the impact of an increase in the inherent riskiness of land, the effects of an increase 
in family labour were simulated. It was reported in the previous chapters that, at least in 
Kanzara, the labour endowment is an important tool for risk management and thus affects the 
level of crop inputs. Disappointingly, Table 6.8 shows that the changes in input use resulting 
from a 10% increase in the family labour endowment do not affect crop income considerably. 
Table 6.8. The impact of a 10% increase in family labour (% increase) 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
small medium large small medium large 
Input use 
male labour 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.1 -2.1 -2.1 
female labour 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
inorganic nitrogen - - 0.0 - -3.9 -18.7 
bullock traction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Crop output 
mean output 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -1.0 
SD output 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.8 
CV output 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Crop income 
mean crop income 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.7 
SD crop income 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.8 
CV crop income 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
Total family-labour supply 
mean labour supply 9.4 12.1 15.0 7.1 7.6 12.8 
mean labour supply per capita -0.6 1.9 4.5 -2.6 -2.2 2.6 
SD labour supply 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 3.9 
CV labour supply -8.6 -10.8 -13.0 -6.6 -7.2 -7.9 
Income 
mean total income 6.8 4.3 1.5 5.7 2.9 1.1 
mean total income per capita -2.9 -5.2 -7.7 -3.9 -6.5 -8.1 
SD total income 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -2.7 
CV total income -6.3 -4.1 -1.5 -5.4 -3.0 -3.7 
A rise in family labour induces the Kanzara farmers to decrease the use of male 
labour and inorganic nitrogen. The purpose of this reduction of inputs is to spend less on 
yield stabilisation. However, fertilisers technically increase yield variability, and the effect of 
male labour on input variability is negligible. Yet, the input reaction of the farm households 
hardly affects the mean and SD of crop production and crop income. 
As family size hardly affects the variability of crop income, it does not substantially 
affect the SD of labour supply for the Kanzara small and medium farmer. Because of the 
existence of a minimum boundary for harvest-labour supply, addition of family members 
involves a surprisingly large increase in the SD of labour supply for the large farmer: the 
minimum boundary is less often binding for a household with more family members. 
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Aurepalle farmers do not adapt input use in response to a change in the family labour 
endowment. Hence, additional family members do not increase any of the indicators related 
to crop production and income. Consequently, family size does not affect the variability of 
labour supply either. 
Not surprisingly, an increase in family size leads to a rise in total labour supply for all 
six farmers. The Aurepalle small farmer and the Kanzara small and medium farmers, whose 
main source of income is family labour, decrease per capita labour supply. This indicates that 
there are economies of scale in consumption: adding an additional consumer requires adding 
less than proportional income to obtain the same utility of income. For example, the 
household does not need to add a new room to the house or to buy new pots and pans. The 
other farmers increase per capita hours worked. They must (at least partly) compensate a 
large drop in per capita crop income. This drop is higher than the economics of scale 
associated with the additional consumer. The overall result of increasing family size is a 
percentage decrease in per capita income that is smaller than the percentage increase in 
family members. Moreover, the CV of total income decreases as the share of labour income 
rises. 
6.4. Covariate yields and equilibrium wages for the harvest stage 
The previous analyses focus on the impact of production risk on farm-household behaviour. 
All other variables are assumed to be deterministic.25 Prior research justifies this focus on 
production risk as opposed to price risk. Nevertheless, production risk may imply stochastic 
harvest-stage wage rates. Village labour markets are insular and crop production provides the 
bulk of employment. A village-wide negative yield shock would lead to a decrease in total 
labour demand and an increase in total labour supply, and thus to lower wage rates. 
Consequently, farmers would face low crop income and low harvest wage rates at the same 
time. If this were the case in the study villages, the above simulations would overestimate the 
stabilising impact of family labour. The bias may be especially large in the high-risk village 
of Aurepalle. 
In this section, the impact of stochastic wages on harvest-stage labour income is 
analysed. First, a description is given of how a set of covariate shocks and corresponding 
wage rates is created. Next, the changes in simulated household behaviour resulting from 
stochastic harvest wage rates as opposed to deterministic wage rates are described. 
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6.4.1. Harvest wage rates and covariate shocks 
When the harvest-stage labour market clears, the wage rate (w) is such that labour demand 
equals labour supply:26 
If=1i2,i(w2,a)+Ak)=i:;iif2(w2)+x:iF2(w2,a), (6.D 
where L depicts farm labour demand and D demand for nonfarm labour. R represents labour 
supply by the landless, and F labour supply by farm households. Q is crop production. N is 
the number of farm household in the village, while M is the number of landless labour 
households. The subscript 2 indicates that the variables concern the harvest stage. 
Inserting the functional forms introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 gives 
fou + w2 + 02 \QV ~ K, ~ w2£2,» + w2Z;. )) 
where Ye represents landless exogenous income and planting-stage labour income, T is the 
total time endowment, and K summarises net planting-stage expenses. Note that similar 
functional forms are assumed for labour supply by landless and farm households (linear) and 
for labour demand by farmers and the nonfarm sector (double logarithmic). 
Substituting Eqs (3.1) and (3.2) for crop output and inserting the harvest labour 
demand function in farmers' harvest-labour supply gives 
» t t I w v ( > LjAu +AW* +W> +h,(et+e,)-K,-w2(%0Jw/>(ft +ht{et + e, ))*))+ w2Tt ) 
where Et is the covariate shock and & the idiosyncratic shock. 
2 5 The regressions include expected output prices, but they do not account for possible effects of 
price uncertainty. 
2 6 There are, of course, multiple determinants of labour supply and demand (see chapters 3 and 4). 
The balance presented mentions only those directly affected by a village-wide yield shock The output 
price is, e.g., determined at the regional level and, therefore, not affected by a village-level yield 
shock. 
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Calibration of the above labour balance yields a set of covariate shocks and associated 
wage rates. This requires estimates of the coefficients for the farm-household labour supply 
and demand functions, the landless labour supply function, and the nonfarm labour demand 
function. Chapters 3 and 4 present the farm-household functions. The remaining functions are 
discussed below. 
As the ICRISAT data provide information on landless as well as cultivator 
households, estimation of harvest labour supply by the landless is straightforward. 
Nevertheless, the limited variability of labour supply in combination with a relatively small 
number of cases prevents satisfactory estimation of a labour supply function for Kanzara.27 In 
this village, total labour supply by the landless is assumed to be independent of the harvest 
wage rate. 
Table 6.9 presents the estimates for harvest labour supply by landless households in 
Aurepalle. The independent variables are similar to those in the harvest labour supply 
function for farmers: labour endowment, full income, asset ownership, and a time trend. 
Obviously, labour supply rose with the number of adults. The wage elasticity of labour 
supply was positive, as expected for poor households. Moreover, like farm households, the 
landless decreased labour supply in response to a rise in full income (see Chapter 3). The 
impact of liquid assets on landless labour supply was negative, as was found for Kanzara 
farmers (see Table 3.3). Finally, labour supply decreased over the years. 
Table 6.9. Fixed effect estimates for harvest labour supply by the landless in 
Aurepalle (1979-1984) 
N=44 Coefficient Standard error 
adults 521.592*** 154.572 
harvest wage rate (Rs/hr) 6283.80* 3284.39 
full income (1000 Rs) -237.176*** 82.9668 
liquid assets (1000 Rs) 241.789* 127.972 
livestock (1000 Rs) 233.222 182.319 
year -670.407*** 256.180 
Adjusted R2 0.49 
Notes: All monetary values are in 1983 prices 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, levels, respectively 
The data set provides information on nonfarm employment for the sample households. 
Nevertheless, six years of data are not enough to estimate aggregate nonfarm labour demand 
functions. Therefore wage rates are simulated for two different assumptions about nonfarm 
2 7 None of the coefficients was significant. Moreover, most coefficients had counterintuitive signs. 
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mean 0.48 0.48 
minimum 0.45 0.46 
maximum 0.52 0.50 
CV 2 1 
The relation between the covariate shock and the harvest-wage rate is almost linear. 
The effect of covariate shocks on wage rates is highest when nonfarm labour demand is 
employment: i) nonfarm labour demand is fixed; ii) nonfarm labour demand has a wage 
elasticity of-1. 
For calibration of the labour balance, idiosyncratic shocks for each farm household 
and a set of 1000 covariate shocks were generated. By definition, the distribution of the total 
shock is JV(0,1). A significant part of this shock is idiosyncratic. Kochar (1999) states that 
village-year dummies explain only 40% of the variance of kharif profits in real Rupees in 
Aurepalle and 33% in Kanzara. Hence, the distribution of the covariate shock is assumed to 
approximates iV(0,V0.4) in Aurepalle and JV(0,V0.33) in Kanzara. Accordingly, the 
distribution of the idiosyncratic shock is JV(0,V0.6) in Aurepalle and JV(0,v0.67) in Kanzara. 
The labour balance holds for an entire village, while the data provide information for 
a sample only. Simulation for a limited sample may create a bias in the resulting wage rates. 
The sample is, therefore, duplicated as many times as necessary to reach the size of the 
village. By doing so, the difference in sample representation between farm households and 
landless households is accounted for. Each farm household in the extended data set gets a 
draw of the idiosyncratic shock. 
At a covariate shock of 0, labour supply and demand as defined above should balance 
for the average harvest-wage rate used in section 6.3. Unfortunately, total labour supply and 
demand do not balance in the data set in any of the survey years. To correct for this, total 
labour supply is multiplied by a factor fj, which is set to balance supply and demand with 
covariate shock 0 at the average harvest-stage wage rate from section 6.3. 
Table 6.10 and Figure 6.1 present the wage rates simulated for Aurepalle, where the 
covariate shock is highest. A similar series of wage rates could not be determined for 
Kanzara, where the estimated wage elasticity of labour supply is 0 for the landless and all but 
the largest farmers, and negative for the largest farmers (see Appendix 4). Combined with a 
negative wage elasticity of labour supply, this impedes equating the labour supply and 
demand for different shocks. 
Table 6.10. Stochastic harvest wage rates for Aurepalle 
wage elasticity nonfarm employment = 0 wage elasticity nonfarm employment = -1 
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inelastic. In this situation, the agricultural labour market must buffer all changes in labour 
supply in response to a covariate shock. The wage rate has a CV of only 2% and 1% for a 
nonfarm wage elasticity of 0 and -1, respectively. These CVs are much smaller than the CVs 
of output for individual farmers. The spread of wage rates is small: 0.45-0.52 for inelastic 
nonfarm labour demand and even smaller for elastic nonfarm labour demand. 
i i , 1 0.16 I , , , , 
-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 
covariate shock 
Figure 6.1. Stochastic harvest wage rates in Aurepalle 
6.4.2. Stochastic harvest wages and household labour allocation and income 
All simulations for the Aurepalle farmers were repeated with the generated series of covariate 
shocks and wage rates and a new set of 1000 idiosyncratic shocks. The mean wage rates 
equal the deterministic harvest wage rates used in section 6.3, and the sums of the covariate 
shock and the individual shock match the shocks used for simulation with deterministic 
wages. Consequently, differences between the two sets of analyses result from wage 
variability alone. 
The impact of stochastic wage rates on the level and variability of income and labour 
supply is marginal (see Table 6.11). The relative change in the SD of labour supply for the 
small farmer may seem impressive, but implies nothing more than a decrease from 13 to 11 
in absolute terms. The absolute changes in the standard deviation of labour supply are hardly 
higher for the medium and the large farmer. 
0.52 -, 
elastic nontarm demand 
'inelastic nonfarm demand 
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Table 6.11. The impact of stochastic harvest wage rates: 
% changes to deterministic wages 
Aurepalle 
small medium large 
Mean values 
crop income 0.2 0.2 0.1 
(If (2) (9) 
labour supply 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(0) (0) (-1) 
total income 0.1 0.1 0.1 
(1) (2) (8) 
Standard deviations 
crop income 0.3 0.4 0.5 
(1) (2) (9) 
labour supply -11.8 -6.0 -1.4 
(-3) (-3) (-3) 
total income 4.6 1.9 0.7 
(14) (13) (19) 
Note: 4 Absolute changes are in parentheses. 
Table 6.12. The impact of exogenous changes on the SD of income and labour 
supply: stochastic vs deterministic wage rates 
Aurepalle 
small medium large 
10% increase in risk 
crop income 7.4" 8.4 10.0 
(7.4)" (8.4) (10.0) 
labour supply 8.3 8.9 9.9 
(7.4) (8-4) (9.8) 
total income 7.1 8.2 10.0 
(7.4) (8.4) (10.1) 
10% increase in family labour 
crop income 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
labour supply 0.8 0.4 0.1 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
total income 0.3 0.1 0.0 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Notes: * % increase with stochastic wage rates. 
b % increase with deterministic wage rates is in parentheses. 
Given the limited impact of wage variability on the base-run simulation, it is not 
surprising that the stochastic nature of wage rates hardly affects the impact of exogenous 
changes in production risk and family labour. There is no effect on the percentage changes of 
the levels of income and labour supply, and the impact on the variability of income and 
labour supply is extremely small (see Table 6.12). Summarising, stochastic wage rates have 
little effect on household behaviour in the study villages. It appeared impossible to simulate 
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the effects of wage variability in Kanzara, but these are most likely even smaller than the 
effects found for Aurepalle. 
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter summarised the main findings of the previous chapters, and in doing so it raised 
some questions that have yet remained unanswered. Chapters 3 to 5 showed that labour 
income significantly affected the stability of total household income and the use of inputs in 
risky crop production in the two study villages in India's SAT. Farm households used family 
labour as well as crop inputs to manage income variability. What was, however, the precise 
impact of family labour on the level and variability of household income? And, to what 
extent did risk management through adapting crop inputs affect household income? 
Moreover, did covariate yield shocks not limit the effectiveness of income stabilisation 
through the labour market? 
In order to answer the above questions, a simple two-stage simulation model was 
developed based on the analytical model and the regression results from Chapters 3 to 5. The 
model consists of a production function, an income equation, and reduced form equations for 
the use of all major inputs and household labour supply. The results of the simulations 
illustrate and enrich the conclusions of the previous chapters. The remainder of this section 
summarises the main new findings, which relate to the effectiveness of management through 
family labour, the translation of changes in input use into changes in household income, and 
the impact of stochastic harvest wage rates. 
The simulations show that the presence of a stable flow of labour income explains 
most of the difference between the level and CV of crop income and total income. Moreover, 
this flow of income prevented households from experiencing large negative incomes in low-
yield years. Nevertheless, there were two other stabilising effects of labour income: i) ex ante 
risk management through labour supply; and ii) ex post income smoothing through adapting 
labour supply to actual crop production. 
These risk management strategies were certainly not ineffective. Their main result 
was an increase in minimum income. In other words, the risk management strategies made 
the farm households less vulnerable to downward production risk. Ex post income smoothing 
significantly increased minimum income for all farmers except small farmers in Aurepalle. 
The effect increased with farm size and was largest in Kanzara. Only in Aurepalle did 
farmers use family labour for ex ante risk management. The impact was largest for medium 
farmers, who increased minimum income by about 30%. These farmers had sufficient crop 
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income to be significantly affected by production risk and a sufficient share of labour income 
to allow compensation of downward yield risk. 
The impact of changes in production risk on household income through changes in 
input use was limited. As the estimated input elasticities of mean output were low, a risk or 
otherwise induced change in input use translated into a much smaller change in the level and 
variability of output. As farm households are assumed to behave rationally, the real effects 
may have exceeded the effects shown by the simulations. 
The impact of changes in the endowment of family labour on crop income was 
negligible in both villages. The results from the previous chapters suggest that family labour 
had a positive impact on crop income in Kanzara. As farm households in this village used 
family labour to counteract negative production shocks, households with a large labour 
endowment could use input levels closer to the point of profit maximisation. However, this 
had only a small impact on crop income in the simulation model. 
Finally, simulations reveal that harvest-wage variability had little effect on household 
behaviour. Harvest-wage rates were quite stable and are influenced only to a small extent by 
covariate yield shocks. In Aurepalle, the study village with the highest covariate risk, the CV 
of wage rates resulting from production risk was 2% at most. Not surprisingly, this variability 
had a limited impact on farm-household behaviour. This may come as a surprise to those who 
consider covariate weather variability the main source of production risk in the semi-arid 
tropics. However, weather and its impact differ between farmer's fields on a scale as small as 
a single village in India's SAT. 
In conclusion, labour markets were important for income stabilisation of farm 
households in the two study villages, but simulations did not demonstrate a noteworthy 
impact of this behaviour on income from crop production. Labour market flexibility allowed 
households to adapt labour supply to the riskiness of their land and land use system and to the 
outcome of their production process. This behaviour specifically affected the level of income 
they earned in adverse years. Although labour markets were mostly agricultural, yield 
covariance did not inhibit risk management behaviour. The production environment was 
sufficiently diverse to rule out situations in which all farmers had low yields and supplied 
much labour. This does not, however, imply that public works are ineffective instruments for 
income smoothing. Nonfarm employment may not be needed to compensate for periodical 
shortages of harvest employment, but dry-season employment expands the period in which 
households can increase their workload to compensate for low crop incomes. 
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7. NONFARM INCOME AS A STIMULUS OF CROP PRODUCTION: 
Evidence from India's Semi-Arid Tropics 
While at the aggregate level of the regional economy, rising farm income may spur nonfarm activities, 
at the level of the household, rising nonfarm income may stimulate advances in agriculture. Off-farm 
income can decrease the variability of total income and increase household liquidity. This can result 
in an increase in agricultural productivity. However, off-farm activities may also decrease the amount 
of resources used in agriculture. Previous research has shown that the impact of off-farm income on 
crop production and income depends on the technological and market environment. This chapter 
shows the impact of timing, productivity, and riskiness of off-farm income on crop income. As these 
factors vary between various streams of income, distinct off-farm income sources affect crop income 
differently. Nonfarm development appears to stimulate crop production if it generates employment at 
a return higher than the casual agricultural wage rate, but does not become the farmers' main 
interest. 
7.1. Introduction 
Much has been written to show how rising agricultural income stimulates the growth of 
nonfarm activities in rural areas and small towns (e.g., Delgado et al, 1994; Haggblade et al, 
1989; Hazell and Haggblade, 1991; Batty and Vashistha, 1987). Growth in farm income 
provides an expanding market for consumption goods and agricultural inputs produced by the 
nonfarm sector. The impact of a small percentage growth in agriculture on nonfarm growth 
can be large because of the large mass of agriculture: agriculture occupies most of the land, 
labour, and capital of a low-income region. Moreover, consumption patterns resulting from 
modest agricultural incomes tend to favour demand for domestically produced, labour-
intensive products (Mellor, 1995). Nevertheless, since the early 1960s the link between 
agricultural development and growth in the rural nonfarm sector tended to break down in 
India. Forces originating outside the agricultural sector, high and rising per capita incomes in 
the rural and urban nonfarm sector, and public and private investment in both rural and urban 
areas, now account for most of the increase in rural workforce participation in nonfarm 
activities (Bhalla, 1997). 
Autonomous developments in the nonfarm sector suggest a different research 
perspective: How does nonfarm growth affect the agricultural sector? While at the aggregate 
level of the regional economy, rising farm income may (or may not) spur nonfarm activities, 
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at the level of the household, rising nonfarm income may stimulate advances in agriculture 
(Evans and Ngau, 1991). Income from activities outside the family farm is an important 
source of cash, which potentially improves farm productivity if it is used to finance farm-
input purchase or longer-term capital investments (Collier and Lai, 1986). Moreover, 
nonfarm income may help reduce the variance of overall household income and improve food 
security by allowing the household to buy food in cases of yield shortfalls (Reardon et al., 
1994; Reardon, 1997). Households may then be able to increase the riskiness and profitability 
of crop production (Sakurai and Reardon, 1997). Thus, in a situation where agricultural 
productivity is relatively stagnant, a growing nonfarm sector could be a stimulus for 
agricultural development. 
Unfortunately, the impact of nonfarm income on on-farm production is not 
necessarily positive. Instead of freeing funds for agriculture, nonfarm activities may compete 
for the same resources. Hence, well-intended policies to exploit positive interactions must be 
based on sound insights into the precise nature of the relationship between the various 
activities. 
Existing empirical evidence allows some generalisations about the impact of the 
technological and market environment on farm-nonfarm relations. First, nonfarm activities 
will divert resources from the farm unless crop production is relatively profitable. In South 
Africa, for example, nonfarm employment has pulled labour out of stagnant agriculture as a 
result of which agricultural production declined. On the other hand, agricultural productivity 
growth in Taiwan was sufficient to prevent increasing nonfarm employment possibilities 
from resulting in declining agricultural production and income (Low, 1981). Second, the 
market environment shapes the relation between farm and nonfarm activities. Farmers use 
nonfarm income to purchase fertiliser in Senegal, where credit is scarce (Kelly, 1988; 
Reardon and Kelly, 1989). Similarly, off-farm income increases expenditures on variable 
farm inputs by liquidity constrained Ethiopian farmers (Woldehanna, 2000). By contrast, 
nonfarm activities extract resources from agriculture in Botswana, where local labour markets 
are missing: farmers rejected labour-intensive maize hybrids because they wanted to devote 
labour to nonfarm activities such as migration to the mines (Low, 1986). 
Besides the farmer's production environment, the characteristics of the respective 
income flows affect the relation between farm and nonfarm income. These characteristics 
include the timing as well as the intra- and inter-household distribution and control (Reardon 
et al., 1994). Evidence on the impact of these factors is scarce, as it requires disaggregated 
income data for farmers with several sources of income: one needs to know not only the level 
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and riskiness of each income source, but also the distribution of the various income flows 
over the year. 
This chapter contributes to the existing understanding on farm-nonfarm relations by 
exploring how the nature of a stream of noncrop income determines its effect on net crop 
income in India's SAT. In doing so, it takes a somewhat different perspective than the 
previous chapters. Labour income is no longer considered as a uniform flow. On the contrary, 
the analysis includes labour income from off-farm sources only and distinguishes between 
casual farm employment, casual nonfarm employment, and regular employment. In addition, 
three minor sources of noncrop income are considerd: nonfarm self-employment, transfers 
and livestock production28. These six income sources differ with respect to timing, 
profitability, and access barriers. 
The preceding chapter points out that the family labour endowment, being a tool for 
risk and liquidity management, had only a limited impact on net crop income. The main 
cause of this limited impact is the relatively small (and sometimes negative) input elasticities 
in the estimated production function, which may not completely capture the actual production 
process (see Chapter 3). Besides, aggregating all family labour as a single potential income 
source may obscure the effect of differences in access to off-farm activities. Most labour was 
traded in the casual agricultural labour market, which is accessible to all healthy adults. 
However, the survey households also supplied labour to the casual nonfarm labour market, 
the regular labour market, and nonfarm self-employment. This chapter goes beyond 
considering the family labour endowment as a uniform potential source of income and looks 
at the impact of earned income from different sources outside the family farm. 
The chapter starts by setting out a conceptual framework for analysis and by outlining 
the possible effects of off-farm income and net crop income. Owing to the subtlety of 
differences between various sources of income, the framework is much more informal than 
the model presented in the previous chapters. Next, the chapter provides background 
information on the different income sources. This information is used to examine the 
postulated relationships between off-farm and crop income using regression analysis. The 
results confirm that even within a given production environment, different sources of off-
farm income have a different impact on crop production. The nature of the income stream 
Livestock production is largely independent of land ownership, as common wastelands are an 
important source of fodder. 
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determines not only the magnitude of its effect on net crop income, but also the direction of 
the effect. This has important implications for rural development policies. 
7 . 2 . The potential impact of nonfarm earnings on crop production 
7 . 2 . 1 Approach and issues 
The basic approach outlined in Section 2.6.1, is extended in this chapter, and the farm 
household is considered as a complex of the farm firm, the consumer household, the worker 
household, and possibly the nonfarm firm. The household maximises the utility of income 
and home time by allocating labour time and capital resources to various farm and off-farm 
activities. Productive activities differ in profitability, riskiness, the requirements of fixed and 
working capital, and other entry barriers (e.g., caste and capital requirements). The household 
is risk averse and limited in its choices by budget and time constraints, asset ownership, and 
technology. 
As risk markets are missing, agricultural production cannot be considered in isolation 
from other productive activities and the characteristics of the consumption and labour sphere 
of the farm household (Singh et ah, 1986b). Wealthy households can take more risk and, 
hence, allocate their resources to riskier, but more profitable, activities (Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger, 1993). Capital constraints could further limit the engagement of resource-poor 
households in profitable activities. The results from the previous chapters, nevertheless, 
indicate that credit constraints are not binding in the short run. 
There are several ways in which engagement in noncrop activities can increase net 
crop income for a farm household as described above (see Figure 7.1). Petty trade or other 
off-farm activities can increase a farmer's access to input and output markets. Off-farm 
employment may also enhance farm management skills. For these effects, engagement in the 
activity is what matters, not the level of activity or income. This is not the case for the other 
potential relations. 
Crop and noncrop activities may compete for resources. Competition for family 
labour is a prominent phenomenon in West Africa's SAT, where farmers mostly rely on 
family labour for crop production (Fafchamps, 1993). The well-developed Indian rural labour 
markets presumably counter this effect at the household level — although not necessarily 
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completely.29 Activities may also compete for capital resources. Reardon and Islam (1989) 
point out that in a degrading and unstable environment, the priority of the farm household 
may be to diversify away from farming. The household may want to maximise present 
earnings in agriculture and invest the surplus in livestock and noncrop activities. Such 
behaviour affects not only the level of farm assets, but also the purchase of variable inputs 
like fertilisers and pesticides. 
noncrop income 
market access 
management skills 
risk coping 
own crop capital 
crop family labour 
Figure 7.1. Potential effects of noncrop income on net crop income 
net crop 
On the other hand, noncrop income may also increase the availability of resources for 
crop production. In the absence of sufficient credit, noncrop income can provide the cash 
needed to purchase external inputs (Kelly, 1988; Reardon and Kelly, 1989). Moreover, the 
presence of relatively stable (or at least not completely covariate) alternative income sources 
will increase a farm household's risk-taking capacity. This may stimulate investment in risky 
crop technologies and increase crop income. 
The joint effect of the processes described above depends on the nature of rural 
markets and the characteristics of the alternative income sources. Activities differ in their 
profitability and resource requirement. Further, the timing and riskiness of the income flow 
vary between activities. Timing of the activity relative to crop production determines its 
effects on hquidity, while the variability of income and the covariance with farm income 
controls the extent to which households can use the income source to manage risk. Finally, 
At the regional level, well-functioning labour markets will not prevent the substitution effect of 
nonfarm labour for farm labour. Nonagricultural job opportunities may pay better than farm jobs, and 
thus drive up the competitive farm wage, increasing capital intensity of farming and/or leading to a 
shift to less labour-intensive crops (Reardon, 2000). On this scale, the size of the effect depends on 
the stage of development of the off-farm sector and the availability of surplus labour in agriculture 
(Shand, 1986). 
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the generation of useful managerial skills and market contacts is restricted to a limited 
number of activities. 
7.2.2. Estimation issues 
Reduced-form profit functions were estimated to assess the effect of the various types of off-
farm income on net crop income. The independent variables in the functions are cultivated 
area, the share of irrigated area, liquid assets, and the different noncrop incomes.30 All 
income was aggregated over the agricultural year, which starts at soil preparation. Year 
dummies were included to account for differences in input and output prices. As theory does 
not dictate the functional form, interaction terms between the different income and liquidity 
sources and household illiquid assets were included in a first regression. As a joint F-test 
could not reject the insignificance of the interaction terms, the final regressions estimate 
linear approximations of the profit functions. 
Fixed effect estimation accounts for unobserved time-independent factors like 
household preferences, access to credit, and managerial capacities.31 All independent 
variables are considered endogenous: households can rent and fallow land, and liquidity and 
the engagement in various farm and nonfarm activities are part of a single livelihood strategy. 
The instruments used were the size of owned area, the share of owned land irrigated, the 
composition and education of the household, the size and composition of the livestock herd, 
lagged liquidity, and lagged values of off-farm income. Separate functions were estimated for 
the two villages to accommodate inter-village differences in production technology and the 
impact of off-farm income. Instruments may differ between the villages: both equations cover 
only instruments that significantly affect at least one of the endogenous variables. 
Wage income and irrigation share are bounded at zero and only positive for a limited 
sample of the survey households. Nevertheless, standard fixed-effect estimation on the 
unbalanced panel is consistent and asymptotically normal if the error term is mean 
independent of the selection indicator given the individual effect and the independent 
variables32 (Wooldridge, 2000). This may be a reasonable approximation and can be tested by 
I tested for the significance of other factors of production: male and female family labour and 
the number of bullocks owned. Insignificance could not be rejected at the 20% level, which suggests 
that hiring markets work sufficiently well to consider labour and bullock traction as variable inputs. 
3 1 This approach prevents biases due to unobserved individual effects, but, unfortunately, also 
averages out the structural effects of off-farm employment on crop production through their impact on 
market access and management capacities. 
3 2 Selection in all time periods can be correlated with the independent variables or the individual 
effects. 
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inclusion of the lagged selection indicator in the regression. As Hausman tests could not 
reject independence in any of the equations, Standard fixed-effect regression was used to 
create instruments on the restricted sample. 
7.3. Income diversification in India's SAT 
Interpretation of the effects of various sources of income on net crop income requires insight 
into the characteristics of the individual income streams. The detailed ICRISAT data provide 
information about several income sources for many different households in India's SAT (see 
Table 7.1). These data allow the analysis of the determinants of each source of income 
(Tables 7.2-7.6) and the timing of the various income flows (Figure 7.2). Finally, the long-
term character of the data allows us to gain insight into the between-year variability of the 
income flows (Tables 2.3-2.4). 
Only for large-farm households, did crop income encompass more than half of total 
household income. The second important source of income was the labour market, which was 
the focus of Chapters 3 to 6. Other income sources were livestock, nonfarm self-employment, 
and inter-household transfers. Although the variability of income from the different noncrop 
sources was high, total household income was much more stable than crop income (see Table 
2.3). The remainder of this section discusses the various sources of noncrop income in detail. 
Table 7.1. Descriptives of the two study villages (1979-1984) 
Aurepalle (N=161) Kanzara (N=162) 
mean standard dev. mean standard dev. 
net crop income (Rs) 3183.59 4411.10 4833.60 7222.30 
livestock income (Rs) 1835.71 4031.79 1479.20 2470.33 
self-employment income (Rs) 1319.93 1835.30 354.018 1181.27 
casual farm wages (Rs) 553.264 612.584 857.581 814.554 
casual nonfarm wages (Rs) 573.570 3239.22 326.282 824.986 
regular wages (Rs) 255.115 595.424 1279.42 2346.01 
transfers (Rs) -282.264 750.870 -123.450 622.634 
liquid assets (Rs) 7281.91 9067.50 5356.15 11289.1 
cultivated area (ha) 3.88012 3.40179 4.97549 6.57568 
irrigated area/cultivated area 0.12462 0.19997 0.05751 0.14838 
Note: All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
Transfers 
Transfers were a minor source of income for the study households: on average, net income 
transfers were negative. As expected, wealthier households transferred larger sums of money 
to relatives than poorer households did. Previous year income from nonfarm self-employment 
(which was positively related to current income from the same source) increased the outflow 
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of transfers. Surprisingly, an increase in land ownership decreased the outflow of funds (or, 
alternatively, increased the inflow of funds) in Aurepalle. This may be the reaction to a 
purchase of land, which erodes the household's reserves. In Kanzara, current outflows led to 
lower outflows or even inflows in the following year. This points at the reciprocity and/or 
incidental nature of transfers. Part of the transfers went to in-laws: additional women 
increased outflows. Most transfers took place during the dry season, when uncertainty about 
crop income was resolved. Nevertheless, these transfers had little effect on income stability: 
on average, gifts and remittances reduced the variability in cultivators' net crop income by 
less than 1 percent (Rosenzweig (1986), according to (Walker and Ryan, 1990)) 
Livestock production 
Simple bivariate correlations show that households with large endowments of land and liquid 
assets earned most income from livestock production. This is not surprising: livestock 
activities require a considerable investment, which may prevent poorer households from 
entering this activity. In Kanzara, land ownership directly increased livestock income. Large 
landowners had easier access to fodder, and hence a higher livestock income. This effect was 
not found in Aurepalle. 
Dairy was the major source of livestock income. In Aurepalle, bullocks also 
contributed significantly to income, while young cattle represented a significant cost. Liquid 
assets decreased livestock income, presumably because farmers used these assets to purchase 
new livestock. The same holds for previous year income from self-employment in Aurepalle. 
Women appeared to be the main caretakers of productive animals: the more women, the 
higher the livestock income. In Kanzara, secondary education increased livestock income. 
Highly educated households may get better prices for their products. 
The between-year variability of livestock was very high, especially for small farmers. 
The composition of the herd explains at least part of the difference in variability between the 
three farm-size groups. Small farmers mostly owned small stock and derived a relatively 
large share of their income from sales. Large farmers also owned dairy animals and bullocks, 
which provided a relatively stable stream of income from milk and draught power. Contrary 
to expectations, the variability of livestock income was comparable in drought-prone 
Aurepalle and rainfall-assured Kanzara. The limited covariance of yields apparently 
prevented periodical fodder shortages. 
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Table 7.2. Probit estimates for off-farm income (1979-1984) 
Aurepalle (N=161) Kanzara (N=162) 
nonfarm permanent self- nonfarm permanent self-
wages wages employment wages wages employment 
Agricultural resources 
land owned (ha) -0.16696* -0.02567 0.08547* -0.06471 -0.11222 0.21628*" 
(0.10027)" (0.04541) (0.04661) (0.06392) (0.15183) (0.05987) 
irrigated/total owned -0.20662 -8.74361*** 0.38894 0.21405 ^1.32534 0.07944 
(1.04330) (2.43729) (1.25009) (0.67206) (3.11259) (0.85380) 
bullocks 0 .56242*" 0.06811 -0.18877 -0.46619"* -0.01140 -0.67651*** 
(0.21550) (0.17100) (0.15984) (0.14450) (0.31769) (0.15837) 
dairy animals 0.64120*" 0.18848 0.08573 0.00376 0.22281 0.40981*** 
(0.17850) (0.15890) (0.15080) (0.15664) (0.30628) (0.12063) 
young cattle (Rs) -0.00307*" -0.00083 -0 .00012 -0.00059 -0.00412** -0.00109** 
(0.00059) (0.00052) (0.00029) (0.00064) (0.00203) (0.00043) 
Previous year liquidity & income 
liquid assets (Rs) -0 .00023*" -0.00001 0 .00011*" 0.00011"* -0.00014* -0.00004 
(0.00006) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00008) (0.00003) 
transfers (Rs) -0.00081*** 0.00060 0.00160*" 0.00039 -0.00053 0.00013 
(0.00029) (0.00047) (0.00039) (0.00030) (0.00043) (0.00029) 
self-employment -1.43139*** -0.11940 1.64537*** 0 .58287" -0.00847 1.26317*" 
dummy (yes= l ) (0.48994) (0.39801) (0.33679) (0.25265) (0.47083) (0.33534) 
farm wages dummy 0.22634 1.00649* 0.96963 0.75484 -8.70804** 0.61698 
(yes= l ) (0.59699) (0.54217) (0.68908) (0.51884) (3.97290) (0.44834) 
nonfarm wages 0.63791 -0.03881 0.66495 0.89927*** -0.56913 0.38471 
dummy (yes= l ) (0.47423) (0.43440) (0.45112) (0.31610) (0.44188) (0.32833) 
permanent wages -0.52223 2 .98066*" 0.52410 0.83879*** 11.7306*" 0.10361 
dummy (yes= l ) (0.44186) (0.58584) (0.37057) (0.28441) (4.10236) (0.31477) 
Family characteristics 
adult men -0.18570 1.11354*** -0.03643 -0.12588 -1.45745"* 0.25780* 
(0.19766) (0.35394) (0.21339) (0.14672) (0.42892) (0.15215) 
adult women 0.72734* -0.95106*** -0.14715 0.17255 0.83246 -0.40322 
(0.37533) (0.22674) (0.23368) (0.17978) (0.80336) (0.25966) 
women 25~44yr -0.70030* 0.54977 0.63245* -0.59422*** -0.26325 -0.00540 
(0.38767) (0.33918) (0.35738) (0.17969) (0.47680) (0.26543) 
men 45-54yr 1.15016** -0.57066 -0.30426 0.62764** -0.06015 -0.30410 
(0.50628) (0.50538) (0.39385) (0.27671) (0.73167) (0.33908) 
literate adults -0.09266 -0.39282 - 0 . 3 6 3 4 2 " 0.52753*" 1.15844*" -0.02359 
(0.32719) (0.42588) (0.15854) (0.13168) (0.37407) (0.11473) 
adults with secondary 0.52811 1.08544** 0.71681** -0.04594 1.17072*" -0.04211 
education (0.51099) (0.43466) (0.28612) (0.13243) (0.43900) (0.14865) 
intermediate caste 1.65741 -2.04377* 2.18208*** 0.58195* -3.52681*** 1.50196*** 
(yes= l ) (1.05227) (1.11768) (0.73878) (0.35321) (0.98458) (0.39964) 
low caste (yes= l ) 1.97063 -1.36098 -0.59320 1.17920*" - 3 . 0 0 3 3 2 " 0.90463* 
(1.21026) (1.17572) (0.86923) (0.43797) (1.36272) (0.54295) 
year 0.01470 -0.03288 0.00139 -0.20074 0.16664 -0.11645 
(0.12964) (0.12800) (0.11827) (0.12882) (0.22261) (0.08036) 
constant -3.65020 1.80565 -2.04504 13.9605 -13.0473 6.58656 
(10.3569) (10.1086) (9.48655) (10.2581) (18.0644) (6.41592) 
pseudo R 2 0.47 0.63 0.54 0.49 0.82 0.41 
Notes: 4 Participation in the other income generating activities was too high to estimate the 
probability of participation. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for dependence between 
observations for a single household. 
All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
, and "* indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.3. Blvariate correlation of income and household characteristics, Aurepalle 
crop 
income 
livestock 
Income 
self-em-
ployment 
farm wages nonfarm 
wages 
regular 
wages 
transfers 
total income (Rs) 0.869*" 0.863'** 0.079 -0.339*" -0.039 -0.089 -0. .442 
land owned (ha) 0.633*** 0.488*** -0.148* -0.380*" -0.090 -0.176" -0. .363*** 
irrigated/total owned 0.707*" 0.474*" 0.036 -0.438*" -0.166*" -0.233"* -0 .185" 
bullocks 0.597*** 0.657*** -0.011 -0.295"* -0.075 -0.153" -0. .428"* 
dairy animals 0.630*" 0.656"* -0.118 -0.283"* 0.023 -0.097 -0. .297*" 
young livestock (Rs) 0.485*** 0.384"* -0.105 -0.169" -0.077 -0.097 -0. .359"* 
liquid assets (Rs) 0.693*** 0.782*" -0.030 -0.323"* -0.141* -0.138' -0 .647 
men 0.323"* 0.258*** 0.139* 0.000 -0.056 0.300* -0, .137 
women 0.161" 0.181" 0.091 0.182" 0.205"* 0.074 -0. .133* 
literate adults 0.745'" 0.584"* -0.093 -0.438*" -0.153" -0.153" -0 .385*" 
sec. education 0.481*** 0.463*" 0.124 -0.359*" -0.105 -0.135" -0 .346'" 
caste 0.795*" 0.603"* -0.040 -0.643*" -0.260"* -0.247"* -0. .344"* 
Note: All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
*, * and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Table 7.4. Fixed effect regression of noncrop income, Aurepalle (1979-1984)" 
livestock farm wages nonfarm 
wages 
self-
employment 
transfers regular wagei 
(N=161) (N=104) (N=38) (N=161) (N=161) (N=39) 
Agricultural resources 
land owned (ha) -209.845 -21.9703 -1809.34"** 55.4298 94.2761* -677.929 
(250.295) (95.6792) (437.553) (83.4976) (56.3050) (594.338) 
irrigated/total 5662.34 1662.66 495022 1854.70 -2576.84"* -11207.8 
(3939.74) (1733.78) (321624) (1314.28) (881.784) (8062.48) 
bullocks 717.795*" 155.266* 1103.34 -205.853* 68.1018 873.891* 
(323.207) (91.1440) (715.895) (107.821) (72.2463) (444.618) 
dairy animals 901.114"* 55.4230 2212.90'* -75.7505 -17.4799 385.727 
(281.624) (76.6627) (703.566) (93.9486) (60.9947) (283.395) 
young cattle (Rs) -1.24098* 0.14050 2.76253 -0.10236 0.079058 -2.71733* 
(0.67278) (0.16500) (2.81847) (0.22444) (0.15101) (1.35075) 
Previous-year liquidity and income 
liquid assets (Rs) - 0 . 1 4 7 3 4 " 0.00229 -0.50275 0.03181 -0.04168**' 0.13520 
(0.06800) (0.05272) (0.37798) (0.02268) (0.01529) (0.24084) 
self employment - 0 . 6 3 8 8 4 " 0.05321 -2 .55030" 0.53211"* -0.112001* -0.44989 
(Rs) (0.29655) (0.08136) (1.11045) (0.09893) (0.06738) (0.28624) 
Family composition 
adult men -352.725 -182.177 1184.02* -20.9422 71.5347 1052 .20" 
(659.241) (129.293) (641.055) (219.920) (146.462) (458.086) 
adult women -298.522 313.453*' 1049.79* 368.538' 181.024 - 1 0 1 0 . 3 2 " ' 
(585.045) (119.706) (555.183) (195.169) (127.238) (339.997) 
women 25-44 yr 1935.07" 168.048 1119.79 -524.331* -111.533 2 9 0 7 . 1 1 " 
(796.768) (179.121) (1174.15) (265.799) (172.282) (1104.63) 
literate adults 527.298 83.9281 -344.601 1.87221 
(646.294) (290.705) (215.601) (145.082) 
Adjusted R 2 0.64 0.48 0.98 0.81 0.44 0.45 
Notes: " Estimation includes (fixed) household and year effects. The regressions are the first stage in 
the 2SLS estimation of net crop income. 
All monetary values are in 1983 prices 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7.5. Bivariate correlation of income and household characteristics, Kanzara 
crop livestock self-em- farm wages nonfarm regular transfers 
income income ployment wages wages 
total income (Rs) 0 .944- 0.898*" -0.068 -0.385™ -0.050 0.438*" -0.389*" 
land owned (ha) 0.810'" 0.753*** -0.146* -0.409*** -0.147* 0.365*** -0.515"* 
irrigated/total owned 0.432"* 0.391*" -0.119 -0.333*" -0.094 0.091 -0.055 
bullocks 0.855"* 0.779'" -0.151* -0.360"* -0.172" 0.252'" -0.467"* 
dairy animals 0.670*" 0.757*" -0.212*" -0.396*" -0.112 0.163" -0.169" 
young livestock (Rs) 0.392*** 0.390"* -0.154" -0.321*" -0.058 0.029 0.000 
liquid assets (Rs) 0.799*** 0.702*" -0.114 -0.412"* -0.067 0.343*" -0.372*" 
men 0.422*" 0.385*** 0.069 0.047 0.050 0.347"" -0.228*" 
women 0.304*" 0.326"* 0.227"* -0.064 -0.064 0.313"* -0.319'** 
literate adults 0.626*" 0.605"* -0.024 -0.351"* -0.201*" 0.277"' -0.334"* 
sec. education 0.610"* 0.615*** -0.130* -0.409*** -0.112 0.462*** -0.329*" 
caste 0.358*" 0.365"* -0.067*" -0.408*** -0.053*" -0.063*" -0.081*" 
Note: All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
*, * and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Table 7.6. Fixed effect regression of noncrop income, Kanzara (1979-1984)3 
livestock farm wages nonfarm self- transfers regular wages 
wages employment 
(N=162) (N=127) (N=65) (N=162) (N=162) (N=82) 
Agricultural resources 
land owned (ha) 379.722*" 183.663 -273.318 -23.4676 - 1 6 4 . 5 9 1 " 307.681 
(144.311) (117.566) (275.212) (108.489) (70.8456) (204.198) 
irrigated/total 337.366 -1192.69 -2456.70 -21.0788 319.177 -154.530 
(704.707) (1285.40) (2258.38) (529.777) (345.956) (760.426) 
bullocks 29.1705 169.649 -885.524 186.566* 59.5429 -171.081 
(139.335) (104.467) (431.748) (104.747) (68.4025) (225.580) 
dairy animals 440.322*** 299.733* -203.559 -34.3543 108.233 524.488' 
(166.455) (153.661) (425.887) (125.136) (81.7163) (268.838) 
Previous-year liquidity and income 
liquid assets (Rs) -0 .06342*" 0.00584 0.03964 -0.00162 0.02026' -0 .09609" 
(0.02141) (0.07561) (0.03775) (0.01610) (0.01051) (0.04051) 
nonfarm wages -0.07107 0.02748 -0.48256*** -0.18392* 0.03213 - 0 . 6 3 1 8 3 " 
(Rs) (0.12671) (0.06913) (0.13247) (0.09526) (0.06221) (0.29918) 
regular wages (Rs) 0.01359 0.07400 -0.03130 -0.08341 -0 .10447" 0 .21360" 
(0.09606) (0.05915) (0.11262) (0.07222) (0.04716) (0.10385) 
transfers (Rs) 0.13782 -0.00828 -0.77954 0.15308 -0.25535"* -0.08854 
(0.16567) (0.14494) (0.57787) (0.12454) (0.08133) (0.22886) 
Family composition 
adult men -71.0429 -146.241 402.901 549 . 917" -146.582 -679.396 
(389.163) (242.135) (438.830) (292.561) (191.049) (644.236) 
adult women 5 7 9 . 2 1 1 " -94.2526 -664.620 56.6065 -228.512* 426.621 
(250.077) (172.601) (743.619) (188.000) (122.768) (365.349) 
women 25 ^ t4 yr 162.744 18.9357 -1003.13 135.969 -21.8256 -398.228 
(307.973) (208.799) (615.596) (231.524) (151.191) (361.893) 
men 45-54 yr 405.423 102.617 -893.230*** -223.866 254.629 
(476.206) (285.368) (357.997) (233.780) (768.957) 
literate adults -200.977 666.697*** -848.853 156.005 1.6369 387.161 
(366.474) (230.854) (742.353) (275.504) (179.910) (527.959) 
adults with sec. 3071.69*** - 1 6 7 8 . 8 1 " ^134.304 -232.168 1843.12 
education (686.541) (823.419) (516.120) (337.038) (1167.18) 
Adjusted R 2 0.83 0.50 0.47 0.58 0.36 0.88 
Notes: See Table 7.4. 
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Figure 7.2. Seasonal distribution of net income for the study villages (1979-1984) 
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The seasonal distribution of livestock income differed between the two survey 
villages. In Aurepalle, income seasonality resulted from variability in the returns on livestock 
products. This source of income was highest in the first and fourth quarter. High sales during 
the first and second quarter caused the seasonal pattern of livestock income in Kanzara. In 
both villages, low fodder costs increased the net returns on livestock in the fourth quarter. 
Nonfarm self-employment 
Self-employment was especially important for small and medium-size farm households in 
Aurepalle, where the major nonfarm activity was the production and trade of palm wine or 
toddy. About one quarter of the village was involved in toddy tapping, a traditional caste 
occupation. The activity was closed for members of other castes. Likewise, traditional 
handicrafts, e.g., carpentry, pottery, and basket weaving, were carried out by members of 
specific 'service' castes (Walker and Ryan, 1990). These service castes took an intermediate 
position on the social ladder. 
In both villages, members from intermediate castes had the highest probability of 
engaging in nonfarm self-employment. Literacy decreased the probability of participation in 
nonfarm self-employment in Aurepalle. This reflects the relatively large importance of 
traditional caste activities. On the other hand, secondary education increased participation in 
nontraditional self-employment activities. Given participation, education did not affect the 
level of income obtained. 
The capital requirements of nonfarm self-employment were moderate. Self-
employment generally requires some fixed and working capital: e.g., tools and wood for 
carpenters, or transportation and starting capital for petty traders. Consequently, there was a 
small positive impact of previous-year liquid assets and transfers on the probability of self-
employment in Aurepalle. In Kanzara, income from livestock production stimulated 
participation in self-employment. Nevertheless, liquid assets, dairy animals, and transfers did 
not affect the level of income from self-employment in either village. Moreover, previous-
year nonfarm wages even decreased income from self-employment in Kanzara. The impact of 
bullocks was diverse. 
Most self-employment activities were labour intensive. There was a small positive 
correlation between income from self-employment and the family labour endowment in both 
villages. Besides, the presence of women increased participation in nonfarm self-employment 
and the level of self-employment income obtained in Aurepalle, where women were 
responsible for such activities as the sale of toddy. In Kanzara, men appeared most important 
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for self-employment: an additional adult man increased the probability that a farm household 
would participate in nonfarm self-employment and the level of income generated from that 
source. 
Large landowners did not diversify away from agricultural production. The 
correlation between agricultural assets and self-employment was negative in both villages. 
Nevertheless, an increase in landownership increased the probability that a farm household 
participated in nonfarm self-employment. 
The between-year variability of income from self-employment was high. This 
variability may reflect the riskiness of the activities as well as differences in household 
involvement related to the variability of, e.g., crop production. Nevertheless, there was some 
continuity in self-employment; households engaging in self-employment one year had a high 
possibility of doing so the following year. Moreover, a higher income from self-employment 
one year implied a higher income from self-employment the following year. 
Self-employment income was highest in the first and second quarter. This is the 
period after harvest, when money is relatively abundant and people have their tools repaired 
and their household goods replaced. Consequently, the demand for local handicrafts is high. 
In Aurepalle, self-employment income was also substantial during the second half of the 
calendar year. This was mainly due to the seasonality of toddy production. 
Casual farm wages 
The main participants in the casual labour markets were illiterate households with limited 
agricultural and liquid assets.33 Labour was their most abundant resource, and the casual 
labour market allowed them to cash this resource without the need for complementary assets. 
The casual farm labour market was open to all healthy adults: employers were usually 
indifferent about the caste or socio-economic status of prospective employees. 
Women dominated the agricultural labour market, while men did most of the work on 
the family farm. The demand for female labour was especially high in transplanting paddy. In 
Aurepalle, tie number of adult women in the household was, hence, the major determinant of 
farm wage income. Livestock induced an increase in farm wages in both villages. This 
indicates that the generally asset-poor households engaging in tie casual farm labour markets 
The sample includes only farm households. Inclusion of landless households would reinforce 
this observation, as the landless participate actively in the casual labour market, own few assets, and 
have enjoyed little education. 
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required money to purchase fodder. Surprisingly, given that a household earned casual farm 
wages, literacy increased the level of wages earned in Kanzara. 
As expected, the temporal distribution of farm wages followed the cropping season. In 
Aurepalle, castor picking generated much employment between September and January. 
Other labour intensive activities were transplanting and weeding of paddy in July and the 
paddy harvest in October. The mix of short- and long-duration crops in the assured-rainfall 
environment of Kanzara allowed a relatively even spread of farm-wage income over the year. 
There were, however, peaks in July and August, when farmers weed, hoe, and apply 
pesticides, and from September through December, when the various crops are harvested. 
Casual noftfarm wages 
Few people participated in the casual nonfarm labour market. Like those in the casual farm 
labour market, most of these people belonged to low-caste families with small amounts of 
agricultural assets. The character of the nonfarm casual labour market differed between the 
two villages. In Kanzara, this type of employment mostly involved participation in the 
public-works programme. In Aurepalle, private firms provided by far most of the casual 
nonfarm employment. Land and previous-year liquid assets and transfers decreased 
participation in the nonfarm labour market in Aurepalle. On the other hand, liquid assets 
increased participation in nonfarm wage employment in Kanzara. As expected, an increase in 
the labour endowment resulted in an increase in nonfarm wage income. 
The casual nonfarm labour market seems to absorb spill-over labour supply from the 
casual farm labour market. Although casual nonfarm wages were earned throughout the year, 
they peaked in the first and the second quarter of the calendar year, when agricultural labour 
demand was small. The between-year variability of nonfarm wages was very high. In 
Kanzara, high levels of nonfarm wage income even led to low levels of nonfarm wage 
income in the following year. 
The relation between nonfarm wage employment and other sources of income was 
diverse. In Aurepalle, nonfarm self-employment decreased participation in nonfarm wage 
employment, while livestock income increased participation in the casual nonfarm labour 
market. In Kanzara, previous self-employment and regular wages increased the probability of 
participation in the nonfarm casual labour market. 
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Regular wages 
Although Walker and Ryan (1990) state that 'the bulk of labour income is earned in the daily 
rated labour market', Figure 7.2 and Table 2.4 show that regular wage income was far from 
unimportant, especially in Kanzara. Regular employment involved two distinct types of 
workers: permanent farm servants and salaried employees. The relative importance of these 
groups differed between the two villages. 
Regular farm servants earned the bulk of regular wages in Aurepalle. These servants 
were men from poor illiterate low-caste families, who generally participated in the casual as 
well as the regular agricultural labour market. Hourly wages for regular farm servants were 
lower than the hourly wage for casual labourers. The dominant caste among the farm servants 
was a Harijan community. Employers seemingly exploited the low status of this group and 
their demand for loans for marriage of their children (Walker and Ryan, 1990). Moreover, 
farm households seemed to use regular employment to finance bullocks. Young cattle, on the 
other hand, lowered the level of regular wages, presumably because they require much care. 
Women decreased participation in the regular labour market as they were very active in the 
casual farm labour market and in self-employment. 
In Kanzara, salaried jobs provided a significant part of regular wage income. Wealthy, 
highly educated farmers from high-caste families brought in the lion's share of these salaries. 
As in Aurepalle, regular farm wages went mostly to the poorer households. However, then-
status was different: the regular wage rate exceeded the rate for daily labourers. Still, 
irrigation, liquid assets, and casual wages decreased regular employment. The number of both 
men and women increased the probability of participation in regular labour markets. Due to 
the importance of salaried jobs and the relatively high wage rates for farm servants, the 
average level of regular wages was high in Kanzara compared to Aurepalle. 
The term regular wages falsely suggests stability within and between years. Especially 
in Aurepalle, the distribution of regular wages was quite erratic. Regular farm servant 
contracts were exclusively on a yearly basis. Contracts were for twelve months, and wages 
were partly paid as lump-sum advances in the second quarter (Walker and Ryan, 1990). 
Nevertheless, current participation in the regular labour market increased the probability of 
next-year participation. The significant share of salaried jobs in Kanzara resulted in a relative 
stability of regular wages within as well as between years: current permanent wages 
positively affected next-year nonfarm wages. 
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7.4. Evidence of the impact of off-farm income on net crop income 
Net crop income was estimated as a function of the above mentioned income sources and 
cultivated area. The estimation results are presented in Table 7.7, while Table 7.8 presents the 
elasticities at the village mean. The explanatory power of the profit functions is high: 89% in 
risk-prone Aurepalle and 94% in rainfall-assured Kanzara. Covariant revenue shocks explain 
only a limited part of the variability of crop income: without inclusion of year dummies, 
which account for prices as well as weather, the adjusted R2s are still as high as 0.82 and 
0.91.3 4 
Table 7.7. 2SLS estimation of net crop income (1979-1984)" 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
(N=161) (N=162) 
livestock income 0.03148 0.94430*** 
(0.12278) (0.30268) 
self-employment income 0.03308 0.68363* 
(0.20920) (0.35635) 
casual farm wages -1.63521"* -0.72179* 
(0.39491) (0.44382) 
casual nonfarm wages 0.02956 0.06082 
(0.03047) (0.08319) 
regular wages -0.53116" 0.49051*** 
(0.22987) (0.15562) 
transfers 1.65584** 1.04154* 
(0.79157) (0.57712) 
liquid assets 0.17770" 0.13952*** 
(0.07221) (0.04137) 
cultivated area 236.370* 301.676" 
(137.129) (148.384) 
irrigated area/cultivated area 10615.0"* -1452.82** 
(1950.24) (723.245) 
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.94 
Notes: a Estimation includes (fixed) household and year effects. All reported variables are 
instrumented. Refer to Tables 7.3 and 7.5 and Appendix 3 for the results of the first stage. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
*, " and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Cultivated area has the expected significant positive coefficient in both equations. 
The high and positive irrigation coefficient for Aurepalle reflects the considerable 
productivity differences between dryland and irrigated agriculture in this village. The same 
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farmers who harvested dryland crops with yields ranging from 200 to 400 kg per ha received 
paddy yields from 4 to 5 tonnes per ha (Walker and Ryan, 1990). Irrigation was of limited 
importance in Kanzara. Firstly, rainfall was abundant and assured relative to Aurepalle, 
which enabled farmers to grow profitable dryland crops like cotton and hybrid sorghum. 
Secondly, the number of farmers cultivating irrigated crops was very small. The latter may 
cause the irrigation coefficient to pick up something other than differences in the share of 
irrigated area. 
The significant positive coefficients for liquid assets confirm the importance of 
imperfections in insurance and credit markets. Liquid assets will increase net crop income if 
farmers cannot or do not want to take production loans. The previous chapters indicate that 
short-term credit constraints were not binding, but that households were hesitant to take a 
loan. They disliked the idea of having to repay a loan after a bad harvest. Hence, the 
household endowment of liquid assets had a positive impact on the use of crop inputs. Due to 
the characteristics of the estimated production function, this, however, hardly translated into 
changes in the simulated level and variability of crop income. Nevertheless, Table 7.8 
suggests that the actual effect of household Uquidity on net crop income was substantial. 
Table 7.8. Income elasticities of farm labour use at mean values (1979-1984) 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
livestock income 0.02 0.29*" 
self-employment income 0.01 0.05* 
casual farm wages -0.28*** -0.13* 
casual nonfarm wages 0.01 0.00 
regular wages -0.04" 0.13*** 
transfers" -0.15" -0.03* 
liquid assets 0.41" 0.16*" 
Notes: 4 The mean value of transfers in negative in both villages. Hence, the elasticities must be read 
as the decrease in crop profits resulting from an increase in income transfers from the 
household to a third party. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10,0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The effect of liquid assets was especially large in drought-prone Aurepalle: a 10% 
increase in liquid assets led to a 4.1% increase of net crop income in Aurepalle compared to a 
1.6% increase in Kanzara. Aurepalle households were especially reluctant to borrow as they 
faced higher ex ante production risks and had less capacity to smooth income ex post. 
3 4 We can conclude from these numbers that the covariate shock constitutes % = 33% of the total 
shock in Kanzara, and 7 / 1 8 « 40% Aurepalle. This coincides with Kochar's findings, which are used in 
chapter 6 to simulate the covariate shock. 
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Transfers increased net crop income as did liquid assets; only the size of the effect 
was smaller. The level of net transfers was uncertain at the beginning of the cropping season. 
Hence, transfers had only limited impact on household risk perceptions and liquidity during 
the cropping season. Besides, most money transfers took place only after harvest. Transfers 
may, therefore, have had more effect on the following-year liquidity and production than on 
current crop income. 
It was argued in Section 7.2 that the effects of alternative sources of (earned) income 
are ambiguous. The impact of noncrop income depends not only on the presence of risk and 
credit constraints, but also on the characteristics of the income flow. The results clearly 
demonstrate the relevance of these characteristics: some noncrop income coefficients are 
positive and others are negative. 
Livestock income stimulated net crop income in Kanzara. The impact of livestock 
income was extremely high: the livestock elasticity was almost double the Uquidity elasticity. 
Only the presence of complementarities other than increased liquidity and risk coping can 
explain this impressive effect. Livestock produces manure, which can help to improve soil 
quality and crop production. Moreover, livestock production involves demand for fodder, a 
by-product of crop production. This may increase the returns on crop production by 
increasing the imputed price of crop by-products. In Aurepalle, livestock income did not 
significantly affect crop production. The more pronounced production risk in this village may 
explain the difference with Kanzara. 
Like livestock income, income from nonfarm self-employment had a positive effect on 
net crop income in Kanzara. In this village, manufacturing provided a large share of self-
employment income. Nonfarm self-employment did not compete much for labour with crop 
production as most activities could be executed during the dry season. Nevertheless, the self-
employment elasticity of net crop income was low relative to that of liquid assets. Income 
from self-employment was uncertain and was mostly earned after harvest. The survey 
households, therefore, anticipated this type of income only to a certain extent. The effect of 
self-employment on next-year liquidity and crop production may have been more important 
than the contemporaneous impact. 
Income from self-employment did not significantly affect net crop income in 
Aurepalle. For a number of households in this village, self-employment (i.e., toddy tapping) 
was the main source of income. These households considered agriculture as a secondary 
activity and were therefore less likely to put great effort in crop production. This may be the 
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cause of the insignificance of the self-employment coefficient. Another explanation is the 
existence of some positive covariance of toddy production and crop production. 
Casual farm wages appear to be substitutes for crop income in both villages: ceteris 
paribus an increase in farm wages was associated with a decrease in crop income. In the 
semi-arid tropics, the timing of agricultural labour on and off the family's own farm 
necessarily coincides. Cash requirements may force farmers to work off-farm, even if they 
could allocate their labour more productively to own-farm production. Hired labour can 
substitute for family labour, but this does not solve the cash needs that lead to labour market 
participation.35 Besides, for farmers earning much farm wage income, crop production is only 
of secondary importance for their livelihood. In both villages, the farm wage elasticity of crop 
income was larger than minus one. This implies that casual farm wages decreased crop 
income but increase total income. The absolute value of the elasticity was lower in Kanzara 
than in Aurepalle. Compared to Aurepalle, farm labour demand in Kanzara was spread 
relatively evenly over the year. This made the conflict between cash demand and crop 
production less serious. 
The estimates do not demonstrate a significant impact of casual nonfarrn wages on 
net crop income. The competition for family labour between nonfarrn employment and crop 
production was limited, as both activities took place at largely different time periods. 
Nevertheless, casual nonfarrn wages did not help increase net crop income, as wage rates in 
the casual nonfarrn labour markets were low. 
The impact of regular wages on crop income was positive in Kanzara, where regular 
employment was relatively remunerative. The households involved could offset the decrease 
in the availability of family labour by hiring labour in the market or by substituting capital for 
labour. The stimulus of regular wages on crop income was only slightly smaller than that of 
liquid assets. This reflects the high certainty of the income source. 
In Aurepalle, on the other hand, regular employment decreased net crop income. Farm 
servants brought in the bulk of regular income. Their hourly wage rate was lower than that of 
casual agricultural labourers. This prevented (complete) substitution of hired labour for the 
family labour pulled out by regular employment. Nevertheless, the decrease in crop income 
was much smaller than for casual farm employment. Most farm servants belonged to the 
poorest households in the village, while casual farm workers belonged to small and medium-
I did not observe a direct effect of the family labour endowment on crop production, because the 
family adults are both sources and sinks of liquidity. 
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farm households alike. The poorest households were relatively well endowed with labour and 
had more than enough family labour to meet labour demands during the peak season. 
7.5. Conclusion 
In an area where agriculture is relatively stagnant, like India's SAT, growth in the nonfarm 
sector may stimulate agricultural growth. There are two mechanisms through which this 
process may occur. First, farmers may use nonfarm income to invest in agricultural assets. 
Various studies have dealt with this topic. Savadogo et al (1994), for example, found that 
nonfarm income had a positive impact on the purchase of bullocks. Second, nonfarm income 
may increase current crop income. This is the focus of the present study. Nonfarm activities 
can increase the household's farming skills or their access to markets. Moreover, nonfarm 
income may boost crop income due to improvements in household liquidity and risk-taking 
capacity. Conversely, engagement in nonfarm activities may reduce crop income if crop and 
noncrop activities compete for labour and capital resources. 
Previous research has shown that the sign and size of the impact of noncrop income 
on crop production depends on the socio-economic and biophysical environment in which a 
farmer operates. Even within a given environment, different sources of off-farm income will, 
however, have different effects on crop income. Each income source differs with respect to 
capital requirements, timing, and riskiness. The timing of an activity relative to crop 
production determines its effects on liquidity and the potential competition for family labour. 
The variability of an income source and the covariance with farm income controls the extent 
to which households can use the income to manage risk. Although the literature recognises 
the importance of the nature of the off-farm income stream for its effect on farm production, 
these aspects have received little empirical scrutiny. 
Data from the study villages confirm the hypothesis that dissimilar sources of income 
affect net crop income differently. Activities with returns not higher that the casual farm 
wage rate did not stimulate crop production. If these activities require labour simultaneous to 
crop production, they even reduce net crop income. On the other hand, households simply 
substituted hired labour or capital for any family labour withdrawn from crop production if 
the returns on off-farm employment were high relative to the casual farm wage. What is 
more, the households used part of the off-farm income to intensify crop production. 
Uncertainty decreased this effect, but uncertain income streams may have increased next-year 
liquidity and, thus, next-year net crop income. Moreover, if the off-farm activity became the 
farmers' main interest, it no longer boosted net crop income. 
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The above implies that there will be a positive impact of nonfarm development on the 
development of agriculture under two conditions: i) nonfarm development involves an 
increase in the availability of relatively certain nonfarm employment with returns on labour 
above the agricultural wage rate; ii) nonfarm employment does not become the farmer's 
major concern. In other words, the nonfarm employment must be selectively available, and 
there will be a positive impact on the crop production of those farmers that succeed in getting 
a share. As nonfarm employment rises over time, the agricultural wage rate will go up to the 
level of the nonagricultural (shadow) wage rate, and the positive impact disappears. 
Alternatively, nonfarm employment becomes the main source of income for a part of the 
farm households, which also reverses the positive impact of nonfarm development on 
agricultural production. In the early stages of development when agriculture contains the 
mass of employment and economic resources, the conditions for stimulating agricultural 
development through the nonfarm economy are, however, available. 
These findings shed new light on the study by Fan et al (2000), which considers the 
impact of different types of government expenditure on rural poverty and agricultural 
productivity growth in India. Fan et al found that in order to generate productivity growth in 
agriculture, the Indian government should give highest priority to additional investments in 
agricultural research and in rural roads. The latter is meaningful in light of the present study. 
Obviously, investment in roads increases the farmers' access to markets and decreases 
transportation costs of agricultural inputs and outputs. Fan et al, however, also showed that 
investment in roads boosts nonfarm employment. The present study suggests that this 
explains part of the positive impact of investment in roads on agricultural productivity. 
Although this chapter indicates that income earned from public-works programmes 
does not affect same-year income from crop production, public-works programmes can raise 
net crop income indirectly. The introduction of public works may imply an increase in the 
savings capacity of the poorest farmers. The resulting additional liquidity at the beginning of 
the cropping season does have a significant positive impact on net crop income. Moreover, 
Chapter 6 indicates that the mere availability of public-works programmes in areas with high 
dry-season unemployment induces farmers to use more risky (and more profitable) 
production technologies. This is not the result of the income actually earned in these 
programmes, but the possibility to resort to public-works employment when crop yields are 
unexpectedly low. 
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8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Continuous efforts are needed to stimulate stagnating agriculture in India's SAT. SAT 
agriculture provides a livelihood for over 250 million Indians, and this number is 
continuously increasing. The nonprimary sectors currently support only a small share of the 
population, and growth is not fast enough to increase this share rapidly. Consequently, 
agriculture has to absorb the bulk of population growth. Three factors are important in this 
respect: the demand for labour in agriculture, the biophysical sustainabiUty of agricultural 
production, and crop income earned by smallholder households. 
Smallholders are the major agricultural producers in India's SAT. Important 
determinants of their productive capacity are risk and credit constraints. Owing to the absence 
of sufficient long-term credit (and insurance), households have only a limited capacity to 
smooth consumption over time. On the other hand, empirical evidence on the availability of 
short-term production credit is mixed. Small farmers use little production credit, but this may 
be the result of prudence as well as credit constraints. 
Most smallholders acquire a significant part of their income outside their own farm. 
Wage income from the daily labour market is the largest income source besides crop 
production. Other, less important, sources of off-farm income are the regular labour market, 
nonfarm self-employment, and remittances. 
Income from these sources may have a strong impact on agricultural production 
decisions in a risk-prone environment with a strong seasonal agricultural production pattern 
like India's SAT. Off-farm activities are an important source of cash income, which can 
improve farm productivity if it is used to finance farm-input purchases or investment in 
agricultural assets. Moreover, off-farm income may help reduce the variance of overall 
household income and improve food security by allowing the household to buy food in cases 
of yield shortfalls. Households may then be able to increase the risk and profitability of their 
agricultural activities. 
In India's SAT, where growing-season labour markets are well developed, not just 
off-farm income, but all labour income may affect the productivity of agriculture. Hired 
labour can be considered a perfect substitute for family labour. Own-farm employment, 
therefore, yields a return equal to off-farm employment: the market wage rate. Both 
employment types have equal liquidity and risk effects: own-farm employment means not 
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having to spend a given amount of money, while wage employment implies earning a given 
amount of money. 
The remainder of this section discusses the findings of this study regarding the impact 
of labour income and (other) off-farm income on crop production and income in India's SAT. 
Section 8.1 reviews the place of this study in the development economics literature. Section 
8.2 summarises the major findings of the previous chapters, while section 8.3 explores the 
policy implication of these findings. 8.4 presents some final reflections on the findings of the 
study. 
8.1. Off-farm income and the development economics literature 
8.1.1. Farm-nonfarm linkages in the development economics literature 
Farm-nonfarm linkages have inspired generations of development economists. Two general 
observations can be made: (i) the share of agriculture in a country's labour force and total 
output declines during the process of development; (ii) rapid agricultural growth needs to 
accompany or precede general economic growth. This process of transformation from an 
agricultural to an industrial economy is relatively well understood. Since the income 
elasticity of agricultural products is less than unity (Engel's law), the gross value of 
agricultural sales will grow less rapidly than gross domestic product. Moreover, a rapid 
growth in agricultural productivity is needed to foster incomes and to prevent a rise in the 
terms of trade in favour of agriculture (Timmer, 1988). 
As early as the 1950s, Lewis designed a dual economy model describing the macro-
level interactions that take place between the agricultural and the nonagricultural sector. The 
starting point of dual economy models is the coexistence of two sectors that are basically 
asymmetrical in terms of both product and organisational characteristics. On the one hand, 
there is a small modernising manufacturing sector, which accumulates capital and absorbs 
labour as needed. On the other hand, traditional agriculture employs little capital, relatively 
fixed inputs of land, and a pre-existing input of labour. The core of the development problem 
in this dual economy is the ability of the agricultural sector to yield sufficiently large 
surpluses and to preserve a sufficiently large part of such surpluses for productive investment 
in the nonagricultural sector. Moreover, in the process of development, low marginal product 
agricultural labour is reallocated to more productive employment elsewhere (Ranis, 1988). 
More recently, development economics has shifted attention from these macro-
processes to their micro-foundations. In a standard neo-classical setting, all individuals have 
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the same information and do not face transaction costs. Markets for all goods exist, including 
markets for future goods and risks, and the only relevant institutions are markets and property 
rights (Hoff et al, 1993). In developing countries, however, transportation and communication 
infrastructure are often rudimentary, legal systems are weak, and statutory and customary 
property rights systems may clash (Hoff et al, 1993). Consequently, transaction costs and 
informational asymmetries play an important role in economic behaviour. Only when, we 
understand the behaviour of economic agents in such an environment can we design 
appropriate policies to stimulate development. 
For farm-nonfarm relations, this new approach implies a focus on the development of 
individual farm and nonfarm enterprises, and especially on the resource flows between the 
two types of undertakings. While both farm households and rural nonfarm enterprises have 
been extensively studied in isolation, attention to the nature of inter-enterprise resource flows 
has been limited. Important examples are the numerous studies by Reardon on farm-
household income diversification (see references), but these mainly discuss theories and 
postulate hypotheses. The few empirical studies on the impact of off-farm income on farm 
income do not cover the impact of risk and seasonality on farm-nonfarm relations (Evans and 
Ngau, 1991; Woldehanna, 2000), which is the focus of the present study. 
Although off-farm income is potentially very important for household risk 
management, most studies on farm-household risk behaviour focus on the role of savings and 
assets (Behrman et al, 1997; Deaton, 1992a; Dercon, 1998; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 
1993; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). Risk may induce households to hold their wealth in 
assets that are relatively liquid, but not very productive. Moreover, if assets are used for 
consumption smoothing as well as production, the household asset endowment will be lower 
than the profit maximising level. Off-farm employment as an alternative risk-management 
tool could decrease the negative impact of risk on asset profitability, and therefore deserves 
substantial research attention. 
8 . 1 2 . Innovations 
The focus of this study is on farm-nonfarm relations in the light of two important 
characteristics of SAT agriculture: risk and seasonality. Previous research has argued that 
these factors will strongly affect the impact of nonfarm income on farm production and 
income (Reardon, 1997). Farm households need to invest labour and other variable inputs in 
crop production months before the uncertain returns on this investment are realised. Off-farm 
income can facilitate this process in various ways. Off-farm income may increase cash 
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availability during the pre-harvest season. This will decrease the effect of potential cash 
constraints or household prudence. Moreover, off-farm employment may offer households 
the possibility to increase the level of off-farm income when farm income is disappointingly 
low. This option will lower the variance of household income. Hence, it is not only the 
seasonality of crop production that shapes the farm-nonfarm relation, but also the seasonality 
of nonfarm activities. 
Previous empirical research on the impact of off-farm income on farm production and 
income has largely ignored risk and seasonality. Agricultural seasonality is accounted for in 
that off-farm income is considered to alleviate cash constraints (Evans and Ngau, 1991; 
Reardon and Kelly, 1989; Woldehanna, 2000), but no distinction is made between different 
sources of off-farm income with different seasonal income flows. Moreover, previous 
empirical studies have not explicitly accounted for the stochastic nature of crop income. 
In the present study, a two-stage model was developed that illustrates the diverse 
effects of wage income on crop production in an area with high production risk and well-
functioning labour markets. The model reveals that in this situation no difference occurs 
between labour income earned on the family farm and that earned in the casual agricultural 
labour market. Both are certain and partly realised before the crop is harvested. Hence, the 
family labour endowment can be used to manage risk and liquidity constraints, irrespective of 
whether the household supplies labour to the market or not. The effects of risk, prudence, and 
credit constraints on inputs used in crop production are diverse. Credit constraints and 
prudence unambiguously lower input use. Risk may, however, increase as well as decrease 
input use, depending on the input at hand and the specific production environment. Previous 
research has overlooked this ambiguity in the impact of risk (Kanwar, 1999). 
The model shows the importance of the seasonality of off-farm employment: 
households can use family labour for ex ante risk management as well as ex post income 
smoothing. Ex ante risk management involves an increase in labour supply in response to 
production risk, while ex post smoothing involves changes in household labour supply in 
response to unexpected variations in income from crop production. Previous research has 
considered both options in isolation, but not as a joint strategy. The empirical part of the 
present research indicates that ignoring the ex ante strategy and, to a lesser extent, the ex post 
strategy, does not much affect the results of studies on farm-household behaviour in India's 
SAT. 
The measures utilised to demonstrate this are more precise than the risk measures 
used in previous studies. These studies used the standard deviation of production based on 
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time series data as a measure of ex ante production risk (Kanwar, 1999; Saha, 1994). This 
measure includes historical information only and thus ignores a significant part of the 
information available to the farmer at planting: area to be planted, land quality, and actual 
weather. The Just-Pope two-stage method from the production hterature, which is used in this 
study, allows inclusion of at least part of the farmer's nonhistorical information. 
Previous studies on ex post income smoothing through adaptations in family labour 
supply are not very decisive (Kochar, 1995; Kochar, 1999). They base their conclusions on 
the impact of unanticipated income shocks on labour supply. Estimation of these shocks is 
tedious and imprecise. The model developed in this study shows that the demonstration of ex 
post risk coping through family labour supply does not require any shock estimates. If it is 
possible to single out harvest-stage labour supply, it is sufficient to determine the household's 
reaction to actual harvest-stage full income. 
The study disentangles the effects of risk, prudence, and credit constraints on input 
use not only analytically, but also empirically. The latter is unusual. Risk aversion and credit 
constraints are unobservable, and asset ownership often serves as a proxy for both. Besides, it 
may be very difficult to distinguish the effects of liquidity constraints and prudence. The 
behaviour of a liquidity-constrained agent may be similar to the behaviour of an agent who 
can borrow as much as desired but who has a significant precautionary motive. What is more, 
in a consumer model that allows for both prudence and credit constraints, the effects of 
increased uncertainty and the effects of a more tightly binding budget constraint are identical 
(Browning and Lusardi, 1996). 
The reason for the study's capacity to distinguish between risk and credit constraints 
is the potentially opposite impact of both factors on input use. The impact of production risk 
can be determined directly through inclusion of the expected variability of crop output in the 
estimation function. The coefficient of a proxy for risk aversion on input use must have the 
same sign as the coefficient for the risk measure. This knowledge often allows for 
determining whether short-term credit constraints are binding or not. Let us consider a case 
where risk increases the use of a specific input, i.e., the impact of risk and credit constraints 
are opposite. Suppose that the use of this input is negatively affected by the household's 
endowment of illiquid assets. This must imply that risk aversion is more important for 
household behaviour than credit constraints are. Households with higher endowments of 
illiquid assets have more access to credit. Binding credit constraints would, therefore, cause a 
positive relation between asset ownership and input use instead of the negative relation 
observed. 
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Liquid assets are likely to have a larger impact on credit constraints and prudence than 
on risk aversion. Hence, no matter what the relation between risk and input use, the effect of 
liquid assets is expected to be positive, either because of prudence or because of credit 
constraints. If the coefficient for illiquid assets indicates that short-term credit constraints are 
of limited importance, a significant positive effect of liquid assets on input use results from 
prudence. 
The model and the empirical estimates reveal how family labour affects crop 
production through its impact on income risk and liquidity. More family members mean 
potentially more labour income and thus higher liquidity and more income stability. If this is 
the case, the larger the family-labour endowment is, the smaller the effect of risk, prudence, 
and credit constraints on input use. Most previous research considers labour market 
imperfections as the only reason for a relation between family labour and the use of inputs. If 
labour markets are imperfect, more family labour will imply a greater use of labour in crop 
production. The model developed in this study shows that it is precisely the well-functioning 
of labour markets that can cause family labour to affect input use, and that the impact of 
family labour on labour used in crop production may be negative as well as positive. 
Finally, the study looks into the direct effects of various sources of off-farm income 
on income from crop production. Casual wage employment was by far the main source of 
off-farm income in the study area. This seems to indicate that the effect of off-farm income 
equalled the effect of family labour described above. This is, however, not necessarily the 
case. Some households worked long hours, while others consumed large amounts of home 
time. Moreover, there were other (minor) sources of income besides casual wage income and 
crop production. Each income source may have had its own distinct effect on crop 
production. 
Off-farm income sources differ with respect to capital requirements, timing, and 
riskiness and may, therefore, affect crop income differently. Timing of the activity relative to 
crop production determines its effects on liquidity and the potential competition for family 
labour, while the variability of income and the covariance with farm income controls the 
extent to which households can use the income source to manage risk. Although the literature 
recognises the importance of the nature of the off-farm income stream, these aspects have 
received little empirical scrutiny. 
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8.2. Crop production and off-farm income: Main findings 
8.2.1. Risk and labour supply 
Simulations based on regression results for two villages in India's SAT reveal that labour 
income was extremely important for the income stability of farm households. There were 
three stabilising effects of labour income: i) the presence of a certain flow of income; ii) ex 
ante risk management through labour supply; and iii) ex post income smoothing through 
adapting labour supply to actual crop production. Ex ante risk management implies that 
households will work long hours in order to guarantee a certain consumption floor, while ex 
post risk coping involves an increase in labour supply at the cost of home time when crop 
income turns out to be low. 
The presence of a certain flow of labour income was most important for income 
stability as defined by the coefficient of variation. Compared to crop income alone, the 
coefficient of variation of crop and non-risk-induced labour income was about 75% lower for 
small farmers, 30% lower for medium farmers, and 10% lower for large farmers. 
Nevertheless, the intentional risk strategies were certainly not ineffective. 
Ex post income smoothing significantly increased minimum income. As large-farm 
households experienced the highest yield losses, they made the most use of this strategy. This 
did not, however, hold for extremely wealthy farmers,36 who had other means of stabilising 
income. A farm household's ex post smoothing capacity depends on the conditions of the 
dry-season labour market. Where there is high dry-season unemployment, the period in which 
farm households can work long hours to compensate for yield losses is short. The impact of 
ex post income smoothing through the labour market is, therefore, limited in this situation. 
When ample dry-season employment was available, farm households compensated 21% of 
the unexpected loss in crop income through ex post income smoothing. 
Yield covariance hardly affected the household's capacity to smooth income ex post. 
Harvest wage rates were quite stable and only influenced to a very small extent by covariate 
yield shocks. This may come as a surprise to those who consider covariate weather variability 
the main source of production risk in the semi-arid tropics. However, weather and its impact 
differ between farmer's fields on a scale as small as a single village in India's SAT. 
Farm households cultivating more than 8 hectares of land in a rainfall-assured region with 
productive soils. 
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Only when the household's capacity to smooth income ex post was limited did they 
use family labour for ex ante risk management. The impact of this strategy on household 
income was largest for medium-farm households, who earned enough crop income to be 
significantly affected by production risk, and whose share of labour income was high enough 
to affect total income. A representative medium-farm household increased its average income 
by 8% and its minimum income by 32% through increased labour supply for ex ante risk 
management. 
8.2.2. Input use 
Farm households can manage risk not only by adapting family labour supply, but also by 
adapting the use of agricultural inputs. Depending on the production environment and the 
technology used, each input can increase as well as decrease the variability of crop 
production. If an input increases production risk, the risk-averse household will use this input 
below the level of profit maximisation. The opposite holds for risk-decreasing inputs. Farm 
households that are well able to manage risk, either through the ownership of large assets 
endowments or through large labour endowments in an environment with sufficient 
employment, will produce closer to the point of profit maximisation. 
The empirical estimates show that the relation between risk and input use is diverse in 
India's SAT. In a relatively stable production environment, farmers used male labour to 
stabilise yields. Consequently, risk increased the use of male labour in crop production. The 
opposite holds in a rainfall-unassured area. Farmers were afraid to lose their labour 
investments in a bad year and applied less (male and female) labour when they faced higher 
risk. The impact of risk on fertiliser use was more uniform: output variability increased the 
use of fertilisers in both study villages. This implies that the village households considered 
fertilisers as risk-decreasing inputs. Perhaps surprisingly, the above household behaviour did 
not coincide with the technical relations found between input use and output variability. 
However, this deviation is not unique for the present study. The same was found for Texas 
farmers (SriRamaratnam, 1987). 
The effects of the farmers' endowment of illiquid assets on input use confirm the 
above observations. Wealthier households, which were better able to smooth consumption, 
used less risk-decreasing fertilisers. Likewise, the impact of illiquid assets on labour use was 
opposite to that of production risk: if labour was considered to decrease risk, wealthier 
households used less labour in crop production and vice versa. In other words, more affluent 
households made less use of adaptations in input levels to manage risk. Depending on the 
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characteristics of a specific input and the production environment, this resulted in either a 
positive or a negative impact of illiquid assets on the use of the respective input. 
These findings imply that short-term credit constraints were not binding: binding 
credit constraints lead to a uniformly positive relation between illiquid assets, which are 
collateral to loans, and input use. The position of a household in the financial markets did, 
nevertheless, affect production behaviour. As the village households were prudent, risk 
decreased the willingness to borrow. Liquid asset holdings, therefore, had a positive impact 
on input use. 
The risk management capacity of family labour was only large enough to affect input 
use when year-round employment was available. In this case, households with a larger labour 
endowment felt less need to adapt the use of crop labour and fertilisers to production risk. 
Well-functioning cropping-season labour markets were not sufficient to achieve this effect, 
unless the cropping season was sufficiently long. Moreover, given liquid asset holdings at the 
start of the cropping season, the impact of family labour on household liquidity was 
insufficient to affect household behaviour through prudence. 
8.2.3. Net crop income and other household income sources 
The conclusions from the previous section suggest that family labour will have a positive 
impact on crop income when there is year-round employment. In this situation, family labour 
is an important means of stabilising household income. More family members, therefore, 
implies that a household sacrifices less crop inputs for risk management. However, 
simulations indicate that a change in the number of family members would have had only a 
marginal impact on the total crop income of the survey households. Most of the estimated 
input elasticities of the mean and variance of production are low. A risk or otherwise induced 
change in input use, hence, translated into a much smaller change in the level and variability 
of output. Consequently, the simulated impact of family labour on crop income is negligible. 
Despite this conclusion, actual labour income may still have had a significant impact 
on net crop income: some farmers worked longer hours than others did. Moreover, it would 
be interesting to gain insight into the specific impact on crop production of labour and other 
income from the nonfarm sector. When agriculture is relatively stagnant, development of the 
nonfarm sector could be a stimulus to agricultural production. One can analyse these issues 
by testing directly for the impact of different income sources on net crop income. 
Empirical estimates show that the effect of noncrop income on crop income was 
diverse. The size and nature of the effects depended on the characteristics of the income flow. 
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Noncrop activities that required labour simultaneous to crop production and that had low 
returns on labour decreased net crop income. If the returns on noncrop activities were certain 
and high relative to the casual farm wage, households, however, simply substituted hired 
labour or capital for family labour. Moreover, they used part of the noncrop income to 
intensify crop production. Uncertainty decreased this effect. However, uncertain income 
streams may have increased next-year liquidity and thus next-year net crop income. Finally, 
if the nonfarm activity was the main source of interest of the farm household, income from 
this activity did not affect crop production. 
8.3. Stimulating agricultural production through rural employment 
programmes 
8.3.1. Off-farm employment and agricultural production 
Farmers and agricultural labourers in India's SAT do not need to resort to nonfarm 
employment to compensate for periodical shortages of agricultural harvest-stage 
employment. As less than half of yield risk is covariate, fluctuations in aggregate labour 
demand and supply are small. Consequently, harvest wage rates and employment levels are 
relatively constant from year to year. 
Yet, the availability of off-farm employment can significantly improve the economic 
security of farm households. Dry-season employment enhances the period in which 
households can increase their workload to compensate for low crop incomes. Besides, access 
to secure remunerative nonfarm activities increases the level and stability of household 
income. Hence, increased availability of off-farm income mostly leads to increased 
profitability of crop production. Risk-averse and prudent farmers produce closer to the level 
of profit maximisation if they have access to relatively certain and profitable off-farm 
activities. Only if the off-farm activity becomes their main interest does it not affect the 
profitability of their crop production. Otherwise, remunerative off-farm activities induce 
farmers to slightly increase the riskiness and profitability of their crop production. 
In both study villages, increased risk-taking involved a decrease in the use of 
fertilisers since farmers considered fertilisers as risk-decreasing inputs. Given the low doses 
of fertilisers applied, it is surprising that farmers using fertilisers felt that they applied more 
than the profit-maximising level. Farmers are prudent as well as risk averse. In the absence of 
a relation between fertiliser use and production risk, prudent households will use less 
fertiliser than the profit-maximising level. Perhaps more importantly, the low fertiliser 
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elasticity estimate from Chapter 6 indicates that actual returns on fertilisers were low due to 
inefficient application. 
The effect of increased risk-taking on agricultural employment is ambiguous. The 
survey households worked fewer hours during the planting stage if they had sufficient 
possibilities to compensate yield losses through increased income-generating activities during 
the harvest-stage and dry season. This led to a slight decrease in involuntary unemployment. 
In contrast, the effect of increased risk-taking on the use of labour was undefined. Depending 
on the specific production environment at hand, higher yield risk involved either an increase 
or a decrease in the use of labour. The results for the two study villages suggest that increased 
farmer risk-taking is associated with an increase in labour use in areas with high production 
risk and a decrease in labour use in areas with moderate production risk. 
8.3.2. Utilising employment policies to stimulate SAT agriculture 
Technological innovation is a standard requirement for agricultural development. In line with 
this, Fan et al (2000) concluded that to increase agricultural productivity, the Indian 
government should give the highest priority to investment in research and development. 
Farmers must, however, be willing and able to adopt the new technologies. Whether they do 
so depends on their knowledge and the socio-economic environment. Of course, a new 
technology must be remunerative, but this is not the only criterion on which farm households 
base their decisions. Among other things, they account for the relative riskiness of different 
economic activities and for the amount of investment that these require. 
Important for the adoption of new technologies is the distribution of information to 
the prospective users of the technology. Empirical estimates suggest that lack of knowledge 
has limited fertiliser use in the study villages. Older farmers from traditional farming families 
used more fertilisers than their fellow villagers did. The average efficiency of fertiliser use 
was low, however, which largely decreased the profitability of fertiliser use. Extension could 
lead to a significant increase in fertiliser use. 
In addition to extension, governments can stimulate the adoption of technology 
through both price and other policies. Given the nonseparability of smallholders' production 
and consumption decisions, policies directed at nonprice factors may be most effective. 
Fertiliser subsidies, for example, have been a huge drain on government financial resources, 
while the current study indicates that the nitrogen price did not significantly affect nitrogen 
use. Moreover, the bulk of fertiliser subsidies goes to the more affluent farmers (Datt and 
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Sundaharam, 2000). Unless the general (market) infrastructure improves significantly, it is 
not likely that price policies will have much effect on agricultural production. 
One aim of the present study was to assess the usefulness of employment policies for 
stimulating development of the agricultural sector. As explained above, the family labour 
endowment is an important tool for risk management. The higher the risk-absorbing capacity 
of family labour, the higher the willingness of farm households to engage in risky, but 
profitable technologies. This suggests that policies directed at the labour market will 
indirectly affect agricultural development. However, the current study provides only weak 
evidence for this relation. The family labour endowment of the survey households affected 
input use, but the resulting effect on crop income was negligible. On the other hand, the 
regressions demonstrate some significant direct effects of lucrative sources of nonfarm 
income on crop production. 
Public-works programmes have a limited impact on agricultural production and 
income. Public-works programmes necessarily involve wage rates not higher than the casual 
wage rate paid in agriculture. Empirical estimates show that income earned in such activities 
does not increase the net income from crop production. On the other hand, the mere 
availability of public-works programmes in areas with a relatively short cropping season and 
low dry-season market employment induces fanners to use more risky production 
technologies. This change in technology is not the result of the income actually earned in 
government programmes, but the possibility to resort to public-works employment when crop 
yields are unexpectedly low. However, recall that this study could not demonstrate a 
significant effect of these changes on net crop income. Finally, the introduction of public 
works may imply an increase in the savings capacity of the poorest farmers. The resulting 
additional liquidity at the beginning of the cropping season will have a significant positive 
impact on net crop income. 
Contrary to the introduction of public-works programmes, increased private nonfarm 
employment will have a positive impact on aggregate agricultural income in areas like India's 
SAT, where agriculture is by far the most important sector of the economy and labour 
markets function well. Farm households participating in remunerative nonfarm activities will 
partly or even more than compensate for the withdrawal of family labour from crop 
production by hiring labour in the village market. As long as the returns on labour in nonfarm 
employment exceed the casual agricultural wage rate, participation in nonfarm activities will 
lead to an increased profitability of crop production. In other words, the returns on nonfarm 
activities are not only nonfarm income but also an increase in net crop income. Increasing 
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local agricultural income will, thus, be a side-effect of government programmes stimulating 
nonfarm employment. These programmes can involve stimulation of cottage industries or 
petty trade as well as small factories hiring in labour. However, the positive side-effect is 
only relevant for those fortunate households gaining access to activities with returns on 
labour above the common casual wage rate. The effect disappears when the agricultural wage 
rate comes to a par with the nonfarm wage rate. 
Stimulation of nonfarm employment will not lead to a significant increase in the 
biophysical sustainabiUty of agriculture through increased fertiliser use. Increased risk-taking 
leads to a decrease of fertiliser use. Public-works programmes, although valuable in their own 
right, are, therefore, not suitable to promoting smallholder fertiliser use. On the other hand, 
there might be a positive impact of remunerative nonfarm employment on fertiliser use 
through its impact on household Uquidity. Still, extension seems much more effective in 
stimulatin g sustainability. 
Summarising, the current study demonstrates a positive impact of nonfarm 
development on agricultural production and income, but — contrary to expectations and to 
assertions in previous studies — this impact is not very strong.37 Moreover, the impact of 
nonfarm development on growth in the agricultural sector is likely to weaken even further 
over time. As nonfarm employment increases, the agricultural wage rate will go up to the 
level of the nonagricultural (shadow) wage rate. This breaks down the positive effect of 
nonfarm income on household economic security. Alternatively, nonfarm employment 
becomes the main source of income for some farm households, which also cancels out the 
positive impact of nonfarm development on agricultural production. Nevertheless, 
households earning substantial income from off-farm activities are not likely to withdraw 
completely from crop production. A recent visit to the village of Aurepalle revealed that 
households that earned much money through self-employment activities like toddy tapping 
and livestock herding have used part of this income to purchase land. Other research indicates 
that farm households in a village in North India's SAT have used nonfarm salaries to invest 
in irrigation (Parikh, 1996). 
Note that this conclusion is valid for India's SAT, where short-term credit is abundantly 
available. The impact of off-farm income on agricultural income is likely to be higher in Africa, 
where farmers lack access to all types of credit In line with this, Woldehanna (2000) observes a 
positive impact of off-farm income on the use of variable inputs and crop income in the Tigray region 
in Ethiopia. 
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We can thus conclude that the possibility to improve farm production and income 
within the given setting is limited. An improvement in the general (market) infrastructure 
seems needed to decrease rural poverty substantially. Currently, the lack of good roads and an 
adequate chain of warehouses and transporters leads to a loss of about 20% of total 
agricultural output along the way from producer to consumer (Economist, 2001). In line with 
this observation, Fan et al (2000) suggested that investment in roads should be an integral 
part of any rural development policy. Their empirical analysis showed not only that roads 
stimulate both nonfarm employment and agricultural productivity, but also that public 
investment in roads leads to a larger decrease in rural poverty than investment in agricultural 
research, education, irrigation, soil and water conservation, power, rural development or 
health. Walker and Ryan (1990) argued that the economic growth potential of India's SAT 
lies mostly in high production potential areas like Kanzara. In the long run, households in 
areas with a low production potential, like Aurepalle, should migrate to the more well-
endowed areas. Public-works programmes are required to absorb labour in the mean time. 
Unfortunately, the present study does not provide support for a more positive conclusion. 
8.4. Reflections 
The present research corifirms that increasing dry-season employment will decrease the 
income volatility of farm households. This is, of course, not the only way to improve the 
economic security of these households. An obvious alternative would be the development of 
markets for long-term consumption credit. These markets are, however, plagued by 
information problems. Informal lenders are best able to master these problems. During the 
survey period, some informal consumption credit was available in Aurepalle, but not in 
Kanzara. Nevertheless, consumption volatility was highest in Aurepalle, as was income 
volatility. Moreover, the opening up of the village economy has led to a weakening of the 
informal credit market. It seems unlikely that government policies can alter this situation. 
Labour markets may be an indirect way to stimulate security, but at least they are transparent. 
Moreover, spending government funds on nonfarm employment programmes is justified in 
itself for reasons of absorbing the growth of the economically active population. 
Despite the importance of labour income and (other) off-farm income to total income 
stability, the study indicates that the effects of these types of income on current crop income 
are not very large. However, during a recent field visit, farmers indicated that they had used 
income from nonfarm self-employment to purchase land. Several studies coiifirm the use of 
nonfarm income for agricultural investment. Savadogo et al (1994) found that nonfarm 
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employment increases investment in animal traction, while Parikh and Thorbecke (1996) 
indicated that farmers use nonfarm salaries to invest in irrigation. Given these findings, it 
seems likely that off-farm income has more effect on agricultural investment than on current 
crop income. Future research should, therefore, focus on the more long-term relations 
between farm and nonfarm development. 
Some other recent developments were observed during the field visit. Despite 
population growth, labour markets have tightened in both study villages. Kanzara households 
no longer resort to the public-works scheme for employment, as there is sufficient market 
employment available. This is not the case in Shirapur, the permanent ICRISAT village with 
limited agricultural development possibilities (see Chapter 2). In Shirapur, unemployment has 
increased significantly since the abolition of the public-works programme. In Aurepalle, 
many people migrate to the city during the dry season. At the same time, agricultural labour 
markets have tightened. Large landowners have problems hiring sufficient labour during peak 
seasons and adapt their crop technology accordingly: for example, some farmers sow then-
crops in squares instead of lines in order to facilitate mterculmring and limit the need for 
(female) weeding labour. 
In conclusion, it is worth stressing the paradox that this study presents. On the one 
hand, the survey farmers adapted input levels to exogenous production risk. On the other 
hand, these changes in input use had little effect on the variability of crop production. And if 
they did, they did not always do so in the direction that farmer behaviour suggests. Why then 
would farmers bother to adjust input use to risk? This behaviour seems difficult to reconcile 
with the standard economic assumption that farmers are at least boundedly rational. Farmers 
have generally cultivated the same set of crops on the same fields for years. Therefore, they 
are likely to know the relation between inputs and outputs. Would this be the case only for 
the average level of output and not for something as intangible as output variability? 
Alternatively, is there a relation between input use and yield variability that the estimated 
production function does not capture? This relation cannot lie in higher moments of the yield 
distribution: the yield distributions of the most commonly grown crop combinations approach 
normality. Finally, it is possible that a less restrictive functional form, such as the translog 
form, approximates the real production function more closely than the Cobb-Douglas form. 
However, the data set is too limited to accommodate these complex functions. Only 
additional research can elucidate the seemingly paradoxical behaviour of the survey 
households. 
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APPENDIX 1. DERIVATION OF THE KUHN-TUCKER CONDITIONS 
The following equations hold for the harvest stage: 
Ut2=w2UC2, (AU) 
(A1.2) 
P 
F2 =F2(T2,w2,p,r,Q',B\z), (A1.3) 
L2=L2fa,p,w2), (A1.4) 
where: 
ft = /(£,) + ftfc )ye, e ~ tf(0,l). (A1.5) 
The Lagrangian for planting-stage decision problem is 
3 = i/MF, -L^+BJ, -F1]+pEf/[pg(/(iI) + /»(L 1Ki 2) 
+ w2(F2 - i 2 ) - ( l + r )5 , r 2 -F 2 ;Z]+X(B m -B) 
(A1.6) 
(A1.7a) 
The three decision variables are. I;, B, and F ; . Note that the choice of Lt and B affects harvest-stage 
decisions regarding L2 and (Eqs (A1.3)-(A1.5)). Moreover, the stochastic shock (e) affects Qj and 
thus L2 and F 2 (ibid). Hence Z,^  and F 2 are uncertain in the planting stage. 
The first order condition for labour demand (Li) can be derived as follows: 
•Jr-=-w,£/c, +pE!pC2\pgQi{flt +hhyE)+pgL2L2iLi +w2F2A -w2L2A] 
~Ut2F2Ah0 
As pgj^ = T V 2 (EqA1.2), this reduces to 
-WlUc> +pE{uC2\pg&fLi +Pg&hLiyE+w2F2A\-Ul2F2M\=0 , (A1.7b) 
which can be rewritten as follows: 
- w,C/Ci + pE{uC2pgBtfk )+ PE{uC2pgQh^ ys)+ pE[ucw2F2A )-pE{uhF2A )=0. (A1.7c) 
As Ui2 =w2UC2 (EqAl.l), this reduces to 
-wxUCi +pE{uC2pgg)f^)+pE{uC2pgQihh^)=0. (A1.7d) 
This equals 
-wxUCi +pPfliE(uC2g&)+pphkiE{uC2gQie)=0, (A1.7e) 
Derivation of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
which can be rewritten as 
f =21  Uc> _ A Auc,8&£) 
A P pE[UCigBi) h ï E{uC2gQy 
The first order condition for borrowing (B) is 
JL</C, +pEUCi{w2FXB-{\ + r))-pEUti{F2_B)-X 
which can be rewritten as 
UCi =p(l + r)EUC2-PEUC2{w2F2iB)+pEU(2{FX3)+ 
As Ui2 = w2UC2 (Eq Al.l), this reduces to 
UCi=p(l + r)EUC2+A. 
Finally, the first order condition for labour supply is 
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APPENDIX 2. PRODUCTION RISK 
Output variability can be determined using a two-step method developed by Just and Pope (1979). A 
third step gives an efficient estimate of crop production. Just and Pope define a production function 
that allows for separate effects of inputs on output and output variability. The specification includes 
two general functions—one that specifies the effects of inputs on the mean of output and another that 
specifies the effects of inputs on the variance of output. The function is given by 
y = f(X) + KX)e, E(e) = 0,V(e) = l. (A2.1) 
Thus, E(y)=f(X) and V(y)=h2(X). 
We can rewrite Al. for observation t explicitly including the parameters of / and h as 
V, = / ( * , ) + <?*, E{e,) = 0,E(e,e'j) = 0for t*j, (A2.2) 
where em,=h(XbP)ei. Supposing that both / and h follow a Cobb-Douglas form, we can now estimate a 
consistently with nonlinear least squares. Using the estimate of a, say d, we can consistently (though 
not efficiently) estimate f(Xb a) by f(Xb a). Thus £*, can be estimated as follows: 
et=y-f(Xt,a) . (A2.3) 
But note that 
E[{e'tf] = E[h2(X„B)e,2]= h*(X,B). (A2.4) 
This suggests the following regression equation: 
= A2 (*,/?)«,. (A2.5) 
Hence, 8 can be estimated by regressing ln\i"t\ on InX-, using OLS. On the basis of this regression, one 
can easily determine V(y). 
Using this result, one can get attain asymptotic efficiency in estimation of a. The required procedure 
is to apply weighted least squares regression of yt onX,in eq (A2.2) with weights h(Xb p). 
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APPENDIX 3. INTERMEDIATE REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table A3.1. First stage of the estimates for labour supply: full income (1000 Rs) (1979-1984)' 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
(N=152) (N=124) 
coefficient standard error coefficient standard error 
adults 1.44429"* 0.29676 1.36881™ 0.15246 
cultivated area (ha) 1.74599'*' 0.39864 0.54152*" 0.14449 
cultivated area squared -0.07690"* 0.01940 -0.03795*" 0.00912 
land value (Rs/ha) 0.01118 0.02101 -0.01329 0.01288 
irrigated/total cultivated 4.04987* 2.39523 -2.20003 1.91236 
wage rate (Rs/day) 129.039"* 41.4762 25.6722*** 6.33100 
bullock price (Rs/day) -18.6070" 7.46423 -26.5866"* 6.14043 
inorganic nitrogen price (Rs/kg) -2.77527*** 1.05373 -0.56133*** 0.14742 
paddy price (Rs/kg) -18.9328 12.3122 
cotton price (Rs/kg) 0.38048 2.41314 
land ownership (ha) -0.43608 0.32376 0.40870 0.33363 
livestock (1000 Rs) 0.04687 0.10994 0.48271 0.43678 
liquid assets (1000 Rs) -0.12077 0.11054 0.10630 0.13051 
year -5.74112*** 2.03297 -4.04830*** 0.95546 
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.95 
Notes: a White/Heteroscedasticity corrected covariance matrices used. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Table A3.2. First stage of the estimates for labour use: share of irrigated area (1976-1984)' 
Aurepalle, N=240 
coefficient standard error 
share of owned area irrigated 0.67054""" 0.06749 
bullock owned (yes=l) 0.00329 0.00983 
previous-year share of cultivated area irrigated 0.07138 0.08619 
ln(wage rate) -0.01768 0.12946 
ln( bullock price) 0.11335 0.10388 
ln(nitrogen price) -0.06167 0.08539 
ln(castor price) -0.00181 0.03240 
ln(paddy price) -0.37362* 0.21353 
ln(greengram price) 0.05271" 0.02448 
ln(liquid assets) -0.00760 0.00989 
ln(land owned) -0.00374 0.00417 
ln(livestock) -0.00033 0.00287 
ln(adults) -0.00966 0.01916 
year 0.01292 0.02144 
dummy -0.04639 0.03093 
Adjusted R2 0.82 
Notes: a White/Heteroscedasticity corrected covariance matrices used. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table A3.3. First stage of the estimates for bullock use: ln(cultivated area) (1976-1984)° 
Kanzara 
(N=247) 
coefficient standard error 
ln(previous-year cultivated area) 0.26049*** 0.07967 
bullock owned (yes=l) 0.28595"* 0.09292 
irrigated area/total area -0.14458 0.25623 
ln(wage rate) -0.12214 0.53213 
ln( bullock price) -0.28007 0.40848 
ln(nitrogen price) 0.22908 0.28144 
ln(liquid assets) 0.03292 0.03412 
ln(land owned) 0.58438*** 0.11959 
ln(livestock) 0.03783" 0.01864 
ln(adults) 0.02489 0.08273 
year -0.01305 0.01960 
Adjusted R 2 0.90 
Notes: * White/Heteroscedasticity corrected covariance matrices used. Output prices are included in the 
regression but not presented in the table. 
, * and *" indicate significance at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Table A3.4. First stage of the estimates for harvest labour use: ln(output value) (1976-1984)° 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
(N=260) (N=271) 
coefficient standard error coefficient standard error 
ln(expected output) 0.78766*** 0.15658 0 .55973*" 0.11545 
ln(inherent riskiness (j)) 0.33449 0.52508 0.74473*" 0.23855 
ln(wage) 0.58384*** 0.16109 0.71812*** 0.21273 
ln(liquid assets) 0.04269 0.04438 0.00363 0.02995 
ln(land owned) 0.01755 0.03651 0.10949 0.11618 
ln(livestock) -0.01895 0.05409 -0.00551 0.02124 
ln(adults) 0.08400 0.12504 0.05975 0.10719 
ln(cottan price) -0.35203 0.21553 
ln(eastor price) 0.00995 0.29607 
ln(paddy price) 2.48331*** 0.69792 
ln(sorghum price) -0.36957 0.31325 0.22081 0.25150 
ln(greengram price) 0.10405 0.17552 - 0 . 4 5 2 3 2 " 0.18354 
year -0.11825*" 0.03076 0.08516"* 0.01946 
Adjusted R 2 0.86 0.90 
Notes: a White/Heteroscedasticity corrected covariance matrices used. 
, and "* indicate significance at the 0.10,0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table A3.5. First stage for crop income (1979-1984) 
Cultivated 
area (ha) 
(N=161) 
Aurepalle 
irrigated 
area/total area 
(N=58) 
Liquid assets 
(Rs) 
(N=161) 
Cultivated 
area (ha) 
(N=162) 
Kanzara 
irrigated 
area/total area 
(N=38) 
Liquid assets 
(Rs) 
(N=162) 
land owned (ha) 0.48145*** 0.00044 -1325.49*" 1.21254*" 0.07813 2264.18"" 
irrigated/total 
(0.11220) 
2.58643 
(0.01548) 
0 .93041*" 
(224.645) 
2619.47"* 
(0.19281) 
0.62144 
(0.02646) 
0.49986 
(508.337) 
2288.63 
bullocks 
(1.76600) 
0.37205** 
(0.21650) 
0.04377* 
(678.246) 
-222.202 
(0.94152) 
0.64460*** 
(0.10732) 
-0.02122 
(2482.34) 
-947.169* 
dairy animals 
(0.14488) 
0 2 2 5 2 9 * 
(0.02356) 
-0.01181 
(289.881) 
363.169 
(0.18616) 
0.28905 
(0.01098) 
-0.03749 
(490.807) 
-2679.40 " 
young cattle 
(0.12624) 
-0.00004 
(0.01609) 
0.00002 
(251.065) 
0.43703 
(0.22239) (0.01053) (586.338) 
previous-year 
(0.00030) 
0.00002 
(0.00004) 
0.00000 
(0.59876) 
0 .28791"* -0.00006** -0.00000** 0.25399"* 
liquid assets 
previous-year 
self-employment 
(0.00003) 
0.00000 
(0.00013) 
(0.00000) 
0.00000 
(0.00002) 
(0.05939) 
0.10663 
(0.26590) 
(0.00002) (0.000000) (0.07543) 
previous-year 
nonfarm wages 
previous-year 
regular wages 
previous- year 
transfers 
literate adults 
adults with sec. 
education 
women 25-44 yr 
men 45-54 yr 
0.00248 
(0.28970) 
-0.99948*** 
(0.35715) 
-0.07481 
(0.11424) 
0.19530 
(0.06199) 
-695.512 
(593.094) 
-100.615 
(710.447) 
adult men -0.30441 0.12556 -60.0115 
(0.29551) (0.10378) (580.050) 
adult women 0 .58695" -0.01668 1535.05*" 
(0.26225) (0.10752) (524.132) 
constant 0.09205 -0.12847 7910.44*"* 
(0.83551) (0.27821) (1675.96) 
Adjusted R 2 0.90 0.81 0.94 
-0.00018 
(0.00017) 
-0.00011 
(0.00013) 
0.00031 
(0.00022) 
-1 .22479" 
(0.48962) 
2.01957 * 
(0.91725) 
-0.27588 
(0.41146) 
0.56730 
(0.63623) 
0.42656 
(0.51994) 
0.67270 * 
(0.33411) 
-1.86654 
(1.61372) 
0.000575 
(0.00013) 
0.00002* 
(0.00001) 
-0.00000 
(0.00001) 
0.020511 
(0.04170) 
-0.01274 
(0.05735) 
0.19768 
(0.04912) 
-0.14590* 
(0.08340) 
-0.17973 
(0.04881) 
0.04862 
(0.02051) 
-0.44723 
(0.36972) 
-0.30345 
(0.44635) 
-0.01043 
(0.33838) 
-3.03425 
(0.58356) 
1573.68 
(1290.91) 
2631.86 
(2418.35) 
676.956 
(1084.84) 
2994.56* 
(1677.44) 
-1486.46 
(1370.83) 
2066.40 ' 
(880.897) 
-7845.91* 
(4254.63) 
0.96 0.98 0.90 
Notes: All monetary values are in 1983 prices. 
, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 4. BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR SIMULATIONS 
Table A4.1. Exogenous prices 
Aurepalle Kanzara 
male planting wage rate (Rs/hr) 0.50 0.80 
female planting wage rate (Rs/hr) 0.35 0.48 
male harvesting wage rate (Rs/hr) 0.45 0.85 
bullock price (Rs/hr) 1.30 2.22 
nitrogen price (Rs/kg) 5.90 6.50 
sorghum price (Rs/kg) 1.40 1.94 
greengram price (Rs/kg) 3.79 3.99 
castor price (Rs/kg) 3.46 
paddy price (Rs/kg) 1.42 
cotton price (Rs/kg) 5.40 
Table A4.2. First stage ) estimates of full Income for large Kanzara farmers (1979-1984) 
N=26 , full income in 1000 Rs coefficient standard error 
adults - 4 .65072" 1.77558 
cultivated area (ha) 0.20510 0.46609 
cultivated area squared 0 .04988" 0.01897 
land value (Rs/ha) 0.31340*" 0.05456 
irrigated/total cultivated -7.20550* 3.62529 
wage rate (Rs/hr) 2 2 8 . 7 5 6 " 80.4807 
bullock price (Rs/hr) 49.5394* 26.0649 
inorganic nitrogen price (Rs/kg) 8.54405*" 2.25583 
land ownership (1000 Rs) -0.00022*** 0.00001 
livestock (1000 Rs) 0.20433 0.24795 
liquid assets (1000 Rs) 0 .00022" 0.00001 
year -8.79358 6.35903 
Adjusted R 2 0.97 
Notes: White/Heteroscedasticity corrected covariance matrices used. 
All monetary values are in 1983 prices 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Table A4.3. Second stage estimates of labour supply for large Kanzara farmers (1979-1984) 
N=26, labour simply in hrs coefficient standard error 
full income (1000 Rs) 29.6169""* 6.67643 
liquid assets (1000 Rs) -3.38723 2.67190 
adults 198.108** 81.5344 
wage (Rs/hr) -2261.30** 845.269 
land ownership (1000 Rs) -0.00282" 0.00133 
livestock (1000 Rs) -14.6000 10.8357 
year 160.353*** 43.1540 
Adjusted R2 0V72 
Notes: White/Heteroscedasticity corrected covariance matrices used. 
All monetary values are in 1983 prices 
*, ** and '** indicate significance at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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SUMMARY 
Continuous efforts are needed to stimulate stagnating agriculture in India's SAT. SAT 
agriculture provides a livelihood for over 250 million Indians, and this number is 
continuously increasing. The nonprimary sectors currently support only a small share of the 
population, and growth is not fast enough to increase this share rapidly. Consequently, 
agriculture has to absorb the bulk of population growth. Three factors are important in this 
respect: the demand for labour in agriculture, the biophysical sustainability of agricultural 
production, and crop income earned by smallholder households. 
The major agricultural producers in India's SAT are smallholders who acquire a 
significant part of their income outside their own farms. Wage income from the daily labour 
market is the largest income source besides crop production. Other, less important, sources of 
off-farm income are the regular labour market, nonfarm self-employment, and remittances. 
Income from these sources may have a strong impact on agricultural production decisions in 
a risk-plagued environment like India's SAT. Off-farm activities are an important source of 
cash income, which can improve farm productivity if it is used to finance farm-input 
purchase or investment in agricultural assets. Moreover, off-farm income may help reduce the 
variance of overall household income and improve food security by allowing the household 
to buy food in cases of yield shortfalls. Households may then be able to increase the riskiness 
and profitability of their agricultural activities. 
The aim of the present study was to unravel the interactions between off-farm income 
and agricultural production in a high-risk environment. An analytical model was developed 
that brings to light the underlying decision processes of family labour supply and crop input 
use. Empirical estimates were used to test the relevance of the model and the impact of the 
different options and constraints. Moreover, the study determined the impact of off-farm 
income from different sources on income from crop production. 
Chapter 2 presents the data and the methodological framework used: farm household 
modelling. The study used data from two villages in India's SAT, which were collected by 
resident ICRISAT investigators during the period 1975-1984. The villages represent two 
distinct agro-ecological zones. Aurepalle is located in the drought-prone district of 
Mahbubnagar, while Kanzara is situated in rainfall-assured Akola. Both the average 
productivity and the stability of yields were lower in Aurepalle than in Kanzara. The Kanzara 
labour market was buoyant due to the favourable production environment and the presence of 
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a public-works scheme. In Aurepalle, labour markets were competitive during the cropping 
season, but there was high unemployment during the dry season. Farm households in both 
villages were plagued by production risk and had limited capacity to smooth consumption 
from year to year. 
While previous research has demonstrated that farm households use variation in 
family labour supply to smooth income, there is little evidence on the impact of the seasonal 
nature of agricultural production on farmers' labour supply. In Chapter 3 a two-stage farm-
household model is presented that provides insight into the seasonal determinants of labour 
supply under risk. A novel measure for production risk is used for the empirical analysis. 
This measure rnimics the information available to the farmer more closely than the 
commonly used historical variance. Moreover, the analysis does not require tedious 
estimation of production shocks. Estimates for two Indian villages confirmed the use of 
family labour for ex ante risk management as well as ex post risk coping. These results have 
important implications for research on the cost of income uncertainty for farm households, 
which currently focuses on asset accumulation. Moreover, interventions in labour markets 
can significantly improve the economic security of farm households. 
In order to absorb the increasing population of India's rural SAT, agricultural 
employment should expand continuously. Nonfarm employment policies are likely to affect 
agricultural employment, as the main agricultural employers, smallholders, are also important 
suppliers of market labour. These smallholders face high production risks and limited 
availability of credit. Wage income affects their capacity to cope with risk as well as their 
liquid asset holdings. Nevertheless, previous research has tended to ignore the interactions 
between wage income and farm labour use. Using the model presented in chapter 3, Chapter 
4 disentangles the ambiguous relations between risk, credit constraints, family labour and 
agricultural labour use. Empirical estimates for the two study villages show that, depending 
on the production environment, risk can increase as well as decrease labour use. However, 
there is no compelling evidence regarding short-term credit constraints. The estimates 
confirm the hypothesis that off-farm employment opportunities affect farm labour use, but 
the direction of the effect is ambiguous. 
The possibility to use public works to stimulate farmers' fertiliser use in India's SAT 
was examined in Chapter 5. Inadequate replenishment of removed nutrients and organic 
matter has reduced fertility and increased erosion rates. Fertiliser use, along with other 
complementary measures, can help reverse this process, which ultimately leads to poverty, 
hunger, and further environmental degradation. In a high-risk environment like India's SAT, 
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there may be a strong relation between off-farm income and smallholder fertiliser use. 
Farmers can use the main source of off-farm income, wage income, to manage risk as well as 
to finance inputs. Consequently, the introduction of public-works programmes in areas with 
high dry-season unemployment may affect fertiliser use. This study confirms the relevance of 
risk for decisions regarding fertiliser use in two Indian villages. Nevertheless, governments 
cannot use employment policies to stimulate fertiliser use. Public works even decreased 
fertiliser use in the setting of this study. 
A simple two-stage simulation model based on the analytical model and the 
regression results from chapters 3 to 5 is described in Chapter 6. The simulation model 
consists of a production function, an income equation, and reduced form equations for the use 
of all major inputs and household labour supply. The results indicate that the risk-
management strategies presented in Chapter 3 — ex ante risk management and ex post 
income smoothing through family labour supply — were effective in increasing minimum 
income. Much more important for income stability, however, was the flow of labour income 
that households earned independent of their risk preferences. The simulations also reveal that 
the impact of production risk on household income through changes in input use was small. 
Finally, harvest-wage variability due to yield covariance had little effect on household 
behaviour. 
Chapter 7 takes a slightly different perspective than the remainder of the study and 
considers the impact of off-farm income from different sources on net crop income. While at 
the aggregate level of the regional economy, rising farm income may (or may not) spur 
nonfarm activities, at the level of the household, rising nonfarm income may stimulate 
advances in agriculture. Off-farm income can decrease the variability of total income and 
increase household liquidity. This can result in an increase in agricultural productivity. 
However, off-farm activities may also decrease the amount of resources used in agriculture. 
Previous research has shown that the impact of off-farm income on crop production and 
income depends on the technological and market environment. Chapter 7 shows the impact of 
timing, productivity, and riskiness of off-farm income on crop income. As these factors vary 
between various streams of income, distinct off-farm income sources affect crop income 
differently. Nonfarm development appears to stimulate crop production if it renders 
employment at a return higher than the casual agricultural wage rate but does not become the 
farmers' main interest. 
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In Chapter 8, the findings of the different chapters are combined and put into the 
perspective of development theory. Together, the chapters give a comprehensive picture of 
the role of labour endowment and off-farm income in rural development in India's SAT. This 
picture demonstrates how governments can stimulate agricultural and rural development 
through labour market interventions. Government programmes increasing private nonfarm 
employment are likely to lead to an increase in agricultural income. Public-works 
programmes have a smaller impact on agricultural production than private nonfarm 
employment has. The availability of public-works programmes in areas with a relatively short 
cropping season and low dry-season employment induces farmers to use production 
technologies that they perceive as more risky. Paradoxically, the present study could not 
demonstrate that this would lead to a change in the level and variability of crop income. 
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
Bevordering van de stagnerende landbouw in India's semi-aride tropen (SAT) vergt 
voortdurende inspanning. SAT landbouw voorziet in het levensonderhoud van meer dan 250 
mitjoen Indiers en dit aantal stijgt voortdurend. Slechts een klein deel van de bevolking 
verdient zijn inkomen in niet-primaire sectoren en deze sectoren groeien niet snel genoeg om 
dit aandeel op körte termijn te doen toenemen. De landbouw moet dus een groot deel van de 
bevolkingsgroei opvangen. In deze context zijn drie factoren belangrijk: de vraag naar arbeid 
voor landbouw, de biofysische duurzaamheid van landbouwproductie en het 
akkerbouwinkomen van kleine boeren. 
Kleine boeren vormen de belangrijkste groep agrarische producenten in India's SAT. 
Deze boeren verdienen een aanzienlijk deel van hun inkomen buiten hun eigen bedrijf. 
Vooral arbeid als dagloner levert een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid inkomen. Andere, minder 
belangrijke bronnen van inkomsten zijn arbeid met een min of meer vast dienstverband, niet-
agrarische activiteiten in eigen beheer en geldoverdracht van familie en vrienden. Het 
inkomen uit deze bronnen kan een belangrijke invloed hebben op de agrarische productie in 
een risicovolle omgeving, zoals India's SAT. Activiteiten buiten het boerenbedrijf zijn een 
belangrijke bron van liquide middelen. Deze extra liquiditeit kan de landbouwproductiviteit 
verhogen als ze wordt gebruikt om gewasinputs te financieren of om te investeren in 
agrarische activa. Inkomen van buiten het boerenbedrijf kan bovendien de stabiliteit van het 
totale huishoudinkomen verhogen. Daarnaast kan dit inkomen de voedselzekerheid 
verbeteren, omdat het de mogelijkheid schept voedsel te kopen als de eigen oogst laag is. Dit 
alles zou huishoudens in Staat kunnen stellen het risico en de winstgevendheid van hun 
agrarische activiteiten te verhogen. 
Het doel van de huidige Studie was het analyseren van de interacties tussen inkomen 
van buiten het boerenbedrijf en agrarische productie in een omgeving met een hoog 
productierisico. Er wordt een analytisch model ontwikkeld dat de onderliggende 
beslissingsprocessen betreffende het aanbod van familie-arbeid en het gebruik van 
gewasinputs laat zien. De relevantie van het model en de invloed van verschillen 
mogelijkheden en beperkingen van het boerenhuishouden worden getest door middel van 
empirische schattingen. Bovendien wordt de specifieke invloed van verschillende 
inkomensbronnen buiten het boerenbedrijf op het gewasinkomen bepaald. 
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Hoofdsruk 2 presenteert de data en het gebruikte methodologische kader: modelering 
van agrarische huishoudens. Er worden data gebruikt uit twee dorpen in India's SAT tijdens 
de periode 1975-1984. De data zijn verzameld door onderzoekers van ICRISAT, die 
gedurende het onderzoek in de desbetreffende dorpen woonden. De dorpen 
vertegenwoordigen twee verschülende agro-ecologische zones. Aurepalle ligt in het 
droogtegevoelige district Mahbubnagar, Kanzara in het relatief regenrijke Akola. Zowel de 
gemiddelde productiviteit als de stabiliteit van de gewasproductie was lager in Aurepalle dan 
in Kanzara. Dankzij de gunstige productieomstandigheden en de aanwezigheid van openbare 
werken was de werkloosheid laag in Kanzara. De arbeidsmarkt in Aurepalle was 
concurrerend tijdens het productieseizoen, maar er was hoge werkloosheid tijdens de droge 
tijd. Boerenhuishoudens in beide dorpen werden geplaagd door productierisico's en konden 
de verschillen in jaarinkomen die hierdoor ontstonden maar ten dele compenseren door 
bijvoorbeeld te lenen of het eigen vermögen te variSren. 
Eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat boerenhuishoudens variatie in gewerkte uren 
gebruiken om hun inkomen te stabliseren. Er is echter weinig bewijs van de invloed van het 
seizoensmatige karakter van landbouwproductie op het arbeidsaanbod van boerenhuis-
houdens. In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt een tweefase landbouwhuishoudmodel ontwikkeld. Dit 
model verschaft inzicht in de seizoensafhankelijke factoren die bepalend zijn voor het 
arbeidsaanbod in een omgeving met een hoog productierisico. In de empirische analyse wordt 
gebruikt gemaakt van een nieuwe maat voor productierisico. Deze maat benadert het risico 
zoals de boer dat ervaart beter dan de meestal gebruikte historische variantie. Bovendien 
vereist de empirische analyse geen schatting van de productieschok. De resultaten voor de 
twee Indiase dorpen laten zien dat de boeren familiearbeid gebruikten voor zowel ex ante 
risicomanagement als ex post risicobeheersing. Dit resultaat heeft belangrijke gevolgen voor 
onderzoek naar de kosten van inkomensonzekerheid voor boerenhuishoudens, dat zieh 
momenteel rieht op de accumulatie van bezit. Bovendien laat deze studie zien dat 
arbeidsmarktinterventies de economische zekerheid van boerenhuishoudens significant 
kunnen verbeteren. 
Agrarische werkgelegenheid zou continu moeten groeien om de groeiende bevolking 
van India's rurale SAT op te vangen. De belangrijkste agrarische werkgevers, kleine boeren, 
zijn ook de belangrijkste aanbieders op de arbeidsmarkt. Deze kleine boeren worden 
geconfronteerd met hoge productierisico's en een beperkte beschikbaarheid van krediet. 
Arbeidsloon bemvloedt zowel hun mogelijkheden om met risico om te gaan als hun liquide 
middelen. Dit betekent dat niet-agrarische werkgelegenheidsbeleid naar alle 
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waarschijnlijkheid de agrarische werkgelegenheid be'invloedt. Desondanks laat het meeste 
onderzoek de interacties tussen arbeidsloon en het gebruik van arbeid in de gewasproductie 
buiten beschouwing. In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt de tweeslachtige relatie tussen risico, 
kredietbeperkingen, famiUearbeid en agrarisch arbeidsgebruik geanalyseerd. Dit gebeurt aan 
de hand van het model van Hoofdstuk 3. Empirische schattingen voor de twee studiedorpen 
laten zden aan dat, afhankelijk van de productieomgeving, risico tot een toe- of een afhame 
van het gebruik van arbeid leidt. Er is echter geen overtuigend bewijs voor een beperkte 
beschikbaarheid van kort krediet. De schattingen bevestigen de hypothese dat 
werkgelegenheid buiten het eigen bedrijf het agrarische arbeidsgebruik beinvloedt, maar de 
richting van het effect is hangt af van de locale omstandigheden. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt de mogelijkheid onderzocht om het kunstmestgebruik van 
boeren in India's SAT te stimuleren met openbare werken. Onvoldoende aanvulling van 
nutriSnten en organisch materiaal heeft geleid tot erosie en een afhame van de 
bodemvruchtbaarheid. Kunstmestgebruik kan, in combinatie met andere maatregelen, leiden 
tot een omkering van dit proces, dat uiteindelijk leidt tot armoede, honger en verdere 
degradatie van het milieu. In een risicovolle omgeving, zoals India's SAT, kan inkomen van 
buiten het boerenbedrijf een grote invloed hebben op het gebruik van kunstmest. Kleine 
boeren kunnen de belangrijkste bron van niet-landbouwinkomen, de arbeidsmarkt, gebruiken 
voor zowel risicomanagement als mputfinanciering. De introductie van openbare werken in 
de droge tijd kan derhalve het kunstmestgebruik bemvloeden in gebieden met een hoge 
seizoenswerkloosheid. De huidige Studie toont aan dat risico invloed hed op de beslissingen 
betreffende kunstmestgebruik in de twee bestudeerde dorpen. Desondanks kan 
werkgelegenheids-beleid niet worden aangewend om het kunstmestgebruik te stimuleren. 
Onder de onderzochte omstandigheden leiden publieke werken zelfs tot een lager 
kunstmestgebruik. 
Hoofdstuk 6 bescbrijft een eenvoudig tweefase simulatiemodel gebaseerd op het 
analytische model uit Hoofdstuk 3 en de regressieresultaten van Hoofdstuk 3 tot en met 5. 
Het simulatiemodel bestaat uit een productiefunctie, een inkomensvergelijking en herleide-
vormvergelijkingen voor het gebruik van alle belangrijke inputs en het arbeidsaanbod van het 
boerengezin. Simulaties met dit model laten zien dat de risicomanagementstrategieen zoals 
gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 3 —ex ante risicomanagement en ex post risicobeheersing door 
familiearbeiö1— effectief waren in het verhogen van het nnnimunhnkomen. Veel belangrijker 
voor inkomensstabihteit was echter het arbeidsinkomen dat huishoudens verdienden 
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onafhankelijk van hun risicovoorkeuren. De simulaties laten bovendien zien dat de invloed 
van productierisico op huishoudinkomen door verandering in inputgebruik klein was. 
Tenslotte hadden onverwachte variaties in de loonvoet tijdens het oogstseizoen nauwelijks 
invloed op het gedrag van de huishoudens. 
In Hoofdstuk 7 wordt uitgegaan uit van een iets ander perspectief dan de rest van de 
Studie. De invloed van inkomen van verschillende bronnen buiten het boerenbedrijf op het 
netto gewasinkomen wordt geanalyseerd. Op geaggregeerd niveau kan extra agrarisch 
inkomen leiden tot een toename van de niet-agrarische activiteiten in de regio. Daarentegen 
kan op huishoudniveau een toename van het inkomen van buiten het eigen bedrijf de 
agrarische productie stimuleren. Inkomen van buiten de landbouw kan echter ook een daling 
veroorzaken van het gebruik van hulpbronnen in de landbouw. Eerder onderzoek heeft 
aangetoond dat de invloed van niet-akkerbouwinkomen op gewasproductie en -inkomen 
afhangt van de technologische en marktomgeving waarin de boer opereert. Hoofdstuk 7 laat 
de invloed van timing, productiviteit en risico van niet-gewasinkomen op gewasinkomen 
zien. Omdat deze factoren varieren tussen de verschillende inkomensstromen, hebben 
verschillende bronnen van niet-gewasinkomen een verschillend effect op gewasinkomen. 
Niet-agrarische ontwikkeling blijkt gewasproductie te stimuleren als het voorziet in 
werkgelegenheid met een hogere opbrengst dan het agrarische dagloon, onder voorbehoud 
dat de boer akkerbouw als zijn hoofdactiviteit blijft zien. 
In Hoofdstuk 8 worden de bevindingen van de verschillende hoofdstukken 
gecombineerd en worden ze geplaatst in het perspectief van ontwikkelingstheorie. Tezamen 
geven de hoofdstukken een uitgebreid beeld van de rol van familearbeid en inkomen van 
buiten het boerenbedrijf in de ontwikkeling van India's SAT. Dit beeld laat zien hoe via 
arbeidsmarktinterventies de landbouw en de ontwikkeling van het platteland gestimuleerd 
kunnen worden. Het stimuleren van private niet-agrarische werkgelegenheid zal in veel 
gevallen leiden tot een toename van het gewasinkomen. Openbare werken hebben een 
kleinere invloed op de landbouw dan private niet-agrarische werkgelegenheid. In gebieden 
met een kort groeiseizoen en läge werkgelegenheid gedurende het droge seizoen, zullen 
boeren na de introductie van openbare werken overgaan op technieken die zij als meer 
risicovol ervaren. Vreemd genoeg kan de huidige Studie niet bewijzen dat een dergeüjke 
gedragswijziging ook werkelijk invloed heeft op het niveau en de variabiliteit van het 
landbouwinkomen. 
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